UNIVERSITY  OF  CA  RIVERSIDE^LIBRARY 


3  1210  01959  7739 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 


GIFT  OF 

Mrs.  Robert  C.  Cotton 


Publications  of  the 
Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace 

Division  of  International  Law 
Washington 


THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE 


The  European  Background  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine 


,  BY 

W.'  p.  CRESSON,  Ph.  D. 

Formerly  Secretary  of  the  American  Embassy  in  Petrograd 


NEW  YORK 
OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

AMERICAN  BRANCH,  35  WEST  32d  STREET 
LONDON,  TORONTO,  MELBOURNE,  AND  BOMBAY 

1922 


L' 


C7^/ 


COPYRIGHT    1922 

BY  THE 

CARNEGIE    ENDOWMENT    FOR    INTERNATIONAL    PEACE 


GIBSON  BROS.,  INC.,  PRINTERS     WASHINGTON 


FOREWORD 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  in  a  few  months  will  celebrate 
its  hundredth  anniversary,  is  one  of  the  few  foreign  policies 
advanced  by  any  one  of  the  nations  taking  part  in  the  World 
War  which  bids  fair  to  survive  that  great  catastrophe.  While 
the  American  and  British  phases  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  are 
familiar  to  students  of  diplomatic  history,  the  materials  have 
hitherto  been  lacking  for  an  adequate  appreciation  of  the  rela- 
tions between  President  Monroe  and  John  Quincy  Adams,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  Tsar,  Alexander,  on  the  other,  against  whose 
Holy  Alliance  President  Monroe's  message  of  1823  was  chiefly 
directed. 

Mr.  Cresson  has  laid  students  of  history,  and  more  especially 
of  international  organization,  under  a  deep  and  abiding  obliga- 
tion by  his  researches  in  the  archives  of  the  Russian  Foreign 
Office  immediately  following  the  Revolution  of  Pvlarch,  1917. 
He  was  Secretary  of  the  American  Embassy  at  Petrograd  at 
the  time  when  Professor  F.  A.  Colder  was  preparing  his  inval- 
uable list  of  documents  in  the  Imperial  archives  relating  to  Amer- 
ica, and,  knowing  Mr.  Cresson's  interest  in  the  history  of  Russian- 
American  relations,  the  authorities  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment invited  him  also  to  examine  the  Imperial  archives.  Mr. 
Cresson's  work  more  especially  related  to  the  personal  dispatches 
of  the  Tsar,  Alexander,  and  the  memoranda  in  his  private 
diplomatic  papers,  which  had  never  before  been  open  to  stu- 
dents. 

In  the  midst  of  these  labors,  Mr.  Cresson  put  aside  the  more 
leisurely  task  of  writing  history  for  the  more  arduous  task  of 
observing  history  in  the  making.  He  resigned  from  the  diplo- 
matic service,  entered  the  army,  served  with  the  American  Expe- 
ditionary Forces,  and  ended  the  war  as  Chief  of  the  American 
Military  Mission  at  Belgian  Headquarters  in  Flanders.  Upon 
his  demobilization  he  resumed  his  interrupted  task,  and  he  has 
recently  been  able  to  bring  his  work  to  a  conclusion  by  researches 
in  the  archives  of  the  Department  of  State.  While  Mr.  Cres- 
son's work  is  complementary  to  the  labors  of  others  in  the  same 
field,  it  covers — as  its  title  implies — negotiations  carried  on  in  St. 


VI  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE 

Petersburg  and  Washington,  which  form  the  European  back- 
ground of  this  American  doctrine. 

The  value  of  the  httle  work  is  out  of  all  proportion  to  its  size. 
It  makes  clear  the  aim  and  purpose  of  the  Tsar,  Alexander,  in 
forcing  the  Holy  Alliance  upon  his  unwilling  confederates,  it 
shows  the  relation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  Holy  Alliance, 
and  it  enables  the  unprejudiced  reader  of  the  Old  as  well  as  the 
New  World  the  better  to  understand  both. 

It  is  to  the  credit  of  our  common  humanity  that  at  the  end  of 
the  greatest  of  wars  attempts  have  been  made  to  devise  some 
scheme  whereby  a  recourse  to  arms  might  be  less  likely  to  occur, 
if  it  could  not  be  wholly  avoided.  The  Thirty  Years'  War  is 
responsible  for  the  Nouveaii  Cynee  of  Emeric  Cruce,  the  Law  of 
War  and  Peace  of  Hugo  Grotius,  not  to  speak  of  the  Great  De- 
sign which  Sully  foisted  upon  his  master,  the  good  King  Henry 
IV.  The  wars  of  Europe  culminating  in  the  wars  of  the  Spanish 
Succession  and  ended  by  the  Treaties  of  Utrecht  (1713-14)  and 
of  Rastadt  (1714)  produced  the  Project  of  Perpetual  Peace  of 
the  Abbe  de  Saint-Pierre.  The  wars  of  the  French  Revolution 
following  these  at  the  space  of  a  century  gave  birth  to  the  Holy 
Alliance.  The  World  War,  a  hundred  years  later,  has  brought 
forth  a  League  of  Nations,  conceived  in  the  same  generous  spirit. 

Will  history  repeat  itself?     History  alone  can  tell. 

James  Brown  Scott, 

Director. 
Washington,  D.  C, 
July  14,  1922. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The  author  desires  to  express  his  thanks  to  the  following  gen- 
tlemen for  their  aid  and  criticism:  Professor  John  Bassett  Moore 
and  Doctor  Julius  Goebel  of  Columbia  University;  Professor 
F.  A.  Golder,  under  whose  expert  guidance  he  carried  on  his  re- 
searches at  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs;  Doctor 
James  Brown  Scott,  Secretary  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for 
International  Peace;  and  Mr.  Raymond  Buell  of  Princeton  Uni- 
versity. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction 1 

Chapter  I. — The  Reception  of  the  Holy  Alliance 37 

Chapter  II. — The    Early    Policy   of  the    Holy   Alliance:   The 

American  Monarchy 55 

Chapter  III. — The  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle 69 

Chapter  IV. — The    United    States    and    the    Political    Recon- 
struction of  Europe,  1815-1820 83 

Chapter  V. — The  Era  of  International  Congress 95 

Chapter  VI, — Europe  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 113 

Appendix  I. — Territorial  Guarantees  at  the  Congress  of  Aix-la- 
Chapelle,  1818 133 

Appendix  IL — Vv^orld   Revolution  after  the  Napoleonic  Wars: 

Troppau 13j 

Bibliography 139 

Index 1^3 


INTRODUCTION 

Within  a  few  months  will  occur  the  one  hundredth  anniversary 
of  the  reading  of  President  Monroe's  Seventh  Annual  Message 
to  Congress.  The  three  great  Continental  Powers  to  which  its 
warnings  were  chiefly  directed  are  today  prostrate  as  the  result 
of  the  World  War.  Yet  the  principles  it  defined  have  continued 
to  furnish  the  basis  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States. 
Morever,  the  eclipse  of  Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria  has  but  re- 
sulted in  a  renewal  of  the  fundamental  problem  which  confronted 
the  diplomatists  and  statesmen  of  the  Republic  in  1823 — a  prob- 
lem which  in  the  words  of  Monroe  regards  essentially  "the  condi- 
tion of  the  civilized  world  and  its  bearing  on  us." 

The  international  questions  which  the  trained  diplomacy  of 
Monroe  and  Adams  was  called  upon  to  meet  and  decide  a  cen- 
tury ago  were  similar  in  a  remarkable  degree  to  those  of  the  pres- 
ent day.  Again  the  measure  to  be  arrived  at  is :  How  far  the  con- 
ditions of  the  international  situation  justify  the  United  States  in 
departing  from  a  system  of  isolation  imposed  by  geographical 
conditions  and  a  generally  accepted,  time-honored  policy?  How 
far  may  we  abandon  the  restraints  of  this  safeguarding  principle, 
and  at  the  earnest  solicitation  of  friendly  nations  bear  a  part  in 
agreements  intended  to  maintain  the  general  peace?  At  such  a 
moment  as  the  present  one,  to  use  once  more  the  language  of 
Monroe,  "a  precise  knowledge  of  our  relations  with  foreign 
powers  as  respects  our  negotiations  and  transactions  with  each" 
is  indeed  "particularly  necessary." 

The  trend  of  American  diplomacy  towards  a  return  to  the 
"traditional  prejudice"  in  favor  of  an  American  system  apart 
from  the  affairs  of  Europe,  has  offered  one  of  the  chief  problems 
confronting  the  statesmen  of  the  Allied  Powers  since  the  close  of 
the  War.  It  is  the  author's  belief  that  in  the  light  of  a  renewed 
study  of  the  events  which  led  to  the  declarations  of  the  Monroe 
manifesto,  the  motives  underlying  recent  policy  tend  to  justify 
themselves  as  the  continuing  result  of  historical  experience.  Ex- 
amination of  the  archives  of  the  Department  of  State  and  docu- 
ments which  have  but  recently  become  available  in  the  Imperial 
Archives  of  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  prove  the 


2  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

similarity  of  earlier  negotiations  to  those  of  the  present  day- 
Yet  the  story  of  the  attempts  made  by  the  statesmen  of  Europe  to 
detach  the  United  States  from  their  traditional  policy  (notably 
the  efforts  of  the  Tsar  Idealist,  Alexander  I,  to  induce  the  govern- 
ment in  Washington  to  accede  to  the  pact  of  the  Holy  Alliance) 
forms  an  almost  forgotten  chapter  of  American  diplomatic  his- 
tory. 

A  misunderstanding  of  the  policies  in  opposition  to  which  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  formulated  has  frequently  arisen  from  a 
failure  to  apprehend  the  nature  of  the  strange  pact  known  as  the 
"Holy  Alliance"  or  to  establish  its  true  relation  to  the  series  of 
treaties  known  as  the  "System  of  1815."  The  latter  formed 
the  basis  of  the  diplomatic  reconstruction  of  Europe  after  the 
Napoleonic  wars.  The  "Holy  Alliance,"  or  "Holy  League," 
was,  in  its  inception,  an  expression  of  the  highly  idealistic  personal 
policy  of  a  single  powerful  sovereign,  the  Tsar  Alexander  I  of 
Russia.  Of  its  three  signers  the  Tsar,  and  the  Tsar  alone,  affixed 
his  seal  without  mental  reservations  concerning  the  principles  It 
invoked.  The  System  of  1815  resulted  from  a  long  series  of 
debated  agreements,  beginning  with  the  politico-military  pacts 
of  Toeplltz,  Reichenbach  and  Chaumont,  continued  by  the  two 
Treaties  of  Paris  and  the  Acts  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  The 
Tsar's  "League  of  Peace"  was  suddenly  imposed  upon  his  allies 
at  a  time  when  the  prestige  of  his  military  power  was  essential 
to  their  cause;  when  to  do  otherwise  than  humor  his  doctrinaire 
theories  of  International  solidarity  might  have  resulted  In  a  seri- 
ous breach  In  the  ranks  of  the  Grand  Alliance. 

In  the  perspective  of  history,  the  Internationalist  aspirations 
and  purposes  of  the  Russian  autocrat  may  be  viewed  in  their  true 
sense  and  value.  His  contemporaries,  however,  may  well  be  par- 
doned for  considering  his  policies  as  contradictory  and  Irrecon- 
cilable. Metternich  and  the  reactionary  statesmen  of  his  school 
saw  in  Alexander  a  dangerous  dreamer,  a  "crowned  Jacobin"  at 
almost  the  same  time  that  Canning  and  Monroe  were  uniting  the 
policies  of  the  "Constitutional  Powers"  to  protect  the  principles 
of  free  government  from  the  Interventions  he  set  on  foot  In  the 
interests  of  monarchical  legitimacy  ab  antiquo.  But  In  order  to 
understand  the  Tsar's  conception  of  his  own  diplomacy,  a  brief 
biographical  study  of  the  varied  personal  Influences  and  relation- 


INTRODUCTION  5 

ships  which  accompanied  the  changing  phases  of  his  political 
beliefs  becomes  essential. 

Alexander  was  born  in  St.  Petersburg  on  December  12,  1777. 
His  celebrated  grandmother,  the  Empress  Catherine,  undertook 
the  entire  direction  of  his  early  education,  to  the  exclusion  of  his 
father,  the  morose  and  unpopular  Tsarevltch  Paul.  With  his 
brother,  the  Grand  Duke  Constantlne,  his  studies  were  regulated 
by  an  elaborate  plan,  drawn  up  by  the  great  Tsarina  herself  after 
a  long  correspondence  with  the  philosophers  Grimm  and  Diderot 
in  Paris.  It  seems  to  have  been  the  deliberate  intention  of  this 
remarkable  woman  to  make  the  young  heir  of  the  Romanovs — If 
not  a  prodigy  of  learning  ^ — at  least  a  well  educated  man,  an 
attainment  far  above  the  level  of  the  court  circles  surrounding 
him!  That  this  intention  was  even  in  a  measure  carried  out 
was  largely  due  to  her  fortunate  choice  of  a  tutor  for  the  little 
princes  in  the  person  of  a  French  Swiss  scholar,  Frederick  Cesar 
Laharpe,  whom  she  found  was  occupying  a  subordinate  position 
in  the  household  of  a  brother  of  the  reigning  favorite.  Count 
Landskoi.^ 

Laharpe  was  at  this  time  thirty  years  old.  He  was  an  avowed 
republican,  strongly  influenced  by  Voltaire  in  his  youth,  and  later 
an  enthusiastic  disciple  of  Rousseau.  Strangely  enough,  none  of 
these  qualities  were  likely  at  this  time  to  Injure  his  prestige  in  the 
eyes  of  the  autocratic  Catherine.  When,  at  a  later  date,  the 
excesses  of  the  French  Revolution  had  disillusioned  the  Empress, 
her  fashionable  approval  of  liberalism  (which  she  shared  with 
the  aristocratic  salons  of  Paris)  changed  to  a  violent  hatred  of 
all  that  recalled  the  doctrines  of  Jacobinism.  Until  1789,  how- 
ever, she  saw  no  contradiction  in  choosing,  for  the  important 
position  of  tutor  to  the  heir  of  the  absolute  Tsars,  a  man  of 
Laharpe's  ultra-liberal  convictions.^ 

From  the  beginning  of  their  Intimate  relationship,  the  young 
master  and  his  pupils  appear  to  have  been  charmed  with  each 

'  Rain,  Un  Tsar  idealogue  Alexandre  I^,  pp.  7  et  seq. 

'  For  a  vivid  picture  of  the  dissolute  court  which  surrounded  the  youth  of  Alex- 
ander, notably  tlie  regime  of  Catherine's  ignoble  "favorites,"  see  The  Diaries  and 
Correspondence  of  the  Earl  of  Malmesbury. 

^Rain,  op.  cit.,  pp.  16-19.  Laharpe  must  not  be  confused  with  the  critic  Jean  Fran- 
cois de  Le  Harpe  (1739-1803),  whose  Correspondence  ivith  the  Grand  Duke  of  Riis- 
sia,  noiv  Emperor  (the  Emperor  Paul),  was  published  in  five  tedious  volumes  in 
1801.  This  work,  generally  concerned  with  the  petty  jealousies  of  the  French 
literary  world,  was  probably  addressed  to  Paul  in  a  spirit  of  pure  snobisme. 


4  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Other.  Laharpe,  filled  with  youthful  enthusiasm  for  his  task, 
recognized  its  importance  and  the  responsibility  it  entailed.  In 
order  to  fulfil  his  mission  to  the  best  advantage,  he  soon  obtained 
entire  direction  of  all  matters  touching  the  education  of  the  young 
Grand  Dukes.  History  and  a  philosophical  interpretation  of  the 
events  it  records  was  a  favorite  method  of  study  for  both  the 
republican  teacher  and  his  imperial  charges. 

Besides  Laharpe,  several  other  foreign  "governors"  and  teach- 
ers were  attached  to  their  household.  Kraft  taught  them  experi- 
mental physics  and  "science."  Pallas  taught  them  botany  and 
took  them  on  long  excursions  near  Pavlovsk.  Masson  taught 
them  mathematics.  But  regarding  matters  essentially  Russian, 
Catherine  wisely  insisted  that  her  grandchildren  should  remain 
under  the  control  of  their  own  compatriots.  Muraviev  taught 
them  Russian  history  and  "moral  philosophy,"  while  their  reli- 
gious education  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  their  confessor,  Father 
Andrew  Samborski.  Alexander's  devotion  as  a  pupil  foreshad- 
owed the  generally  "suggestionable"  character  which  he  devel- 
oped in  after  life.  His  teachers  not  only  found  him  a  diligent 
student — a  great  contrast  to  his  brother  Constantine — but  he 
also  appears  to  have  become  ardently  attached  to  all  those  who 
could  satisfy  his  precocious  curiosity.^ 

In  1791,  when  Alexander  was  barely  fourteen,  the  Empress 
Catherine  decided  upon  his  marriage.  Besides  the  importance 
of  assuring  the  succession  In  direct  line,  she  Impatiently  awaited 
the  moment  when  it  would  be  possible  to  give  the  Grand  Duke 
a  separate  court  and  household,  thus  increasing  his  prestige  at  the 
expense  of  the  Tsarevltch,  his  father.  Catherine's  choice  fell 
upon  the  Princess  Louisa  Augusta,  the  third  daughter  of  the 
reigning  Grand  Duke  of  Baden.  The  princess  and  her  sister 
were  subsequently  invited  to  visit  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg, 
where  the  docile  Alexander  promptly  fell  in  love,  with  a  sincerity 
which  at  least  did  honor  to  his  grandmother's  perspicacity. ^ 

Alexander's  marriage,  which  took  place  September  25,  1793, 
at  first  scarcely  Interrupted  Laharpe's  philosophic  discourses.^ 

'  Bogflanovitch,  Alexander  I,  p.  16. 

^The  story  of  this  imperial  idyl  is  charmingly  told  in  Elizabeth's  own  letters. 
See  Les  Lettres  de  I'Imperatrice  Elizabeth,  published  with  an  introduction  by  Grand 
Due  Nicolas  Mikhailowitch. 

^Czartoryski,  Memoires,  vol   I,  p.  53. 


INTRODUCTION  D 

But  In  1794,  the  year  of  Thermidor,  the  young  teacher's  Jaco- 
binism began  to  offend  the  Tsarina,  and  his  dismissal  was  suddenly 
signified  to  him  "without  rank  or  cross"  ^  or  any  of  the  distinc- 
tions usually  accorded  a  royal  tutor  who  had  completed  his  task. 
Probably,  through  the  Intervention  of  his  pupil,  he  obtained  a 
postponement  of  his  enforced  departure.  He  used  the  oppor- 
tunity which  this  unexpected  delay  afforded  him  to  complete  his 
work.  Impressing  upon  the  receptive  mind  of  Alexander  the  les- 
sons of  democracy  and  liberalism  which  had  already  fired  the 
imagination  of  the  future  autocrat.  The  Grand  Duke  had  now 
become  a  disciple  rather  than  a  pupil.  Laharpe  alone  could  in- 
fluence the  curious  blending  of  gentleness  and  stubborn  determi- 
nation which,  even  at  this  early  age,  formed  the  basis  of  Alexan- 
der's character. 

The  moment  of  separation  arrived  May  9,  1795.  Alexander's 
grief  and  resentment  at  the  departure  of  his  friend  and  preceptor 
was  manifested  publicly  and  without  reserve.  Czartoryski  In  his 
Memoires  records  that  "he  was  heard  to  declare  himself  with  un- 
measured harshness  respecting  his  grandmother's  actions,  using 
terms  of  almost  inconceivable  abuse."  ^  The  sincerity  and  con- 
stancy of  this  ideal  friendship  was  only  proved  by  time.  Laharpe 
left  behind  him  directions  for  the  guidance  of  his  pupil,  which 
specified  In  detail  remedies  for  the  faults  which  his  Interrupted 
education  might  develop.  In  these  Instructions  he  advised  Alex- 
ander to  overcome  his  natural  timidity  and  to  mingle  as  often  as 
possible  with  his  future  subjects.  Only  thus,  he  declared,  could 
the  Grand  Duke  hope  to  win  their  love  and  devotion.  That  his 
misgivings  were  not  without  cause  Is  shown  by  the  sequel. 

Catherine  died  suddenly  In  1796,  and  was  succeeded  by  the 
Tsarevltch,  whose  chief  ambition  was  to  make  the  heir  of  the 
Romanovs  a  soldier.  In  the  company  of  the  young  garrison 
blades  who  now  surrounded  him,  Alexander  lost  sight  not  only  of 
his  earlier  Ideals,  but  also  of  all  that  could  remind  him  of  the 
teachings  of  Laharpe.  His  friend  Czartoryski  recounts  the  ef- 
forts he  made  at  this  time  to  surround  the  Grand  Duke  with  more 
sympathetic  and  profitable  influences.     With  this  unselfish  end  in 

^  Rain,  op.  cit.,  p.  42,  quoting  the  proceedings  of  the  Society  Imperiale  de  I'Histoire 
Russe,  vol.  V,  remarks  on  Laharpe's  unrepublican  indignation  at  this  slight. 
^Czartoryski,  Memoires,  vol.  I,  p.  111. 


6  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

view,  he  asked  leave  to  present  to  his  patron  two  young  men, 
Novosiltzov  and  Count  Stroganov.  In  this  fashion  the  nucleus 
of  what  became  known  as  the  "Young  Liberal  Circle"  was  intro- 
duced to  the  Tsarevitch  during  the  Emperor  Paul's  coronation 
at  Moscow.  These  new  friendships  deserve  more  than  passing 
notice  in  considering  the  development  of  Alexander's  character. 

Novosiltzov,  somewhat  pedantic  and  overconscious  of  the 
advantages  of  this  new  connection,  soon  "prepared  in  Russian  the 
translation  of  a  French  work  filled  with  good  advice  for  a  young 
Prince  about  to  mount  the  throne."  This  was  read  by  Alexan- 
der with  characteristic  "attention  and  satisfaction."  Under 
these  new  influences,  Czartoryski  ^  notes  with  approval  that  "the 
philosophic  and  idealistic  side  of  the  Tsarevitch's  character 
quickly  recovered  its  ascendancy."  These  new  friendships 
brought  him  into  renewed  contact  with  the  political  philosophy 
of  the  French  Revolution.  Stroganov,  a  pupil  of  the  philosopher 
Rom  and  a  disciple  of  Rousseau,  had  visited  Paris  during  the 
Terror  and  listened  to  the  dangerous  eloquence  of  the  Jacobin 
clubs.  Novosiltzov,  sent  to  Paris  by  the  elder  Count  Stroganov 
to  rescue  the  aristocratic  young  liberal  from  this  dangerous  at- 
mosphere, had  himself  become  infected  with  the  doctrine  of 
"liberty  and  equality."  He  returned  to  Russia  almost  as  great  a 
revolutionary  as  his  ward.  Thus,  in  the  company  of  these  more 
traveled  compatriots,  Alexander  heard  reechoed  the  lessons  of 
Laharpe — and  the  voice  of  the  spirit  of  liberty. 

The  influence  of  these  friendships  was  to  become  the  determin- 
ing factor  of  the  "liberal  phase"  which  marked  Alexander's  early 
career.  The  Young  Liberal  Circle,  as  they  were  called,  planned 
a  campaign  of  propaganda  to  educate  public  opinion.  Suitable 
books  were  to  be  translated  into  Russian,  but  at  first  only  those 
for  which  oflicial  approval  could  be  obtained.  It  was  hoped 
that  the  minds  of  Alexander's  future  subjects  would  thus,  by  slow 
degrees,  be  prepared  for  the  measures  of  reform  to  which  he 
already  looked  forward  as  the  glory  of  his  coming  reign.  "How 
happy  I  could  be  were  you  only  by  my  side  at  this  moment,"  he 
writes  to  his  old  master.  And  Laharpe,  filled  with  honest  pride 
at  his  own  part  In  the  education  of  so  generous  a  prince,  wrote  In 

'  Czartoryski,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  156-157. 


INTRODUCTION  7 

reply  long  letters  from  his  quiet  retreat  in  Switzerland.  But  the 
classical  maxims  and  sage  advice  of  a  confirmed  doctrinaire  of 
the  republican  era  were  unequal  to  the  task  of  guiding  his  disciple 
through  the  fast  approaching  crisis  of  his  father's  reign. 

While  the  Tsarevitch  and  his  companions  were  busying  them- 
selves with  their  philosophical  program  of  internal  reform,  im- 
pending events  were  to  bring  him  face  to  face  with  the  stern 
realities  that  beset  a  ruler.  A  palace  revolution — a  sudden, 
fierce  reversion  to  the  customs  of  the  Byzantine  court  on  which 
the  early  Tsars  had  modeled  their  own — ^was  suddenly  to  clear 
the  way  to  Alexander's  throne  and  to  place  him  face  to  face  with 
problems  whose  theoretical  solution  had  amused  his  leisure. 
The  part  which  he  played  in  the  preparation  of  the  plot  which 
ended  in  his  father's  assassination  has  been  the  subject  of  long 
and  bitter  controversy.  Of  a  guilty  foreknowledge  of  this  tragic 
event,  history  has,  on  the  whole,  absolved  him.^ 

The  impression  which  Paul's  character  and  the  circumstances 
of  his  death  left  upon  Alexander  during  the  brief  period  of  their 
relationship  as  sovereign  and  subject  must  be  noted  in  consider- 
ing the  development  of  the  character  of  the  future  author  of  the 
"Holy  Alliance."  ^  In  spite  of  a  striking  physical  dissimilarity, 
there  was  a  curious  resemblance  between  the  two  autocrats,  father 
and  son.^  In  both  Tsars  we  find  the  same  tendency  to  generous 
Impulse  marred  by  an  almost  morbid  egotism;  the  same  restless 
zeal  for  governmental  reform  accompanied  by  an  equal  disre- 
gard of  the  prejudices  of  those  most  likely  to  profit  by  their  acts. 
Finally,   a  wholly  false  conception  of  the  historical  task  of  a 

'  Joyneville,  in  his  Life  and  Times  of  Alexander  I,  analyzes  Alexander's  responsi- 
bility for  his  father's  death  in  the  light  of  the  Memoirs  of  Mme.  Svetchine,  Bulau's 
Narrative,  etc.  According  to  the  former,  the  appeal  made  to  Alexander  by  the 
conspirators  was  merely  for  aid  in  "constituting  the  Emperor  a  state  prisoner," 
(conversation  between  Count  Pahlen  and  General  Svetchine,  quoted  in  Joyneviile, 
op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  p.  118).  It  must  also  be  remembered  that  at  that  time  Portugal  and 
Denmark  were  both  ruled  by  regents  in  the  name  of  imbecile  sovereigns.  Joyneviile 
(p.  142)  also  recounts  that  Pahlen  revealed  to  Alexander  that  Paul  had  ordered 
his  arrest,  together  with  the  Empress  Marie  and  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine. 
"The  business,"  according  to  the  British  Attache,  Ross,  "took  more  than  three- 
quarters  of  an  hour."  Joyneviile  believes  this  to  be  a  direct  proof  that  the  murder 
of  Paul  was  not  decided  upon  in  advance  (pp.  147  and  152).  See  also  VValiszewski, 
Le  fils  de  la  grande  Catherine:  Paul  If. 

'  Czartoiyski,  op.  cit.,  p.  253. 

^Joyneviile,  quoting  Rostopchine,  says  that  Paul,  during  his  first  campaign 
against  the  French,  desired  to  form  a  permanent  league  for  the  "suppression  of 
anarchy  and  democratic  principles,"  a  forerunner  of  the  "Holy  Alliance"  in  its 
later  phase. 


8  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

"benevolent  despot"  and  an  unwavering  belief  in  the  high-minded- 
ness  of  their  own  motives  led  them  both  to  perform  the  most 
astounding  and  contradictory  acts  and  to  adopt  policies  which 
were  often  carried  through  with  ruthless  conviction  rather  than 
statesmanlike  foresight. 

Alexander  was  but  twenty-three  years  old  when  he  succeeded 
to  the  throne  of  the  Romanovs.  Prince  Czartoryski  was  sum- 
moned to  the  capital  to  assume  the  role — but  not  the  office — of 
Prime  Minister,  which  the  Tsar  had  promised  him  in  their  youth- 
ful conversations.  The  new  ruler  soon  found  himself  surrounded 
with  the  friends  upon  whom  he  might  most  naturally  depend  for 
encouragement  and  support.  The  members  of  the  "Young 
Liberal  Circle,"  the  intimates  of  his  boyhood,  returned  to  St. 
Petersburg  from  the  four  quarters  of  Europe,  where  the  desire 
of  the  Emperor  Paul  to  separate  the  Heir-Apparent  from  their 
liberal  influences  had  dispersed  them  in  semi-official  exile.  From 
England  came  Novosiltzov,  filled  with  renewed  admiration  for 
the  constitution  and  political  life  of  the  British  commonwealth. 
Stroganov,  the  aristocratic  admirer  of  the  French  Revolution, 
returned  from  the  interrupted  "grand  tour"  upon  which  his  over- 
democratic  ideas  had  embarked  him.  Perhaps  most  welcome  of 
all  these  unofficial  advisers  was  Alexander's  old  tutor,  Laharpe, 
who  hastened  from  Switzerland  at  the  new  Tsar's  summons.^ 

International  questions,  however,  rather  than  policies  of  inter- 
nal reform,  so  dear  to  the  "Young  Liberals,"  now  forced  them- 
selves on  the  attention  of  the  new  government.  Just  before  the 
Tsar  Paul's  assassination,  that  monarch  had  formed  an  ill-con- 
sidered alliance  with  Napoleon,  reversing  Russia's  former  policy. 
This  had  resulted  in  a  renewal  of  the  "Armed  Neutrality,"  and 
an  embargo  was  placed  upon  all  Russian,  Swedish  and  Danish 
vessels  in  the  harbors  of  Great  Britain.^  Orders  were  also 
given  to  the  West  India  fleet  to  attack  the  Danish  possessions  in 

*  Laharpe  was  now  somewhat  disabused  of  many  of  his  youthful  enthusiasms  for 
unrestricted  "Liberty,  Equality  and  Fraternity."  On  his  return  to  Switzerland  he 
had  taken  a  prominent  part  in  inviting  the  French  Revolutionary  government  to 
interfere  in  th;  civil  quarrels  of  his  native  cantons.  But  the  victories  of  the  French 
troops  over  the  armies  of  the  Bernese  oligarchy  had  been  marked  by  such  scenes 
of  pillage  and  disorder  as  to  trouble  even  the  "pure"  republicanism  of  Rousseau's 
pupil.  Moreover,  his  fellow  countrymen  had,  not  unnaturally,  held  him  responsi- 
ble for  his  share  in  bringing  about  their  predicament. 

''  For  a  full  account  of  this  revival  of  Catherine's  policy  of  the  "Armed  Neutrality,"  see 
Garden,  Histoire  generate  des  traites  de  paix,  vol.  v,  pp.  347  and  361. 


INTRODUCTION  ^ 

the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  while  another  squadron,  under  Nelson  and 
Parker,  set  sail  for  the  Baltic  (February,  1801).  On  April  2, 
after  a  heroic  defense  by  the  Danish  Admiral  Fischer,  the 
British  fleet  won  a  crushing  victory  at  Copenhagen.  After  offer- 
ing terms  tending  to  separate  Denmark  from  Russia,  which  were 
loyally  rejected,  the  victorious  expeditions  proceeded  up  the  Bal- 
tic with  the  avowed  intention  of  capturing  Kronstad  and  St. 
Petersburg. 

Thus,  during  the  first  days  of  his  reign,  the  Emperor  Alexan- 
der found  himself  faced  with  an  international  crisis  of  the  first 
magnitude.  Little  time  remained  to  weigh  in  the  balance  ab- 
stract problems  concerning  "the  rights  of  neutral  nations,"  which 
the  "Powers  of  the  North"  had  sworn  to  defend.  The  first  duty 
was  to  find  some  immediate  remedy  which  might  safeguard  Rus- 
sia's national  interests  and  his  too  accessible  capital. 

In  considering  the  somewhat  inglorious  settlement  to  which 
Alexander  now  gave  his  consent,  several  factors  must  be  taken 
into  account.  His  desire  was  to  obtain  a  respite  during  which  he 
might  devote  hiniself  to  the  task  of  securing  essential  internal 
reforms.^  He  was  constitutionally  averse  to  war  (though  af- 
fected by  what  his  courtiers  called  "paradomania")  and  was 
under  the  peaceful  influence  of  Czartoryski's  idealism.^ 

It  was  a  cruel  irony  of  fate  which  during  the  first  weeks  of  his 
reign  placed  the  Tsar  in  the  dilemma  of  choosing  between  a  forced 
abandonment  of  cherished  principles  of  "international  action" 
and  an  undignified  flight  from  his  royal  residence  !  Yet  the  prin- 
ciple embodied  in  the  "League  of  Neutrals"  was  one  of  the  few 
results  of  the  Empress  Catherine's  foreign  policy  which  his  ideal- 
istic conceptions  could  approve.  He,  therefore,  caught  eagerly 
at  the  suggestion  of  the  British  Government  for  a  "conference," 
This  was  a  form  of  negotiation  which  Alexander  seems  gen- 

^  Nevertheless,  Alexander's  first  impulse  was  to  defend  "the  rights  of  neutrals"  from 
respect  "for  the  opinions  of  his  august  father."  It  was  Vorontzov,  his  Ambassador  in 
London,  who  urged  upon  him  the  necessity  of  an  Anglo-Russian  alliance  to  meet  the 
situation.  See  an  article  by  F.  de  Martens,  in  the  Revue  d'Histoire  Diplomatique,  vol. 
VIII,  1894. 

'^In  considering  Czartoryski's  influence  at  this  time  it  must  be  remembered  that  he  was 
above  all  else  a  patriotic  Pole,  and  that  all  his  hopes  of  renewing  the  early,  generous 
enthusiasm  that  Alexander  had  shown  for  that  much  wronged  nation  lay  in  stressing  the 
duties  of  an  unselfish  international  viewpoint.  This  powerful  personal  influence  was  to 
be  exerted  during  the  whole  period  of  the  Tsar's  "liberal  phase,"  the  period  covered  by  the 
later  "Instructions  to  Novosiltzov."     See  Czartoryski,  Memoires,  vol.  i,  p.  101. 


10  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

erally  to  have  found  irresistible.  All  the  powers  interested  were 
invited  to  send  representatives  in  order  to  arrange  the  differences 
concerning  the  "rights  of  neutrals,"  and  in  response  to  this  over- 
ture Admiral  Hyde  Parker  was  notified  by  the  Russian  authori- 
ties of  the  new  Emperor's  disposition  for  peace.  To  his  own  con- 
ception, Alexander's  "ideals"  were  actually  to  offer  a  convenient 
solution  to  his  difficulties!  The  Prussian  King  was  desired  to 
evacuate  Hanover  for  reasons  which  were  "a  distinct  advance 
upon  the  international  morality  of  the  day,"  and,  while  costing 
the  Tsar  nothing,  enabled  him  to  meet  the  views  of  Great  Britain. 
Alexander  wrote  that  he  was  not  only  "desirous  of  pacifying  the 
North,"  but  also  of  establishing  a  "continuing  world  peace."  He 
ended  with  the  pious  hope  that  in  view  of  the  high  object  to  be 
accomplished,  Frederick  William  "would  place  no  difficulties  in 
the  way."  ^ 

On  June  17,  1801,  a  Congress  of  the  "Powers  of  the  North," 
viz.,  Russia,  Denmark,  Sweden  and  Prussia,  assembled  in  St. 
Petersburg.  The  protocol  agreed  upon,  with  the  exception  of  a 
clause  forbidding  paper  blockades,  was  wholly  favorable  to  the 
contentions  of  Great  Britain.  The  parties  agreed:  (1)  That  a 
neutral  flag  should  not  cover  enemy  goods,  and  (2)  that  visit  and 
search  were  permissible  even  when  vessels  were  under  the  con- 
voy of  a  vessel  of  war. 

If  the  Scandinavian  aUIes  of  Russia,  one  of  whom  had  glori- 
ously suffered  the  loss  of  her  fleet  In  defending  the  rights  of  neu- 
trals, could  see  In  this  arrangement  little  else  than  a  base  betrayal 
of  the  principles  which  the  "Armed  Neutrality"  had  sworn  to 
defend,  CzartoryskI  might  at  least  console  the  Tsar  with  the 
thought  that  he  had  given  an  example  of  philosophic  devotion 
to  the  cause  of  international  peace  and  had  saved  his  capital  from 
invasion. 

Soon  after  this  rather  inglorious  settlement  of  Russia's  dif- 
ficulties, in  1803,  Alexander  appointed  CzartoryskI,  whose  In- 
fluence becomes  more  and  more  traceable  In  ensuing  events,  as  his 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  In  spite  of  the  clouds  gathering 
on  the  horizon,  notably  an  estrangement  with  France,  the  new 
Minister  announced  a  program  of  peace  and  a  foreign  policy 
that  eminently  suited  Alexander's  ambitions.     Said  CzartoryskI: 

'See  Garden,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  376. 


INTRODUCTION  11 

1  firmly  believed  that  it  might  be  possible  for  me  to  reconcile  the  tenden- 
cies of  the  Russian  nation  with  the  generous  ideas  of  its  ruler,  and  to  make 
use  of  the  Russian  craving  for  glory  and  supremacy  for  the  general  benefit 
of  mankind.  The  object  was  a  great  but  a  remote  one,  to  be  pursued  con- 
sistently and  with  perseverance,  and  to  be  executed  with  patience  and  skill. 
I  thought  it  was  worthy  of  the  national  pride  of  the  Russian  people.  I 
would  have  wished  Alexander  to  become  a  sort  of  arbiter  of  peace  for  the 
civilized  world,  to  be  the  protector  of  the  weak  and  the  oppressed,  and  that 
his  reign  should  inaugurate  a  new  era  of  justice  and  right  in  European  poli- 
tics.^ 

Soon  after  Czartoryski's  appointment,  in  1804,  the  Duke  of 
Enghien,  grandson  of  the  Great  Conde,  was  treacherously  seized 
by  Napoleon's  orders,  within  the  territory  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Baden,  and  dragged  across  the  French  frontiers.  After  the 
mockery  of  a  court  martial,  he  was  shot  to  death  in  the  moat  of 
the  fortress  of  Vincennes.  The  disregard  for  international 
rights  shown  by  this  violation  of  neutral  territory  and  Its  accom- 
panying judicial  murder  aroused  all  Europe  to  a  fury  of  protest. 

Two  months  later,  Bonaparte  notified  the  Powers,  still  aghast 
at  this  unnecessary  tragedy,  of  his  formal  assumption  of  the  Im- 
perial title.  The  new  Emperor  of  France  could  hardly  have 
chosen  a  more  unfavorable  moment  for  entering  the  ranks  of  the 
sovereigns  of  Europe.  Although  in  practical  effect  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  Consular  title  was  a  mere  matter  of  form,  Russia 
refused  to  recognize  Napoleon's  usurpation.  Only  Austria  and 
the  subservient  Hohenzollern  dynasty,  both  of  whom  had  felt 
the  weight  of  his  displeasure,  acquiesced  in  the  monarchical  preten- 
sions of  the  ex-revolutionary  general.  The  way  was  prepared 
for  a  fresh  coalition  of  the  Powers  of  Europe,  in  which  the  Tsar 
of  Russia  was  to  play  the  role  of  mediator  which  Czartoryski  so 
ardently  desired  him  to  assume.  Their  ideals  and  dreams  of 
international  polity  were,  moreover,  about  to  receive  definite 
form  through  the  medium  of  the  "Instructions  to  Novosiltzov."  ^ 

The  instructions  follow  the  policy  of  a  carefully  written 
opinion  dated  April  5,  1804,  in  which  Czartoryski  sought  to  de- 
fine the  Tsar's  attitude  towards  a  government  which  "tramples 
under  foot  the  most  generally  accepted  principles  of  international 
law."     The  duty  of  Russia  and  the  Powers  "to  decry  and  avenge" 

^Czartoryski,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  p.  370. 

2  These  instructions  are  too  well  known  through  the  studies  of  Sorel  and  Phillips  to  be 
quoted  in  extenso. 


12  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

such  action  was  discussed  at  length.^  In  the  opinion  both  of  Czar- 
toryski  and  the  Emperor  a  preliminary  understanding  between 
Great  Britain  and  Russia  promised  the  surest  guarantee  for  the 
success  of  their  international  program  and  the  proposed  alliance 
against  the  hegemony  of  France.  In  September,  1804,  Alexan- 
der was  prepared  to  lay  before  the  British  Cabinet  a  scheme  not 
only  for  immediate  military  action,  but  also  for  an  eventual 
rational  settlement  of  the  entire  diplomatic  situation.  The  un- 
derstanding between  these  Powers  was  to  form  the  basis  of  a 
wider  coalition.  Such,  indeed,  was  the  only  means  which  might 
conceivably  place  a  limit  upon  Napoleon's  ambitions. 

"Novosiltzov's  Instructions"  outline  the  plan  which  Alexander 
now  proposed  to  the  British  Cabinet.  Long  buried  in  the 
archives  of  the  Russian  Foreign  Office,  these  were  first  made 
public  in  their  complete  form  through  the  publication  of  Czar- 
toryski's  Memoires.  They  had  previously  been  known  only 
through  a  partial  quotation  by  Tatistcheff  and  notably  through 
Pitt's  reply  couched,  doubtless  from  reasons  of  policy,  in  a 
language  similar  to  the  Emperor's  own.^ 

The  opening  paragraph  of  Novosiltzov's  Instructions  con- 
tains an  eloquent  recognition  of  the  growing  force  of  public 
opinion  in  international  affairs : 

The  most  effectual  weapon  which  France  now  wields — one  with  which 
the  French  continue  to  menace  their  neighbors — is  their  ability  to  persuade 
public  opinion  that  their  cause  is  that  of  the  liberty  and  prosperity  of  all 
nations. 

f  As  a  condition  preceding  the  "moral  union"  he  sought  with 
Great  Britain,  he  next  asks  the  latter's  adhesion  to  a  "New  Or- 
der," which  must  be  brought  about.  The  "New  Order"  was  a 
highly  practical  program  of  "self-determination,"  the  outlines  of 
a  reconstruction  of  Europe  on  "national"  lines.     The  King  of 

^  Czartoryski,  Memoires,  vol.  ii,  p.  2. 

'The  Instructions  to  Novosiltzov  are  given  in  full  in  Czartoryski,  Memoires,  vol.  ii, 
p.  27,  and  Appendix.  In  reading  them,  the  truth  of  Czartoryski's  contention,  that  history 
has  neglected  both  their  importance  and  significance  becomes  apparent.  Modern  writers 
have  in  a  measure  repaired  this  error,  recognizing  that  they  laid  the  foundations  upon 
which,  ten  years  later,  rested  the  program  of  intervention  and  reconstruction  contained  in 
the  Treaties  of  Kalisch  and  Chaumont.  "Compare  this  language,"  says  Sorel,  speaking 
of  Novosiltzov's  Instructions,  "with  that  which  Koutousov  addressed  to  the  Germans  in 
1813,  and  with  that  which  Alexander  addressed  to  the  French  liberals  in  1814.  It  will  be 
seen  that  all  forms  part  of  the  same  program.  The  same  may  even  be  said  of  the  measures 
planned  in  1804  and  1814  for  the  reconstruction  of  continental  Europe."  Sorel,  V Europe 
el  la  Revolution  Fran^aise,  part  vi,  p.  39. 


INTRODUCTION  13 

Sardinia,  who  had  been  unjustly  deprived  by  Napoleon  of  his 
throne,  was  to  be  reestablished,  but  not  until  he  had  promised  to 
give  his  people  the  benefits  of  "a  wise  and  free  constitution."  The 
importance  of  maintaining  Swiss  neutrality  was  also  recognized 
"as  an  essential  factor  in  the  peace  of  Europe."  In  restoring 
Holland  to  national  existence  the  modern  theory  of  self-determi- 
nation is  recognized:  "The  character  of  the  national  desires 
must  be  considered  before  deciding  upon  the  form  of  government 
to  be  established." 

A  paragraph  respecting  the  attitude  to  be  adopted  by  the 
Anglo-Russian  Alliance  towards  France  herself  is  equally  sig- 
nificant at  the  present  day : 

I  now  come  to  the  language  which,  in  my  opinion,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
hold  with  respect  to  France  herself.  After  having  imposed  our  will  upon 
her,  and  after,  through  just,  benevolent  and  liberal  principles,  having  mani- 
fested our  intentions  (giving  her  confidence  that  she  can  count  upon  the 
promises  made  by  our  Alliance),  we  should  declare  that  it  is  not  upon 
France  that  we  make  war,  but  only  upon  a  government  as  tyrannical  towards 
France  as  towards  the  rest  of  Europe.^ 

There  is  no  suggestion  in  the  Tsar's  plan  of  a  superstate  (the 
favorite  remedy  of  the  eighteenth  century  philosophers  for  all 
international  ills)  nor  any  hint  of  the  doctrine  of  intervention 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  neighboring  states  (the  policy  which  was 
later  to  render  the  pretensions  of  the  Holy  Alliance  most  hateful 
in  the  eyes  of  the  "Constitutional  Powers")  ." 

Perhaps  the  most  important  paragraph  of  Novosiltzov's  In-  1 
structions  is  the  one  in  which  the  Tsar,  after  a  brief  historical  ^ 
notice  of  former  proposals  to  organize  humanity,  finds  the 
guarantee  of  future  peace  in  a  pact  binding  the  nations  of  Europe 
by  means  of  a  general  treaty  or  confederacy — a  League  of 
Nations — whose  guiding  principles  would  be  those  of  interna- 
tional law  and  wherein  mediation  would  be  substituted  for  war: 

^The  Tsar's  insistence  that  the  Allies  war  only  against  Napoleon  and  not  against  the 
French  people  finds  a  parallel  in  President  Wilson's  declarations  that  "the  real  enemy  is 
not  the  German  people  so  much  as  the  military  masters  who  enchain  them  as  well  as  the 
foreign  territories  they  have  conquered." 

*"It  seems  evident  that  this  great  aim  can  only  be  considered  as  attained  when  we  shall 
have  succeeded  in  reconciling  the  nations  with  their  governments,  and  in  making  the  latter 
capable  of  action  tending  to  the  best  interests  of  their  people.  We  must  also  fix  the  rela- 
tions of  the  states  among  themselves  by  means  of  well-defined  rules,  which  it  will  be  in  the 
interest  of  all  to  respect.  Profound  examination  of  these  matters  and  the  lessons  of 
history  will  prove  that  these  two  results  can  only  be  obtained  when  the  interior  order  of  all 
states  is  based  upon  free  institutions,  protected  against  the  passions  and  ambitions  of  the 
individuals  who  may  be  placed  at  their  head." 


14  THE    HOLY  ALLIANCE 

I  can  see  no  reason  why,  after  peace  has  been  declared,  we  should  not 
undertake  to  negotiate  a  general  treaty  which  might  become  the  basis  of 
the  reciprocal  relations  between  the  States  of  Europe.  This  indeed  will 
almost  inevitably  suggest  itself  at  the  moment  of  a  general  pacification, 
especially  if  no  incomplete  and  partial  peace  be  allowed  to  interfere,  an  end 
to  which  both  powers  are  equally  interested  in  devoting  all  their  efforts 
and  designs. 

When  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia  was  signed,  a  similar  proposal  was 
entertained.  But  the  degree  of  political  development  and  other  circum- 
stances paramount  at  the  time  would  not  allow  the  consummation  of  this 
great  work,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  for  a  long  time  this  pact  formed  the 
basis  of  foreign  relations.  Modern  diplomacy  should  be  adequate  to  meet 
the  situation  which  presents  itself.  Impossible  though  the  attainment  of 
a  state  of  eternal  peace  would  appear  to  be,  nevertheless  in  many  ways  this 
end  might  be  forwarded  if  the  treaty,  which  should  conclude  the  present 
general  war,  will  embody  clear  and  precise  principles  and  prescriptions  with 
respect  to  international  law.  Why  should  not  a  law  of  nations  be  evolved 
assuring  the  privileges  of  neutrality  and  consecrating  as  an  obligation  never 
to  commence  war  without  having  exhausted  all  the  means  of  mediation  by 
a  third  party? — a  mediator  who,  having  through  the  proper  means  examined 
the  respective  wrongs  of  the  litigants,  will  seek  to  compound  them?  It  is 
by  applying  such  principles  that  a  true  and  lasting  pacification  of  the  world 
might  be  obtained. 

It  is,  moreover,  interesting  to  note  that  membership  in  the  pro- 
posed League  of  Peace  was  based  upon  a  voluntary  decision  by- 
its  members.  Alexander  evidently  believed  that  the  advantages 
to  be  obtained  through  becoming  a  party  to  this  general  treaty 
would  be  patent  to  all  the  civilized  states  of  Europe : 

After  having  experienced  the  drawbacks  and  inconveniences  of  a  com- 
plete— though  precarious  and  illusory — independent  existence,  the  majority 
of  all  Powers  would  probably  desire  to  belong  to  such  a  League.  This 
would  not  only  guarantee  as  far  as  possible  their  external  tranquillity  and 
safety,  but  also  (especially  in  the  case  of  states  of  a  secondary  order)  would 
offer  them  internal  guarantees  of  protection. 

Nor  does  the  Tsar  avoid  consideration  of  the  practical  details 

of  his  problem.     An  interesting  paragraph  in  the  "Instructions" 

has  reference  to  questions  of  political  geography  and  of  strategic 

and — even  of  economic — frontiers : 

In  order  to  secure  our  ends,  it  would  be  necessary  to  fix  the  frontiers 
which  properly  belong  to  each  separate  state.  It  would  thus  appear 
especially  desirable  to  follow  the  boundaries  which  nature  herself  has  laid 
down,  i.  e.,  mountain  chains,  seas,  etc.  Finally,  the  proper  means  of  ac- 
cess should  be  assured  to  each  nation  for  the  interchange  of  the  products 
of  their  soil  and  industry.  It  might  also  be  advisable  if  possible  to  obtain 
that  each  state  should  consist  of  homogeneous  people  in  agreement  among 
themselves  and  with  the  government  that  rules  them. 


INTRODUCTION  15 

Finally,  with  respect  to  the  old  principle  of  "the  balance  of 
power"  and  the  ever-present  questions  of  the  lesser  nationalities, 
Alexander  offers  a  striking  solution — the  grouping  of  the  smaller 
states  into  federations  which  would  place  them  more  nearly  on  a 
par  with  their  neighbors: 

The  disturbances  which  have  shaken  Europe  almost  continually  for  so 
many  centuries  have  only  taken  place  because  so  little  attention  has  been 
paid  to  any  system  of  natural  equilibrium.  Just  how  far  this  principle 
could  be  made  to  govern  the  new  arrangement  which  should  follow  the 
general  pacification  it  would  be  difficult  for  the  present  to  decide.  It  would 
depend  largely  upon  what  powers  would  be  admitted  to  these  councils  and 
the  logical  outcome  of  events.  Nevertheless,  it  is  even  now  possible  to 
recognize  the  necessity  of  strengthening  as  far  as  possible  the  secondary 
powers  in  order  that  these  may  be  capable  of  self-protection,  at  least  until 
the  protecting  powers  and  the  other  members  of  the  League  can  come  to 
their  assistance.  For  the  same  reason  it  is  evident  that  the  existence  of 
very  small  states  would  not  be  in  accord  with  the  ends  desired.  Since  these 
are  without  the  necessary  powers  of  resistance,  they  can  only  serve  as  tempta- 
tions to  the  ambitions  of  larger  states  without  contributing  in  any  way  to 
the  general  good.  A  means  of  remedying  this  inconvenience  might  be  found 
by  uniting  them  to  larger  states,  or  in  grouping  them  in  small  federative 
unions. 

Although  the  defeat  of  the  Allies  at  Austerlltz  was  to  postpone 
for  nearly  ten  years  the  possibility  of  any  practical  application  of 
the  principles  contained  in  Novosiltzov's  Instructions,  Alexander 
had  every  reason  to  believe  that  they  had  formed  the  basis  of  the 
proposed  general  European  settlement  which  was  the  avowed 
object  of  the  Third  Coalition.  The  British  attitude  was,  in  sub- 
stance, a  cordial  acceptance  of  Alexander's  proposals. 

Pitt's  reply  to  Novosiltzov  (made  public  on  May  15,  1805), 
read  as  follows : 

It  would  seem  from  the  vieAVs  advanced  by  H.  I.  M,,  views  to  which 
H.  M.  adheres,  that  three  principal  purposes  are  to  be  sought:  (1)  to  free 
from  the  dominion  of  France  the  countries  conquered  by  her  since  the  out- 
break of  the  revolution,  and  to  restrict  her  to  her  former  frontiers;  (2)  to 
ensure  to  the  countries  released  from  the  French  yoke  not  only  their  con- 
tinued peace  and  happiness,  but  also  to  erect  them  into  a  barrier  against 
further  French  aggression;  (3)  to  establish  (with  the  renewal  of  peace) 
a  convention  and  guarantee  for  the  protection  and  mutual  safety  of  the 
Powers,  and  to  establish  in  Europe  a  general  system  of  public  law.  .  .  . 
His  Majesty  would  consider  this  noble  plan  as  incomplete  if  the  restoration 
of  peace  were  not  at  the  same  time  accompanied  by  measures  tending  to 
secure  the  system  thus  brought  into  existence.  It  would  appear  desirable 
when  the  general  pacification  occurs  that  a  treaty  be  concluded  to  which 
all  the  great  powers  of  Europe  might  become  parties.     Through  this  means 


16  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

the  possession  of  their  respective  territory,  as  now  established,  would  be 
fixed  and  recognized.  To  secure  this  end  the  powers  must  engage  them- 
selves reciprocally  to  maintain  and  support  each  other  against  all  efforts  to 
disturb  and  infringe  upon  their  rights.  Such  a  treaty  would  endow  Europe 
with  a  common  law  and  tend  as  much  as  possible  to  repress  all  enterprises 
troubling  the  general  peace. ^ 

The  diplomatic  history  of  the  epic  struggle  between  Alexan- 
der and  Napoleon,  which,  except  for  the  precarious  duration  of 
the  Tilsit  Alliance,  was  to  continue  for  more  than  a  decade  after 
the  date  of  Novosiltzov's  Mission,  has  been  studied  in  detail  by 
Sorel  ^  and  Vandal.^  Their  scholarly  interpretation  of  new  mate- 
rial and  the  examination  of  archives  not  available  to  earlier  stu- 
dents have  revealed  the  story  of  these  momentous  years,  probably 
in  a  form  approaching  finality.  Yet  everywhere  in  the  pages  of 
these  historical  masterpieces  the  glory  of  the  vanquished  out- 
shines that  of  the  victor.  In  their  revived  enthusiasm  for  the 
Empire,  the  authors  have  done  but  scant  justice  to  what  may 
well  appear  at  the  present  day  the  most  significant  feature  of  the 
campaigns  that  ended  In  the  downfall  of  the  French  Emperor: 
the  Tsar's  determination,  again  and  again  apparent,  to  dedicate 
the  victories  of  the  Alliance  to  securing  an  organized  peace  and 
the  establishment  of  a  European  System.  In  the  negotiations  to 
Induce  the  Courts  of  Vienna,  Stockholm  and  Berlin  to  join  In  a 
levee  en  masse  of  Europe  against  the  pretensions  of  Napoleon 
there  was  no  question  of  the  sweeping  plans  of  International  re- 
construction which  had  preceded  the  signing  of  the  "Treaty  of 
Concert"  between  the  Tsar  and  the  King  of  England.  Neverthe- 
less, "the  young  monarch  firmly  believed  that  he  was  fulfilling  an 
international  mission  in  becoming  the  military  Champion  of 
Humanity."  "*  Even  when  the  Third  Coalition  went  down  in  de- 
feat ( 1805)  at  Austerlitz — and  the  Tsar  Instead  of  maintaining 
the  rights  he  had  championed  In  Novosiltzov's  Instructions  found 

^Ste  Gzrden,  Histoire  generate  des  trail es  de  paix,  \o\.  viii,  p.  317.  Until  the  publi- 
cation of  Czartoryski's  Memoires,  Pitt's  reply  was  the  only  public  document  with  respect 
to  this  important  negotiation  except  for  a  brief  notice  by  Tatichev.  Novosiltzov's  nego- 
tiations in  London  during  January,  1805,  were  continued  throughout  February  by  the 
British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg.  The  result  was  the  Alliance  or  "Treaty  of  Concert" 
of  April  11.  For  a  full  account  of  the  diplomatic  negotiations  preceding  the  Third  Coali- 
tion against  France,  see  Garden,  op.  cit.,  vol.  viii,  pp.  302  et  seq. 

^  A.  Sorel,  L' Europe  et  la  Revolution  Fran(aise. 

^A.  Vandal,  Napoleon  et  Alexandre  1'^''. 

*  Tatistcheff,  Alexandre  /«>•  et  Napoleon,  p.  86. 


INTRODUCTION  17 

himself  defending  the  frontiers  of  his  own  Empire  against  the 
victorious  armies  of  the  greatest  political  "realist"  of  all  times — 
Alexander  still  clung  to  his  ideals  of  European  solidarity.  The 
Russian  disaster  at  Friedland  (1807)  was  the  result  of  his 
chivalrous  devotion  to  Frederick  William  III  of  Prussia,  an 
effort  to  save  him  from  the  consequences  of  his  belated  adhesion 
to  the  Third  Coalition. 

When  a  way  was  opened  for  the  conquerors  to  the  heart  of 
Russia,  the  peace  which  Napoleon  imposed  upon  the  Tsar  at  Tilsit 
was  offered  in  the  form  of  an  Alliance,  and  the  methods  used 
by  the  French  Emperor  to  attach  Alexander  to  his  "Continental 
System"  recall  the  irresistible  appeal  he  had  made  to  the  morbid 
vanity  of  his  father  the  Tsar  Paul.^  Tilsit  was  the  negation  of 
every  policy  and  principle  that  Alexander  had  heretofore  pro- 
fessed.^ The  treaty  laid  down  a  program  of  opportunism :  a 
"free  hand"  granted  to  Russia  in  Finland  and  a  rectification  of 
the  Turkish-Russian  frontiers  were  little  more  than  an  Imperial 
bribe.  In  the  moment  of  the  Tsar's  greatest  military  peril  he 
was  thus  offered  an  opportunity  to  resume  the  imperialistic  poli- 
cies of  Catherine  the  Great, ^  which  the  reactionary  advisers  of 
his  court  had  accused  him  of  abandoning.  But  Tilsit  was  from 
the  beginning  an  alliance  merely  in  name.  Beneath  the  surface, 
in  spite  of  the  assurances  and  compliments  exchanged  between  the 
Emperors,  French  and  Russian  diplomacy  continued  a  struggle 
without  truce  or  common  advantage.  Neither  sovereign  could 
obtain  the  fulfilment  of  the  essential  features  of  a  pact  which  only 
joined  their  real  interests  for  a  few  brief  months.  The  meeting 
at  Erfurt,  scarcely  a  year  after  the  historic  interview  on  the  Nie- 
men,  showed  Alexander  ready  to  plot  the  destruction  of  his  Im- 
perial "ally"  with  the  latter's  most  treacherous  foes,'*  After 
more  than  three  years  of  deceit  and  diplomatic  evasion,  it  was 
almost  joyously  that  the  Tsar  abandoned  the  plan  of  sharing  the 
dominion  of  the  universe  with  Napoleon.    Resuming  the  dialectic 

1  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  73. 

^  Paul  at  least  was  persuaded  that  his  alliance  with  the  "Corsican  tempter"  was 
to  "ensure  the  Peace  of  Europe."     Ibid. 

'Vandal,  Napoleon  et  Alexandre  /«''. 

*Ibid.  At  Erfurt  Alexander  had  a  famous  interview  with  Talleyrand,  who  more  than 
hinted  his  willingness  to  betray  Napoleon.  See  Dupuis,  Le  Ministere  de  Talleyrand  en 
1814,  vol.  I,  p.  27. 


18  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

of  his  earlier  negotiation  with  Pitt — the  language  of  Novosilt- 
zov's  Instructions — we  find  him  (1812)  assuring  his  new  ally, 
Bernadotte  (the  former  Napoleonic  General,  elected  Crown 
Prince  of  Sweden)  that  their  common  task  is  "to  revive  in  Europe 
the  regime  of  liberal  ideas  and  to  save  her  from  the  abyss  of  bar- 
barism to  which  she  seems  hurrying."  ^ 

Into  the  details  of  the  Napoleonic  invasion  of  Russia,  the  burn- 
ing of  Moscow  on  the  approach  of  winter,  which  made  a  with- 
drawal, if  not  a  retreat,  inevitable,  and  the  loss  of  the  Grande 
Arm'ee^  it  is  unnecessary  to  enter  for  the  purposes  of  this  intro- 
duction. Suffice  it  to  say  that  Alexander's  mind  was  busied  with 
far-reaching  schemes  long  since  prepared,  which  were  to  make  of 
the  victories  gained  but  the  starting  point  for  a  second  interna- 
tional crusade.  He  brushed  aside  governments,  and  appealed 
directly  to  the  people,^  and  warned  their  rulers  that  if  they  re- 
mained abjectly  persistent  in  their  system  of  federation,  it  was 
the  voice  of  the  people  which  must  be  heard.  It  was  with  the 
peoples  of  Germany,  rather  than  with  their  rulers,  that  the  Treaty 
of  Kalisch,  uniting  Russia  and  Prussia,  was  signed. 

Through  a  series  of  agreements  anticipating  both  political  and 
military  action,  the  links  of  the  Grand  Alliance  were  one  by  one 
solidly  forged.  The  Treaties  of  Reichenbach,  the  second  link  in 
the  great  system  which  was  to  control  the  destinies  of  Europe 
during  the  ensuing  years,  were  signed  on  June  14  and  15,  1813. 
These  constituted  a  formal  treaty  of  alliance  between  Great 
Britain,  Russia  and  Prussia,  by  the  terms  of  which  a  new  coalition 
came  into  being.  At  Reichenbach  (June  15),  England  also 
renewed  her  continental  policy,  strengthening  the  bonds  of  the 
alliance  with  her  generous  subsidies.  Pitt  promised  to  pay  the 
enormous  costs  of  the  armies  of  Russia  and  Prussia,  but  at  the 
same  time  insisted  upon  a  renewal  of  Alexander's  earlier  pro- 
posals, that  none  of  the  Powers  were  to  permit  themselves  to 
enter  into  any  separate  negotiations  with  the  enemy.    In  Articles 

^Alexander  to  Bernadotre,  quoted  by  Rain,  vol.  i,  p.  208. 

*  "  We  now  appeal  to  the  people  through  this  manifesto  in  the  same  terms  that 
our  envoy  will  use  toward  their  rulers.  If  these  latter  remain  abjectly  persistent 
in  their  system  of  federation  it  is  the  voice  of  the  people  which  must  be  heard. 
The  rulers  who  have  plunged  their  subjects  in  oppression  and  disaster  must  be 
forced  to  embrace  the  cause  of  vengeance  and  glory.  Let  Germany  but  recall  her 
ancient  valor  and  the  tyrant  will  cease  to  exist."     Garden,  vol.  xiv,  p.  181. 


INTRODUCTION  19 

I  and  II  of  the  Treaty  of  Reichenbach  the  return  of  the  "lands 
in  Germany  held  by  the  French  Princes  was  declared  to  be  the 
object  of  the  common  efforts."  Toeplitz  (September  9,  1813), 
the  third  link  in  the  chain  of  alliances,  ranged  Austria  on  the  side 
of  the  Allies.  The  "Battle  of  the  Nations"  at  Leipzig  (October, 
1813)  sealed  the  military  fate  of  Napoleon.  The  era  of  diplo- 
macy was  about  to  begin. ^ 

After  Leipzig,  even  Schwartzenberg,  the  Austrian  military 
commander,  believed  the  greatest  obtainable  military  results  to 
be  achieved.  "All  .  .  .  are  of  this  opinion,"  he  wrote,  "but 
the  Emperor  Alexander  ...  !"  Words  failed  the  horrified 
Austrian  tactician  on  his  attempts  to  describe  the  determination 
with  which  the  Tsar  continued  the  pursuit  of  his  enemy.  With- 
out a  complete  military  victory  the  international  peace  he  aimed 
at  was  impossible.  The  advance  towards  Paris  continued,  "the 
army  dragging  forward,  the  diplomats  murmuring  and  conspir- 
ing." ^  At  Chatillon,  where  Napoleon  was  negotiating  for  peace, 
the  conflict  of  selfish  interests  broke  out  afresh.^  It  was  already 
becoming  manifest  that  to  find  a  common  ground  of  agreement 
among  the  victors  would  be  a  task  almost  as  difficult  as  Napo- 
leon's overthrow.  The  French  success  of  Montmiriel  and  Cha- 
teau-Thierry caused  these  differences  to  be  momentarily  forgot- 
ten. But  the  battles  of  Arcis-sur-Aube  and  La  Feree-Cham- 
peniose,  while  restoring  the  military  equilibrium  of  the  coalition, 
renewed  the  dissensions  of  their  councils. 

The  conference  at  Chatillon  was  in  fact  little  else  than  a 
poorly  staged  diplomatic  comedy  which  deceived  neither  antago- 
nist. Napoleon's  eagerness  to  negotiate  rose  and  fell  with 
the  varying  fortunes  of  his  military  campaign.  The  Allied 
proposals — purposely  made  more  and  more  unacceptable  to 
France — were  not  even  presented  until  February  17.  Badly 
beaten  at  the  engagement  of  La  Rothiere,  Napoleon  had  author- 
ized his  representative  to  make  "the  broadest  concessions."      It 

'The  text  of  the  Treaties  of  Kalisch,  Reichenbach  and  Toeplitz  are  to  be  found  in 
Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil  des  Traites  de  Paix,  vol.  iii,  p.  234;  vol.  i,  pp.  568,  571. 

-Sorel,  op.  cit.,  part  viii,  p.  257. 

^ These  discussions  turned  upon  Napoleon's  successor,  the  question  of  the  "natural 
limits,"  the  plan  of  campaign,  etc.  The  Tsar  only  consented  to  take  part  on  "the  basis 
of  Frankfort,"  communicating  his  reservations  in  a  memoir  to  Metternich.  See  Sorel, 
op.  cit.,  part  viii,  pp.  250-255. 


20  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

required  but  a  few  slight  successes,  however,  to  encourage  him 
again  to  resist  the  Allies'  demands.^ 

One  ominous  fact  must  have  convinced  Napoleon's  envoy, 
Caulaincourt,  that  his  mission  was  more  difficult  than  ever  be- 
fore; the  negotiations  of  Chatillon  were  carried  out  "under  a 
general  instruction"  wherein  the  Allies  "considered  themselves 
as  maintaining  one  and  the  same  Interest."  ^ 

This  was  the  policy  to  be  formally  adopted  by  the  important 
Treaty  of  Chaumont,  an  event  of  the  deepest  significance  to  the 
inauguration  of  a  new  political  system  for  Europe,  which  occurred 
on  March  10.  The  signatures  of  all  the  Allied  Powers  had  been 
affixed  to  the  same  document  after  Leipzig.  But  no  formal 
League  of  the  Allies  as  yet  existed,  except  such  as  arose  from  a 
complicated  system  of  politico-military  protocols  and  treaties, 
notably  those  of  Reichenbach  and  Toeplitz.  These  mainly  con- 
templated military  action  against  the  "Enemy  of  Europe,"  and 
only  hinted  at  political  arrangements.  When  the  negotiation  of 
^  final  peace  became  imminent,  the  necessity  of  consolidating  the 
basis  of  some  future  common  policy  binding  on  all  the  Allies  be- 
came apparent.^ 

It  was  to  secure  this  important  end  that  the  Treaty  of  Chau- 
mont (bearing  the  date  of  March  1 )  had  been  proposed.  In  the 
preamble  it  was  declared  that  the  high  contracting  parties, 

having  offered  to  the  French  government  terms  for  the  conclusion  of  a 
general  peace  (in  case  of  the  refusal  by  France  of  these  conditions)  desire 
to  strengthen  the  bonds  which  unite  them  in  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  a 
vear  undertaken  with  the  intention  of  bringing  a  close  to  the  misfortunes  of 
Europe* 

Having  thus  clearly  stated  its  main  objects,  the  Treaty  sets 
forth  its  intention  "to  insure  the  future  tranquillity  of  Europe  by 
reestablishing  a  just  equilibrium  of  the  powers." 

After  fixing  the  subsidies  to  be  advanced  by  Great  Britain, 
Article  V  continues : 

'See  Talleyrand,  Memoires,  vol.  ii,  p.  151,  and  A.  Debidour,  Histoire  diplomatique  de 
V Europe,  vol.  i,  pp.  (y-1 .  Napoleon  always  believed  himself  on  the  eve  of  a  Marengo  or 
Austerlitz.  After  a  theatrical  tirade,  he  had  pronounced  for  a  peace  at  any  price  on 
January  4th.  Caulaincourt  was  somewhat  disconcerted  at  the  extent  of  these  powers  and 
hampered  by  i};norance  of  the  military  situation.     See  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  part  vii,  pp.  259-262. 

*  Phillips,  The  Confederation  of  Europe,  pp.  72-79. 

'  Metternich  was  even  believed  to  be  negotiating  separately  with  France.  Sorel,  op. 
cit.,  part  viii,  p.  289. 

'  This  treaty  is  given  in  Martens,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  48. 


INTRODUCTION  21 

The  contracting  parties  will  agree  after  the  conclusion  of  the  peace  with 
France  ...  to  take  defensive  measures  for  the  protection  of  their  respec- 
tive territories  in  Europe  against  all  attempts  on  the  part  of  France  to 
trouble  the  results  of  this  pacification. 

This  was  nothing  less  than  the  "mutual  guarantee"  which  the 
Tsar  had  long  advocated.  But  in  order  not  to  raise  premature 
differences  between  the  Allies,  the  "order  of  things  which  shall 
be  the  happy  outcome  of  their  efforts"  was  purposely  left  vague. 

Certain  broad  lines  of  policy  were,  however,  laid  down.  It  was 
determined  that  Switzerland  should  be  raised  to  the  rank  of  an 
independent  state,  that  Spain  should  be  restored  to  the  Bourbons, 
and  that  Germany  should  form  a  federal  union.  In  order  to  carry 
out  these  provisions  the  means  to  be  used  were  further  set  forth 
as  "amicable  intervention"  (Article  VI)  and,  this  failing  (Article 
VII),  an  international  army  might  be  raised,  each  party  furnish- 
ing a  contingent  of  60,000  men. 

The  Treaty  of  Chaumont  thus  became  an  elaboration  of  the 
policy  determined  upon  at  Toeplitz.  While  directed  against 
France,  it  also  furnished  a  treaty  basis  for  future  concerted 
action.  Formally  renewed  at  Paris  in  1815,  and  at  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  in  1818,  it  may  be  said  to  constitute  the  foundation  of 
the  "system"  which  formed  the  groundwork  of  European  diplo- 
macy until  the  year  1848. 

A  great  change  is  observable,  however,  in  the  language  of  this 
document  when  it  is  compared  with  the  generous  sentiments 
embodied  in  Alexander's  Kalisch  pronunciamento,  or  with  the 
liberal  ideas  contained  in  his  tocsin  appeal  to  the  "peoples  of 
Europe."  The  diplomats  of  Europe  could  find  no  place  in  a  formal 
agreement  for  a  league  to  maintain  European  peace  "based  on  a 
new  conception  of  public  law,"  which  Novosiltzov  had  discussed 
with  Pitt.  The  Treaty  of  Chaumont  was  the  resultant  of  con- 
tending forces  and  drew  its  future  strength  and  usefulness  from  the 
purposely  vague  language  of  the  articles  dealing  with  matters 
which  were  a  subject  of  controversy  between  the  Powers.  The 
future  of  Poland  was  ignored,  as  well  as  the  question  of  Napoleon's 
successor;  on  the  other  hand  a  "  balance  of  Europe  "  was  definitely 
guaranteed  (Article  XVI)  for  a  period — which  might  be  ex- 
tended— of  at  least  twenty  years.  Although  France  was  the 
power  ostensibly  aim.ed  at  as  a  possible  disturber  of  this  highly 


22  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

desirable  equilibrium,  the  terms  were  general  enough  to  raise  the 
issue  to  the  rank  of  a  great  European  principle. 

With  this  general  affirmation  of  the  solidarity  of  the  great 
Powers,  a  principle  which  he  was  to  affirm  with  increasing  enthu- 
siasm during  the  ensuing  period  of  diplomatic  reconstruction, 
the  Tsar  was  obliged  to  be  content.  Castlereagh,  however,  had 
been  the  controlling  influence  of  the  debates  and  the  attitude 
which  he  adopted  from  the  beginning  had  been  guided  by  the  terms 
of  definite  instructions,  which  clearly  show  the  limitations  England 
was  about  to  place  upon  her  Continental  policy.  "The  Treaty  of 
Alliance,"  he  declared,  "is  not  to  terminate  with  the  war,  but  is 
to  contain  defensive  engagements,  with  mutual  obligations  to 
support  the  Power  attacked  by  France  with  a  certain  extent  of 
stipulated  succours.  The  casus  foederis  is  to  be  an  attack  by  France 
on  the  European  dominions  of  any  one  of  the  contracting  parties."  ^ 
It  was  the  development  of  this  policy  of  "reservations"  which  in 
the  end  was  to  wreck  the  whole  framework  of  the  Tsar's  idealistic 
proposals  for  a  European  confederation.  To  offset  Great  Britain's 
determination  to  remain  aloof  from  the  internal  quarrels  of  Con- 
tinental Europe,  Alexander  was  soon  to  propose  a  plan  of  action 
having  for  its  basis  a  definite  recognition  of  the  duty  of  inter- 
national solidarity.  This  policy,  "consecrated"  in  the  mystical 
pact  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  was  to  serve  ends  wholly  foreign  to  the 
Tsar's  earlier  ideals. 

Accompanied  by  the  King  of  Prussia,  Alexander  entered  Paris 
in  triumph  on  March  30,  1814,  and  Napoleon's  abdication  was 
signed  a  few  days  later.-  The  first  Treaty  of  Paris  followed  the 
signing  of  a  convention,  dated  April  23,  1814.  The  article  forming 
the  basis  of  both  the  convention  of  April  23  and  the  ensuing 
Treaty^  guaranteed  to  France  "the  frontiers  as  they  actually 
existed  on  January  1,  1792."  This  deprived  the  restored  mon- 
archy of  all  the  conquests  made  by  the  Republic  and  the  Empire, 
with  the  exception  of  certain  territories  belonging  to  the  Con- 
federation of  the  Rhine. 

'  These  instructions,  quoted  by  Phillips,  The  Confederation  of  Europe,  p.  66,  from  the 
Foreign  Office  Records,  are  contained  in  a  Cabinet  Memorandum,  dated  December  26, 
1813. 

'■'Grand  Due  Nicolas  Mikhailowitch,  L' Empereur  Alexandre  /«'',  vol.  i,  p.  134. 

'The  details  of  the  negotiation  of  this  treaty  are  given  in  full  in  Talleyrand,  Memoires, 
vol.  II,  pp.  172  et  seq. 


INTRODUCTION  23 

The  keynote  of  Bourbon  diplomacy  was  to  ignore  past  events. 
When  Alexander  visited  the  Paris  mint,  a  medal  was  struck  in 
his  honor  which  bore  on  one  side  the  inscription:  "To  the  restorer 
of  peace  in  Europe";  on  the  reverse  was  emblazoned  the  arms  of 
France,  with  the  words:  "In  the  month  of  April,  1814,  France 
joined  the  Grand  Confederation  of  the  Powers  of  Europe."^ 
Many  months,  however,  were  to  elapse  before  these  words  had 
any  real  significance.  The  real  terms  which  defined  the  allied 
policy  toward  France  w^re  contained  in  secret  articles  annexed 
to  the  Treaty  of  Paris. •^    These  stipulated: 

The  disposal  of  the  territories  which  his  Very  Christian  Majesty  has 
renounced  by  the  terms  of  Article  III  of  the  Treaty  (of  Paris),  an  arrange- 
ment from  which  a  real  and  durable  European  equilibrium  must  arise, 
will  be  decided  at  the  Congress  along  lines  which  shall  be  determined 
among  themselves  by  the  Allied  Powers. 

Although  the  intention  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  was  several  times 
declared  to  be  that  of  "effacing  all  traces  of  the  recent  unfortunate 
events,"  ^  it  was  in  fact  little  else  than  the  enumeration  of  the 
terms  imposed  by  victorious  conquerors  upon  a  fallen  enemy. 

In  addition  to  the  Allies  of  Toeplitz  and  Chaumont,  Spain, 
Portugal,  and  Sweden  were  invited  to  accede  to  the  Treaty, 
although — a  derogation  from  the  Tsar's  favorite  principle  of  "united 
action" — identical  treaties  were  signed  separately  with  France  by 
each  of  these  Powers.  By  the  terms  of  these  treaties  eight  of  the 
principal  Powers  of  Europe  found  themselves  parties  to  a  general 
agreement.  Their  alliance  was  still  chiefly  aimed  at  keeping  a 
ninth  great  Power  in  a  state  of  military  inferiority,  yet  the  Tsar 
might  well  feel  that  the  foundations  of  his  confederation  of  Europe 
had  been  well  and  truly  laid.  With  the  exchange  of  the  ratifica- 
tions the  sovereigns  and  their  representatives  dispersed.  An  era 
of  good  feeling,  recalling  the  atmosphere  of  international  solidarity 
which  had  reigned  during  the  earlier  conferences  of  the  war,  once 
more  united  the  Allies.  But  as  Sorel  significantly  remarks:  "All 
important  matters  were  but  adjourned  until  the  Congress."^ 

^Mme.  de  Choiseul-Gouffier,  Memoirs,  p.  177.  This  incident  is  sigfiiScant  as  show- 
ing the  quick  apprehension  by  the  restored  government  of  Alexander's  favorite  "inter- 
national" policy. 

^Martens,  Nouvfaux  Supplemens,  vol.  I,  p.  329. 

'Talleyrand,  op.  cil.,  vol.  n,  p.  197. 

*  See  Sorel's  important  appreciations,  op.  cit.,  part  viii,  p.  346. 


24  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Vienna  at  the  opening  of  the  Congress  presented  an  impressive 
spectacle.  Besides  two  hundred  and  sixteen  chiefs  of  diplo- 
matic missions,  representing  with  few  exceptions  all  the  Christian 
Powers  of  Europe/  this  great  "international  parliament"  was 
attended  in  person  by  four  kings  and  two  emperors.  While  the 
civilized  world  awaited,  with  a  natural  anxiety,  the  result  of  the 
deliberations  of  the  assembled  statesmen,  a  series  of  balls,  carnivals 
and  tournaments  varied  the  monotony  of  these  debates  and  fur- 
nished entertainmient  for  the  host  of  courtiers  and  their  ladies 
who  surrounded  the  assembled  monarchs.^ 

No  one  had  awaited  the  formal  opening  of  the  great  Congress 
with  more  eager  anticipations  than  the  idealistic  Tsar  of  Russia. 
His  brief  stay  in  St.  Petersburg  had  convinced  him  that  he  was 
once  more  autocrat,  not  only  by  right  of  law,  but  also  in  the  hearts 
of  his  subjects.^  It  was  fortified  by  the  knowledge  that  his  acts 
were  approved  by  the  people  of  his  whole  vast  Empire  that  the 
Tsar  had  proceeded  to  Vienna.  He  was,  moreover,  confident 
that  the  debt  which  Europe  owed  him  for  Russia's  powerful  inter- 
vention in  the  late  wars  would  make  him  the  natural  arbiter  of 
the  debates  which  were  to  organize  a  permanent  peace."* 

Alexander  was  accompanied  on  his  journey  by  a  complete  diplo- 
matic staff.  Gentz  in  his  letters  criticizes  the  Tsar's  intention 
to  negotiate  in  person  rather  than  to  depend  upon  the  training 
and  experience  of  his  entourage.  His  determination  to  do  away 
w^ith  intermediaries  had  resulted  in  a  quarrel  between  the  Tsar 
and  his  Grand  Marshal,  Count  Tolstoy.  "Persuaded  that  his 
kindness  tov/ards  him  could  have  no  bounds,  Tolstoy  opposed 
Alexander's  appearance  at  the  Congress.  His  idea  was  that  the 
Emperor  could  only  play  an  undignified  role.  Worn  out  by  these 
representations,  his  Majesty  .  .  .  decided  to  part  with  his 
Grand  Marshal."^  He  had  early  reason  to  regret  his  neglect  of 
their  excellent  advice.  The  necessity  of  making  rapid  decisions 
amidst  the  heated  debates  of  the  council  chamber  deprived  him 
of  the  advantage  always  maintained  by  a  deputy  acting  ad  referen- 

'  Talleyrand,  vol.  ii,  pp.  275  et  seq. 

^  For  an  account  of  these  festivities,  see  La  Garde,  Fetes  et  Souvenirs  du  Congres  de 
Vienne. 

'His  natural  modesty  prevented  the  Holy  Synod  from  conferring  upon  him,  according 
to  the  ancient  Russian  fashion,  the  title  of  "Blessed  of  God"  in  recognition  of  his  victories. 
Sec  Rain,  op.  cit.,  p.  245. 

■•  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  part  viii,  p.  384. 

'  La  Garde,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  197. 


INTRODUCTION  25 

dum.  This  egotistical  pretension  to  override  the  accepted  customs 
of  diplomacy  was  to  place  the  Tsar,  on  more  than  one  occasion, 
in  a  position  of  inferiority.  Equally  disquieting  was  his  depend- 
ence on  individuals  like  Czartoryski,  Capo  D'Istria  and  Laharpe, 
personally  sympathetic  advisers  rather  than  sources  of  information 
and  counsel  to  which  the  traditional  poHcy  of  the  Empire  required 
him  to  give  weight.^ 

The  deliberations  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  may  be  studied  in 
detail  in  the  memoirs  of  the  French  and  Austrian  representatives, 
Talleyrand  and  Metternich.  For  the  purposes  of  our  subject 
they  need  only  be  considered  in  so  far  as  they  concern  the  ensuing 
era  of  the  international  congress  and  the  upbuilding  of  the  "Sys- 
tem of  1815."  The  members  of  the  Grand  Alliance  were  loatliA 
to  admit  new  influences  to  their  debates.  They  preferred  to 
consider  the  Congress  as  a  council  of  the  Allies.  As  late  as  Novem- 
ber 1,  one  month  after  the  assembly  of  the  delegates,  Metternich 
still  maintained  that  "the  Congress  is  not  a  Congress;  its  com- 
missions are  not  commissions."  Indeed  the  only  advantage  which 
he  consented  to  accord  to  the  Vienna  gathering  was  that  "it 
seems  an  opportunity  to  remove  the  physical  distances  that 
divide  Europe." - 

A  few  days  later  he  declared  that  the  "very  word  of  Congress 
terrified  the  Prussians"  and  that  it  would  be  preferable  to  call  the 
conference  together  only  after  some  agreement  had  been  reached 
with  respect  to  the  principal  questions  involved.  ^  In  other  words 
he  proposed  that  this  great  "European"  gathering  should  only  be 
allowed  the  power  of  ratification  after  a  division  of  the  spoils  of 
Napoleon's   Empire   had   been   made   by   the  victorious   Allies. 

The  Tsar's  intentions  were  from  the  beginning  distrusted  by 
many.  There  was  indeed  in  his  policy  a  curious  blending  of  inter- 
national idealism  and  practical  advantage  to  Russia.  Behind  all  his 
fine  phrases  a  determination  was  evident  to  draw  profit  from  the 
military  situation.  "The  only  reward  which  I  ask,"  he  repeated 
w^ith  somewhat  affected  enthusiasm,  "is  to  be  allowed  to  repair  in  a 
measure  the  great  crime  committed  by  Catherine  II."  By  uniting 
the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  endowed  with  a  liberal  constitution, 
to  his  own  autocratic  domain,  he  planned  to  restore  the  ancient 

^Cf.  Lansing,  The  Big  Four,  p.  38. 
^Tallej'rand,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  420. 
^Ibid.,  p.  431. 


26  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Kingdom  of  Poland.^  England  and  Austria,  however,  were  un- 
alterably determined  not  to  permit  any  change  of  frontier  which 
might  allow  a  Russo-Prussian  entente  to  become  a  preponderant 
force  in  Europe.  Poland  according  to  their  plans  was  again  to  be 
called  upon  to  play  her  historic  part  as  a  buffer  state. 

Thus  when  the  Tsar,  strengthened  by  his  own  conceptions  of  the 
debt  which  Europe  owed  in  return  for  his  sacrifices  in  the  cause 
of  the  Alliance,  formulated  his  demands,  he  found  himself  faced 
by  a  firm  coalition  determined  upon  refusal.  A  series  of  stormy 
personal  interviews  ensued;  horrified  rumor  affirmed  that  in  his 
conversations  with  Metternich  strong  personalities  were  indulged 
in  on  the  part  of  the  Tsar^  and  that  the  Austrian  envoy's  rejoin- 
ders had  been  made  in  a  tone  of  respectful  but  ill-disguised  con- 
tempt. On  October  1,  Lord  Castlereagh  wrote  to  the  Tsar, 
setting  forth  at  length  his  opposition  to  the  latter's  views  with 
respect  to  the  Duchy.  This  resulted  in  a  sharp  interchange  of 
"extra-official  notes,"  wherein  Czartoryski  was  called  upon  to 
defend  "the  right  of  Poland  to  nationality,"  a  contention  in  con- 
venient accord  with  one  of  the  principal  "points"  of  Novosiltzov's 
Instructions.  This  extraordinary  debate,  carried  on  by  private 
correspondence,  finally  exasperated  the  Emperor,  who  refused 
to  continue  further  negotiations  by  this  means.^  Tolstoy's 
prophecies  respecting  the  "personal  negotiation"  of  his  sovereign 
were  being  fulfilled. 

Above  the  clamor  of  contending  ambitions  and  particularistic 
interests  now  sounded  a  new  rallying  cry,  Talleyrand's  famous 
formula  of  "legitimacy."  This  principle  indeed  appeared  the 
only  one  generally  applicable  to  a  situation  complicated  by 
so  many  contending  interests.  One  cause  which  had  restrained 
Castlereagh  from  openly  opposing  the  military  power  wielded  by 
the  Tsar  was  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  was  still  embarrassed  by 
the  long-drawn-out  war  with  the  United  States.  With  the  sign- 
ing of  the  Peace  of  Ghent  (December  24,  1814),  full  liberty  of 
action  was  restored  to  England's  forces.  Castlereagh  immediately 
declared  himself  ready  to  adhere  to  Talleyrand's  plans,  and  the 
latter  had  the  satisfaction  of  concluding  the  secret  alliance  which 

'  Debidour,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  22. 

2  Talleyrand,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  509. 

'Grand  Due  Nicolas  Mikhailowitch,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  p.  147. 


INTRODUCTION  27 

he  had  so  long  desired  to  form  between  France,  Austria  and  Eng- 
land (Januarys,  1815).^ 

Thus  a  few  weeks  after  France  had  been  dragged  to  the  bar  to 
hear  the  sentence  of  Europe  passed  upon  her  misdeeds,  she  found 
herself,  through  the  surprising  diplomatic  abilities  of  her  chief 
representative,  party  to  a  secret  treaty  wherein  two  of  her 
principal  opponents  formally  engaged  themselves  to  act  with  her 
in  common  against  "the  pretensions  recently  manifested"  by  the 
two  remaining  members  of  the  great  coalition.  "In  case  certain 
circumstances  shall  arise,"  read  this  document,  "from  which 
may  God  preserve  us,  Great  Britain,  Austria  and  France  agree  to 
unite  their  strength  in  order  to  maintain  the  principles  formulated 
in  the  Treaty  of  Paris."  - 

Only  the  return  of  Napoleon  from  the  Island  of  Elba  restored  a 
semblance  of  harmony  to  the  debates.  The  alliance  and  princi- 
ples of  Chaumont  were  reaffirmed  and  all  the  Powders  joined  in  a 
manifesto  decrying  the  Emperor's  treason  to  the  cause  of  Europe.  ^ 
The  end  of  Napoleon's  great  adventure  of  "The  Hundred  Days" 
left  the  Allies  in  an  awkward  and  ill-defined  relationship  toward 
France.  A  tendency  was  manifested  to  hold  the  twice-restored 
Bourbons  responsible  for  their  failure  to  prove  the  blessings  of 
"legitimacy."  Moreover,  the  rivalries  and  differences  which  had 
arisen  at  Vienna  seriously  separated  the  Allies.  The  secret 
Treaty  of  Alliance  between  France,  Great  Britain  and  Austria — 
forgotten  by  Louis  XVIII  in  his  hasty  flight — was  known  to 
Alexander.  The  Tsar,  in  spite  of  this  proof  of  Bourbon  duplicity, 
was  still  disposed  to  be  lenient  towards  France.  Motives  of  altru- 
ism, judged  by  his  allies  to  be  wholly  exaggerated,  and  a  kind  of 
mystical  piety  (which,  as  we  shall  later  see,  resulted  in  the  negotia- 
tions leading  to  the  pact  of  the  Holy  Alliance),  now  guided  his 
policy.  But  the  Russian  troops  had  taken  only  a  minor  part  in 
the  Waterloo  campaign  and  the  Tsar  found  his  prestige  sensibly 
diminished. 

The  Prussians  now  demanded  an  indemnity  of  1,200,000,000 
francs,  but  compromised  on  a  permission  to  occupy  Luxembourg. 
The  situation  was  also  improved  by  the  dismissal  of  Talleyrand. 

1  See  Talleyrand,  op.  cit.,  p.  550,  and  Debidour,  op.  cit.,  p.  36.  Debidour  recognizes  the 
full  importance  of  the  influence  exercised  by  the  War  of  1812  upon  European  affairs  during 
this  period. 

-  See  Talleyrand,  op.  cit.,  appendix,  p.  561.  ^Ibid.,  p.  134. 


28  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

The  latter,  informed  by  Royal  decision  that  his  services  were  no 
longer  needed  at  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  disappeared 
from  the  scene.  A  new  minister,  the  Duke  of  Richelieu,  acceptable 
both  to  Russia  and  the  Allies,  was  installed  in  his  place.  It  was  on 
these  terms  that  the  second  Treaty  of  Paris  was  signed  on  Novem- 
ber 20,  1815.^ 

On  the  same  day,  another  treaty  of  the  utmost  significance  in 
the  development  of  the  System  of  1815  was  signed  between 
Austria,  Russia  and  Great  Britain.  This  was  known  as  the  Treaty 
of  AlHance  and  contained  the  following  important  clause: 

Article  VI.  In  order  to  consolidate  the  intimate  ties  which  unite  the 
four  sovereigns  for  the  happiness  of  the  world,  the  High  Contracting 
Powers  have  agreed  to  renew  at  fixed  intervals,  either  under  their  own 
auspices  or  by  their  representative  ministers,  meetings  consecrated  to 
great  common  objects  and  the  examination  of  such  measures  as  shall  be 
judged  most  salutary  for  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  Europe.^ 

The  above  article  (which  was  a  substitute  for  one  proposed  by  the 
Tsar  calling  upon  the  Allies  to  give  proofs  of  the  "permanency  and 
intimacy  of  their  union")  had  been  modified  by  Castlereagh  to 
suit  the  reluctance  of  the  English  Cabinet  to  ally  themselves 
definitely  to  any  system  of  "European  action"  indefinitely  pro- 
longed or  even  to  indorse  permanently  "the  principles  consecrated 
by  the  Treaties  of  Chaumont  and  Vienna."  ^ 

No  reference  whatsoever  was  made  in  the  highly  practical 
terms  of  the  articles  of  either  the  "Treaty  of  Alliance"  or  the 
Treaty  of  Paris  to  a  treaty  signed  on  September  26  by  the  sover- 
eigns of  Russia,  Austria  and  Prussia,  a  pact  subsequently  known  as 
the  "Holy  Alliance."  It  now  remains  for  us  to  consider  the  sig- 
nificance of  this  manifesto  and  its  relation  to  the  System  of  1815. 

Had  Alexander  rested  upon  his  military  laurels  as  the  con- 
queror of  Napoleon,  his  fame  would  have  been  safe  for  all  time. 
His  experiences  during  the  debates  of  Vienna  were  in  many  ways 
a  bitter  disillusion  to  the  Tsar-Idealist.    As  Rain  remarks: 

The  aureole  of  triumph  that  had  long  hovered  about  the  head  of  the 
Emperor  of  Russia  grew  pale  during  the  Congress.  He  had  arrived  in 
Vienna  like  a  conqueror,  expecting  to  play  the  role  of  arbiter  of  Europe 
in  the  old  capital  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire — and  to  hold  the  position 
he  had  assumed  since  the  beginning  of  the  coalition.  He  had,  however, 
only  triumphed  among  the  ladies  and  in  the  salons.     In  the  conference 

^  Martens,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  682. 

^Ibid.,x>.Ti7. 

^  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  pp.  134  ct  scq. 


INTRODUCTION  29 

he  had  been  tricked  —  bamboozled' — and  his  diplomacy  mastered  by 
that  of  Metternich.  He  found  his  Hfe-long  dreams  opposed  and  mis- 
understood by  his  closest  advisers,  and  even  under  the  most  favorable 
conditions  impossible  of  realization.- 

It  appears  certain  that  Alexander  had  planned  to  bring  to  the 
attention  of  the  assembled  sovereigns  the  generous  schemes  for 
international  organization  and  "concerted"  action  w^hich  he  had 
first  proposed  in  his  Instructions  to  Novosiltzov  and  embodied  in 
the  military  treaties  preceding  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of 
Chaumont.  But  at  Vienna  the  inopportune  return  of  Napoleon, 
coinciding  with  his  diplomatic  struggles  to  revive  Polish  nation- 
ality, prevented  any  elaboration  of  these  plans.  Moreover, 
Alexander  was  absent  with  his  armies  at  the  time  most  appropriate 
for  the  consideration  of  such  matters,  during  the  closing  days  of 
the  conference,  and  the  "Final  Act"  of  the  Congress,  drawn  up 
by  Gentz  and  edited  by  Metternich,  was  a  triumph  of  their  cold- 
blooded system  of  "real  politics." 

Concerning  the  period  of  Vienna,  Alexander  later  wrote  to  his 
friend  Golytzine.  From  this  letter  we  learn  of  his  desire  to  secure 
from  the  representatives  of  the  Powers  assembled  in  the  old  capital 
of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  some  definite  recognition  of  the 
principles  to  which  he  believed  himself  committed.  He  felt — not 
without  reason — that  so  favorable  an  opportunity  might  never 
again  recur  to  lay  the  foundations  for  a  general  treaty  of  peace. 
This  letter  (dated  February  15,  1822)  is  also  highly  interesting 
because  it  contains  Alexander's  own  version  of  the  origin  of  the 
Treaty  of  the  "Holy  Alliance: " 

.  .  .  You  tell  me  to  return  to  my  policy  and  ways  of  thinking  such 
as  these  existed  between  the  year  1812  until  my  departure  for  Vienna. 
You  appear  to  suppose  that  in  some  way  I  have  changed  my  manner  of 
thinking  since  that  time.  What  stay  in  Vienna  have  you  in  mind.? 
(Do  you  refer  to  that  which  I  made  during  the  congress  of  1814.'') 
.  .  .  You  seem  to  forget  that  the  plan  of  the  "Holy  Alliance"  came 
into  my  mind  at  that  time.  I  have  frequently  told  you  it  was  to  crown 
all  my  work  there.  It  was  only  the  return  of  Napoleon  from  Elba 
which,  by  bringing  our  stay  in  Vienna  to  a  close,  forced  me  to  postpone 
the  execution  of  this  plan  until  after  a  new  period  of  struggle  which  was 
happily  ended  through  the  aid  of  Providence.  At  Paris,  when  Napoleon, 
through  the  grace  of  God,  was  overthrown  for  the  second  time,  the  Most 
High  enabled  me  to  reaUze  the  plan  which  I  had  cherished  since  the 
Congress,  and  permitted  me  to  trace  upon  paper  the  Act  of  which  you 

*  Rain,  writing  in  1910,  here  uses  the  word  bafoue. 

*  Rain,  op.  cit.y  p.  259. 


30  THE    HOLY    ALLIANCE 

have  knowledge.  As  soon  as  I  returned  to  Petersburg  I  composed  my 
manifesto,  by  which  the  act  of  the  "Holy  Alliance"  was  made  public,  and 
which  a  little  later,  on  January  1,  1816,  I  published  to  the  world   .  .  .  ^ 

In  the  first  days  of  September,  1815 — not  without  intention  of 
restoring  the  prestige  which  the  Russian  armies  had  lost  by  their 
absence  from  the  glorious  field  of  Waterloo — ^Alexander  decided 
to  display  their  well-trained  strength  as  a  diplomatic  reminder 
to  his  allies.^  A  great  review  of  the  entire  Russian  force  was 
held  upon  the  Plain  of  Vertus,  near  Chalons.  This  spectacle  the 
Tsar  also  determined  was  to  be  the  dramatic  prelude  to  what  he  now 
considered  the  most  important  political  act  of  his  career,  the  mani- 
festo of  a  Holy  Alliance  of  Justice,  Christian  Charity  and  Peace. 

On  September  10  the  magnificent  troops  of  Alexander's  guard 
and  line  (drilled  even  in  war  to  a  state  of  precision,  for  which  the 
Emperor  Paul's  "paradomania"  was  largely  responsible)  passed 
before  the  Russian  sovereign  and  his  guests,  the  Emperor  of 
Austria  and  the  King  of  Prussia,  Following  the  straight  files 
of  the  grenadiers  came  the  turbulent  ranks  of  the  Cossacks,  the 
wild  cavalry  of  the  steppes,  whose  exploits  during  Napoleon's 
retreat  had  given  them  a  wide  reputation  throughout  Europe. 
The  religious  ceremony  was  perhaps  the  most  remarkable  part  of 
the  spectacle.  On  the  broad  plain  seven  altars  had  been  erected, 
where  the  imposing  ritual  of  the  Greek  service  was  celebrated  in 
the  presence  of  this  reverent  host.  Their  thundering  responses 
to  the  chanting  of  the  priests  showed  them  ready  to  die  with 
fanatical  zeal  at  the  word  of  their  Autocrat. 
r  Still  under  the  powerful  influence  of  this  significant  military 
pageant,^  the  sovereigns  present  at  the  review  were  invited  by 
Alexander  to  affix  their  signatures  to  the  famous  document  sub- 
sequently known  to  history  as  the  "Holy  Alliance."  ^  On  Sep- 
tember 14/26  the  Tsar,  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  the  King  of 
Prussia  formally  declared  that  henceforth  their  united  policy  had 
but  a  single  object: 

'  Given  in  full  by  the  Grand  Due  Nicolas  Mikhai'lowitch,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  pp.  221  et  seq. 

^  This  great  review  is  considered  by  Pasquier  to  have  been  held  with  the  generous  object 
of  "bringing  the  Allies  to  adopt  a  more  moderate  conduct  towards  France."  Memoires,  vol. 
IV,  p.  22.     See  also  Mme.  de  Choiseul-Gouffier,  Memoirs,  p.  202. 

^See  note,  Rain,  op.  cit.,  p.  280. 

*  While  detailed  to  the  French  Fourth  Army,  in  1917,  the  author  came  across  a  monu- 
ment— shattered  by  German  shell  fire — which  was  erected  near  Chalons  to  commemorate 
the  Tsar  Alexander's  dream  of  perpetual  peace. 


INTRODUCTION  31 

To  manifest  before  the  whole  universe  their  unshakable  determination 
to  take  as  their  sole  guide,  both  in  the  administration  of  their  respective 
states  and  in  their  political  relations  with  other  governments,  the  pre- 
cepts of  religion,  namely,  the  rules  of  Justice,  Christian  Charity  and 
Peace. 

These  precepts,  far  from  being  applicable  only  to  private  life,  should, 
on  the  contrary,  govern  the  decisions  of  Princes,  and  direct  them  in  all 
their  negotiations,  forming,  as  they  must,  the  only  means  of  giving 
permanence  to  human  institutions  and  remedying  their  imperfections. 

Following  this  unusual  preamble  came  the  terms  of  a  diplomatic 
agreement,  no  less  extraordinary  in  the  eyes  of  contemporary 
statesmen: 

Conformably  to  the  words  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  which  command  all 
men  to  consider  each  other  as  brethren,  the  three  contracting  Monarchs 
will  remain  united  by  the  bonds  of  a  true  and  indissoluble  fraternity. 
Considering  each  other  as  fellow  countrymen,  they  will  on  all  occasions 
and  in  all  places  lend  each  other  aid  and  assistance;  towards  their  sub- 
jects and  armies,  they  will  extend  a  fatherly  care  and  protection,  leading 
them  (in  the  same  spirit  of  fraternity  with  which  they  are  themselves 
animated)  to  protect  Religion,  Peace  and  Justice.     [Article  I.] 

In  consequence,  the  sole  principle  in  force,  whether  as  between  the 
said  Governments  or  as  between  their  subjects,  shall  be  that  of  doing 
each  other  reciprocal  service,  and  of  testifying  by  an  unalterable  good- 
will the  mutual  affection  with  which  they  should  be  animated.  They 
will  consider  themselves  as  members  of  one  and  the  same  Christian 
nation;  the  three  allied  Princes  looking  on  themselves  as  merely  dele- 
gated by  Providence  to  govern  three  branches  of  the  one  family.  The 
rulers  of  Austria,  Prussia  and  Russia  thus  confess  that  the  Christian 
world  of  which  they  and  their  people  form  a  part  has  in  reality  no  other 
sovereign  than  Him  to  Whom  alone  power  rightfully  belongs  .  .  .  Their 
Majesties  consequently  recommend  to  their  people  with  the  most  tender 
solicitude,  as  the  sole  means  of  enjoying  that  peace  which  arises  from  a 
good  conscience,  and  which  alone  is  durable,  to  strengthen  themselves 
every  day  more  and  more  in  the  principles  and  exercise  of  the  duties 
which  the  Divine  Saviour  has  taught  to  mankind.     [Article  H.] 

All  the  Powers  who  shall  choose  solemnly  to  avow  the  sacred  principles 
which  have  dictated  the  present  Act — and  shall  acknowledge  how  im- 
portant it  is  for  the  happiness  of  nations  .  .  .  that  these  truths 
should  henceforth  exercise  over  the  destinies  of  mankind  all  the  influence 
which  belongs  to  them — will  be  received  with  equal  ardor  and  affection 
into  this  Holy  Alliance.     [Article  HI.]  ^ 

The  language  of  the  pact  thus  suddenly  presented  by  the  Tsar 
to  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  the  King  of  Prussia  for  their  signa- 
tures had  no  parallel  in  the  archives  of  diplomacy.  In  adhering 
to  the  Holy  Alliance  these  sovereigns  bound  themselves  to  nothing 

^This  version  is  made  from  the  French  original  in  Martens,  vol.  u,  pp.  656-658. 
Cf.  also,  British  State  Papers,  vol.  in,  pp.  211-212. 


32  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

more  than  a  promise  to  observe  in  their  foreign  and  domestic 
poHcy  "the  duties  which  the  Divine  Saviour  has  taught  to  man- 
kind"; yet,  as  Gentz  reports,  they  were  "amazed  and  terrified"^ 
by  the  possible  consequences  of  their  act.  ReHance  upon  moral 
principles  so  general  and  widesweeping  were  indeed  to  lead  to 
policies  and  events  unforeseen  at  the  time  by  their  author. 

But  in  order  to  understand  aright  the  meaning  which  the  mysti- 
cal invocation  of  the  Holy  Alliance  connoted  in  the  mind  of  Alex- 
ander, it  now  becomes  necessary  briefly  to  consider  some  of  the 
later  inspirations  of  the  Tsar's  internationalism.  Alexander's 
early  training  under  Laharpe,  a  follower  of  that  Rousseau  who  had 
summarized  and  put  in  his  own  persuasive  language  the  princi- 
ples of  the  Abbe  de  St.  Pierre's  project  for  perpetual  peace, 
accounts  for  the  clear  and  lucid  argumentation  of  the  secret 
Instructions  to  Novosiltzov.  His  letter  to  Golytzine  (1822), 
which  recounts,  in  retrospect,  the  origins  of  the  Holy  League, 
is  also  significant.  Golytzine's  mystical  and  religious  influence 
began  during  the  days  of  the  invasion  of  Russia  by  Napo- 
leon's Grand  Army.  It  is  beyond  the  purpose  of  this  study  to 
consider,  at  length,  Alexander's  later  relations  to  the  Baroness  de 
Kriidener  and  the  French  reactionary  philosopher,  Bergasse,  in 
whom  contemporary  historians  saw  the  direct  inspiration  of  the 
Act  of  September  14/26,  1815.^  These  relations,  of  great  interest 
in  themselves,  belong  rather  to  an  intimate  and  personal  biography 
of  Alexander.  To  the  student  of  psychology — especially  the  psy- 
chology of  the  reformer — they  have  a  value  which  it  would  be 
difficult  to  overestimate.  But  in  a  study  of  the  real  influences  of 
the  Holy  Alliance  upon  the  organization  of  Europe,  they  need 
only  to  be  mentioned  in  passing. 

It  was  shortly  after  the  return  of  Napoleon  from  Elba,  while 
the  Tsar  was  hastening  through  Germany  to  join  his  armies  in 
France,  that  he  first  met  this  extraordinary  woman  who  was  to 
be  so  strangely  associated  with  his  preparation  and  promulgation 
of  the  Holy  Alliance.  It  was  by  a  combination  of  circumstances, 
probably  not  wholly  fortuitous,  that  the  "sibyl"  found  herself 
for  the  first  time  face  to  face  with  her  sovereign  and  future  pupil.^ 

'  Gentz,  Depeches  ineditesdu  Chevalier  de  Gentz  aux  Hospodars  de  Valachie,  vol.  I,  p.  216. 

^  See  Metternich's  statement  in  the  following  chapter;  also  Pasquier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i  v,  p.  23. 

^Madame  de  Kriidener's  life  has  been  written  in  two  volumes  by  Eynard.  An 
entertaining  biography  largely  drawn  from  the  above,  Life  and  Letters  of  Madame  de 
Kriidener,  has  appeared  in  English  by  C.  Ford.     She  was  also  the  subject  of  two  of  St. 


INTRODUCTION  33 

Following  this  first  brief  interview,  during  which  the  Tsar  seems 
to  have  been  much  impressed  by  Madame  de  Kriidener's  per- 
sonality, he  invited  her  to  join  him  in  Paris  when  her  prophecies 
concerning  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon  should  be  fulfilled.  On 
July  14,  1815,  she  appeared  in  that  capital,  her  arrival  almost 
coinciding  with  that  of  the  victorious  Tsar.  She  was  lodged  in 
quarters  in  convenient  proximity  to  those  occupied  by  Alexander 
himself.  Her  salons  soon  became  the  scene  of  an  almost  continual 
"prayer  meeting."  While  Madame  de  Kriidener  still  assisted 
publicly  at  the  elaborate  services  of  the  Greek  rite,  celebrated  in 
the  Tsar's  chapel  at  the  Elysee,  the  private  reunions  in  her  own 
home  were  modeled  on  the  simple  gathering  of  the  early  Chris- 
tians.^ Whenever  the  Tsar  honored  her  gatherings  with  his 
presence,  Madame  de  Kriidener,  falling  on  her  knees,  would  com- 
mence a  long  prayer,  generally  reciting  the  triumphs  of  religion 
as  exemplified  in  Alexander's  victories,  together  with  pressing 
demands  for  the  general  repentance  and  conversion  of  mankind. 
Her  aims  seem  to  have  included  a  general  reconciliation  of  all  the 
churches  of  Europe.  It  was  to  aid  her  in  this  work  that  she 
appealed  especially  to  the  repentant  Tsar,  a  task  he  may  well 
have  believed  related  to  his  own  international  aims. 

Mystified  by  the  strange  relationship  between  Madame  de 
Kriidener  and  her  Imperial  "disciple,"  contemporary  writers  have 
undoubtedly  exaggerated  her  influence.  Extravagant  stories 
were  told  concering  the  mystical  ceremonies  that  attended  their 
interviews.  The  language  used  by  the  "initiated"  was  in  itself 
calculated  to  excite  suspicion  and  ridicule.  The  vocabulary  of 
Madame  de  Kriidener  finds  an  echo  in  Alexander's  letters  and  even 
in  his  oflicial  documents — a  fact  which  probably  gave  rise  to  the 
rumor  that  she  either  wrote  with  her  own  hand  or  inspired  many 
of  his  political  acts.  That  she  was  responsible,  however,  for  any 
of  the  Tsar's  political  theories  is  not  only  denied  by  contemporary 

Beuves'  literary  "portraits."  Barbara  Julie  de  Weitinghov  was  born  in  Riga  in  the  year 
1764.  When  their  first  meeting  took  place,  she  was  therefore  considerably  older  than 
Alexander  (born  1777)  and  certainly  well  past  the  bloom  of  her  former  beauty.  (Ford, 
op.  cit.,  p.  4.)  Her  father  was  a  Senator  of  the  Empire,  sincerely  pro-Russian  in  spite  of 
his  Baltic  ancestry.  Her  early  religious  environment  was  that  of  the  Greek  Orthodox 
Church.  She  was  married  at  an  early  age  to  Baron  de  Krudener — and  after  a  youth  of 
pleasure  and  frivolity  became  a  mystical  religieuse  and  devoted  to  good  works. 

1  These  were  attended,  however,  principally  by  members  of  the  highest  society.  Among 
her  congregation  were  the  Duchess  of  Bourbon  and  Duras,  Mme.  Recamier  (who  was 
asked  to  make  herself  "as  ugly  as  possible  so  as  not  to  trouble  souls"),  Chateaubriand  and 
Benjamin  Constant.     Eynard,  Vie  de  Madame  de  Kriidener,  vol.  ii,  p.  30. 


34  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

writers,^  but  is  also  rendered  highly  improbable  from  all  that  is 
known  of  her  teachings.  It  is  difficult,  moreover,  to  conceive  that 
an  experienced  statesman  like  the  Tsar  should  have  been  more 
than  superficially  influenced  by  such  a  source  of  political  advice. 
Recent  evidence  tends  to  prove  that  another  member  of  Madame 
de  Kriidener's  circle  was  infinitely  more  influential  than  the  Baro- 
ness in  this  respect. 

The  part  played  by  the  reactionary  philosopher  Bergasse  in 
the  preparation  of  the  Holy  Alliance  is  defined  by  another  con- 
temporary writer,  Leopold  de  Gaillard.^  Bergasse  was  a  political 
writer  of  some  note  under  the  first  Bourbon  restoration.  However 
reactionary  his  theories  may  have  been,  they  were  at  any  rate  the 
result  of  scientific  inquiry,  not  of  mystical  inspiration.  From 
Gaillard's  account,  it  becomes  evident  that  Bergasse  furnished 
the  "political"  theories,  while  Madame  de  Kriidener  furnished  the 
language  and  inspiration  of  the  Tsar's  manifesto.  Bergasse  seems 
to  have  dreamed  of  a  system  of  theocracy,  vicariously  asserting 
itself  through  the  institution  of  legitimate  monarchy.  The  reign 
of  universal  peace  he  believed  might  be  secured  through  an 
active  cooperation  between  the  Kings  of  Christendom,  the  ''Lord's 
anointed"  on  earth.  The  rights  of  man  with  difficulty  found  a 
place  in  this  new  order  of  ideas,  although  their  rulers  were  bound 
by  higher  laws  to  respect  them.  However  mystical  and  impracti- 
cable such  a  doctrine  might  appear  to  the  statesmen  of  Europe, 
it  was,  nevertheless,  to  be  the  principle  he  besought  Alexander  to 
apply  to  the  adjustment  of  international  diff'erences. 

The  influence  of  Bergasse  long  outlasted  that  of  the  "Letton- 
ian  sibyl."  Even  during  the  Congress  of  Verona  he  continued  in 
correspondence  with  the  Tsar,  urging  that  he  use  the  might  of 
the  "Holy  League"  to  stamp  out  the  power  of  the  revolutionary 
"sects."     There  is  also  evidence  of  somewhat  stilted  and  formal 

'  "I  do  not  know  upon  what  foundations  the  authors  of  the  two  histories  of  Alexander 
have  been  pleased  to  attribute  to  the  exalted  imagination  of  Madame  de  Kriidener  the  idea 
of  the  Holy  Alliance  and  the  League  of  universal  peace, — a  noble  project,  which  could  only 
have  had  birth  in  the  mind  of  Alexander  himself.  Neither  at  that  time  nor  afterwards, 
when  on  several  occasions  he  conversed  with  me,  did  the  Emperor  pronounce  the  name  of 
the  author  of  Falerie,  although  he  often  spoke  of  the  celebrated  literary  men  of  past  times 
and  of  the  present,  and  even  of  women  distinguished  for  their  wit  and  intelligence,  such  as 
Madame  de  Stael,  whose  great  talents  he  admired."     Mme.  de  Choiseul-Gouffier,  p.  153. 

^  Quoted  in  Bergasse:  A  Defender  of  Old  Tradition  under  the  Revolution.  This  interest- 
ing collection  of  family  papers  has  a  valuable  introduction  by  M.  Etienne  Lamy,  mem- 
ber of  the  French  Academy. 


INTRODUCTION  35 

requests  on  Alexander's  part  for  further  light  upon  the  subject.^ 
It  soon  becomes  evident,  however,  that  the  Tsar  was  tired  of  the 
torrent  of  advice  poured  out  by  this  loquacious  valetudinarian. 
The  influence  of  Nicholas  Bergasse — an  influence  which  has  per- 
haps not  been  sufficiently  reckoned  with  in  judging  of  the  re- 
actionary phase  of  Alexander's  policy — appears  to  have  ended 
in  much  the  same  way  as  other  momentarily  preponderating  in- 
fluences in  the  life  of  the  great  idealist.  Like  Czartoryski, 
Speranski,  Madame  de  Kriidener  and  other  lesser  oracles,  Bergasse 
"became  a  bore"  and  was  somewhat  brutally  discarded  in  conse- 
quence. The  Tsar  possessed  to  a  finished  degree  the  faculty  of 
taking  advice  when  he  needed  it  to  support  his  own  faltering 
judgment.  But  once  his  course  was  decided  upon,  he  became 
suspicious  and  intolerant  of  anything  that  savored  of  direction. 
Like  all  convinced  doctrinaires,  he  abhorred  sermons  unless  he 
himself  occupied  the  pulpit. 

^The  "sects"  in  this  correspondence  seem  to  have  played  the  role  of  the  "reds"  in  our 
own  time.  Alexander's  note  of  acknowledgment  dated  4/16  August,  1822,  admits  that 
he  has  "only  been  able  to  consider  these  matters  hastily."     Bergasse,  p.  383. 


CHAPTER  I 
THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE 

"A  Congress  of  Kings  was  to  be  held  at  Cambray.  It  was  to  consist  of 
Maximilian  the  Emperor,  P'rancis  the  First  king  of  France,  Henry  the  Eighth 
of  England,  and  Charles,  the  sovereign  of  the  low  countries.  They  were  to 
enter,  in  the  most  solemn  manner,  into  mutual  and  indissoluble  engage- 
ments to  preserve  Peace  with  each  other,  and  consequently.  Peace  through- 
out Europe  .  .  .  But  certain  persons,  who  get  nothing  by  Peace  and  a 
great  deal  by  War,  threw  obstacles  in  the  way,  which  prevented  this  truly 
kingly  purpose  from  being  carried  into  execution."  Erasmus,  The  Complaint 
of  Peace  ilSl7). 

Through  their  adhesion  to  the  "Act  of  September  14,  1815," 
on  the  Plain  of  Vertus,  the  chief  Continental  Powers  had  reluc- 
tantly signed  the  acknowledgment  of  an  obligation  to  "com- 
mon action."  ^  If  the  mystical  language  of  the  "  Holy  AUiance" 
contained  any  practical  meaning  this  lay  in  its  affirmation  that  the 
sovereigns  of  Europe  should  "on  all  occasions  and  in  all  places 
lend  each  other  aid  and  assistance."  Nor  was  this  to  be  a  "partial 
and" exclusive  alliance."  All  Powers  who  should  choose  solemnly 
to  avow  its  "sacred  principles"  were  to  be  received  in  its  bonds 
"with  equal  ardor  and  affection."  Before  noting  the  effect  of 
this  invitation  upon  the  non-signatory  Powers,  it  would  be  well 
to  consider  certain  evidence  concerning  the  attitude  of  the  signers 
themselves  toward  the  vague  program  to  which  they  found  them- 
selves pledged. 

The  spirit  in  which  Alexander's  cherished  scheme  for  a  Christian 
League  of  Peace  was  received  by  his  allies  is  perhaps  best  shown 
in  Metternich's  own  account  of  the  events  just  preceding  the  signa- 
ture of  the  manifesto: 

During  the  course  of  the  negotiations  which  brought  about  the  signa- 
ture of  the  second  Peace  of  Paris,  the  Emperor  Alexander  asked  me  for  an 
interview.  He  then  informed  me  that  he  was  busy  with  a  great  enter- 
prise concerning  which  he  especially  desired  to  consult  the  Emperor 
Francis.  "There  are  certain  matters,"  said  the  Tsar,  "which  can  only 
be  considered  in  the  light  of  intimate  beliefs.  Moreover,  such  beliefs 
are  entirely  subject  to  influences  and  considerations  of  a  personal  char- 
acter. If  this  matter  were  purely  an  affair  of  state,  I  would  immediately 
have  asked  for  your  advice.     The  subject,  however,  is  one  of  such  a 

'The  name  of  Holy  "Alliance"  or  "League"  was  a  popular  designation.  With  refer- 
ence to  the  much  discussed  adhesion  of  the  Prince  Regent  of  Great  Britain,  Gentz  observes: 
"The  Prince  Regent,  either  carelessly  or  to  be  agreeable — or  even  to  make  fun  of  his 
August  Ally  (the  latter  is  very  possible  in  view  of  the  fact  that  his  signature  had  no  value 
without  a  countersign)  answered  with  an  autograph  letter  adhering  to  the  pact."  Gentz, 
Depeches  inedites  du  Chevalier  de  Gentz  aux  Hospodars  de  Valachie,  vol.  i,  p.  217. 

37 


38  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

nature  that  the  council  of  official  advisers  can  be  of  no  use.  It  is  one 
requiring  the  decisions  of  sovereigns  themselves  .  .  ."  Several  days 
afterwards,  the  Emperor  Francis  sent  for  me  and  informed  me  that  he 
had  just  returned  from  a  visit  to  the  Tsar,  who  had  asked  him  to  come 
I  alone  to  discuss  matters  of  high  importance.  "The  subject  of  our  con- 
versation," said  the  Emperor,  "you  will  understand,  after  reading  the 
document  the  Tsar  has  submitted  to  me  with  the  request  I  give  it  my 
earnest  attention  ,  .  .  For  my  own  part,  I  have  no  sympathies  with 
the  ideas  it  contains,  which  have  given  me  food  for  great  unrest." 

It  did  not  require  any  very  serious  study  to  convince  me  the  document 
had  no  other  value  or  sense  except  considered  as  a  philanthropic  aspira- 
tion cloaked  in  religious  phraseology.  I  was  convinced  it  could  in  no 
way  be  considered  the  subject  of  a  treaty  between  sovereigns,  and  that 
it  might  even  give  rise  to  grave  misinterpretations  of  a  religious  character.^ 

Metternich  found  the  King  of  Prussia,  who  had  also  been  con- 
sulted by  Alexander,  averse  to  thwarting  the  desire  of  his  powerful 
ally,  but  equally  doubtful  as  to  the  propriety  of  signing  the 
manifesto  in  its  original  form.  It  was  only  after  Metternich  had, 
not  without  difficulty,  secured  the  Tsar's  consent  to  a  number  of 
changes  that  the  promised  signatures  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria 
and  the  King  of  Prussia  were  finally  obtained.  In  the  case  of 
Emperor  Francis  this  act  was  executed  (as  Metternich  states) 
"in  spite  of  a  natural  antipathy  with  which  the  whole  project 
inspired  him."  In  closing  his  account  of  the  above  transaction, 
Metternich  adds  the  following  significant,  though  somewhat  dis- 
ingenuous, paragraph: 

The  irrefutable  proof  of  what  I  have  detailed  above  is  found  in  the 
fact  that  subsequently  there  never  was  any  question  among  the  Cabinets 
of  Europe  of  a  "Holy  Alliance";  that  no  such  questions  indeed  could 
arise.     It  was  only  those  hostile  to  the  monarchical  party  who  sought  to 

^xploit  this  act  and  use  it  as  a  weapon  of  calumny  against  its  authors. 

•The  Holy  Alliance  was  never  founded  to  restrain  the  liberties  of  the 
people,  nor  to  advance  the  cause  of  absolutism.  It  was  solely  the  expres- 
sion of  the  mystical  beliefs  of  the  Emperor  Alexander;  the  application  of 
the  principles  of  Christianity  to  public  policy.  It  is  from  this  strange 
mixture  of  religious  and  political  theories  that  the  conception  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  arose.  It  was  developed  under  the  influence  of  Madame  de 
Kriidener  and  Monsieur  Bergasse.  No  one  knows  better  than  myself 
the  true  meaning  of  this  empty  and  sonorous  document.^ 

Metternich  (who  at  a  later  date  was  to  turn  to  the  purposes  of 
Austrian  diplomacy  the  bond  of  indiscriminate  solidarity  which 
Alexander  believed  to  be  the  essence  of  the  Holy  Alliance)  always 
insisted  upon  the  essential  difference  between  the  League  of  Sover- 

'Metternich,  Memoires,  vol.  I,  pp.  209-210. 
^Ibid.,  pp.  211-212. 


THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE         39 

eigns  and  the  "conventional"  agreements  of  the  System  of  1815. 
Posterity,  he  believed,  would  ascribe  to  his  "system" — rather 
than  to  the  Tsar's  manifesto — the  credit  for  the  long  peace 
enjoyed  by  Europe  from  the  downfall  of  Napoleon  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  Crimean  War.  Perhaps  the  truest  conception  of  this  much- 
misunderstood  document  may  be  obtained  from  the  WTitings  of 
the  two  philosophers  to  whom  Alexander  was  chiefly  indebted  for 
his  political  theories — Bergasse  and  Laharpe. 

Two  fundamental  ideas  (wrote  Bergasse)  appear  as  the  basis  of  the 
Treaty  of  the  Holy  Alliance:  The  Sovereignty  of  God,  the  Brotherhood 
of  Mankind. 

The  spectacle  offered  by  the  events  of  the  Revolution  has  afforded  a 
terrible  lesson  both  to  the  nations  and  their  rulers.  The  catastrophes 
which  have  shaken  the  foundations  of  Europe  had  one  fundamental 
cause :  the  weakening  of  the  bonds  of  religion  and  the  resulting  corruption 
of  both  peoples  and  princes.  This  corruption  of  public  morals  brought 
with  it  inevitable  disorder  and  anarchy.  The  systematic  repudiation  of 
all  Divine  Law — and  the  pretensions  advanced  by  those  who  believed 
only  in  the  sovereign  rights  of  man — were  the  fundamentals  of  revolu- 
tionary doctrine.  According  to  these  theories  (had  such  a  result  been 
possible)  organized  disorder  would  have  been  permanently  established, 
thus  inaugurating  a  period  of  fresh  disasters. 

In  the  presence  of  such  a  possibility  it  became  a  great  and  solemn 
necessity  to  proclaim  as  a  guiding  principle  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Divine  Will — and  the  essential  doctrine  that  nations  as  well  as  indi- 
viduals must  obey  His  laws  if  they  desire  to  continue  in  a  state  of  peace 
and  prosperity.^ 

In  the  face  of  the  general  criticism  which  the  mystical  language 
of  Alexander's  manifesto  aroused,  even  his  old  teacher  Laharpe 
was  moved  to  defend  the  good  intentions — and  good  sense — of  his 
Imperial  pupil.  There  was  little  in  common,  however,  between 
the  theories  of  the  Holy  Alliance  and  his  own  philosophical  pre- 
cepts. His  half-hearted  explanations  are  chiefly  interesting 
because  of  his  early  relations  to  the  Tsar. 

In  answer  to  an  article  on  "Alexander  of  Russia,"  by  Impeytany, 

Laharpe  wrote: 

Although  intrepid  in  the  midst  of  danger,  Alexander  had  a  horror  of 
war.  Thoroughly  aware  of  the  abuses  that  excite  the  discontent  of 
nations,  he  hoped  that  during  a  lengthened  peace,  the  want  of  which 
was  generally  felt,  the  governments  of  Europe,  recognizing  the  impor- 
tance of  undertaking  such  reforms  as  the  necessities  of  the  age  called  for, 
would  seriously  apply  themselves  to  that  work.  To  this  end  a  state  of 
profound  tranquillity  was  indispensable;  and  as  the  confusion  of  the 

^Bergasse:  A  Defender  of  Old  Tradition  under  the  Raiolution,  pp.  261-262. 


40  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

past  thirty  years  appeared  to  have  greatly  weakened  the  old  ideas  of 
order  and  subordination,  he  thought  to  offer  a  remedy  by  making  a 
solemn  appeal  to  religion.  So  far  at  least  as  this  monarch  is  concerned, 
no  doubt  such  an  appeal  was  an  emanation  proceeding  from  his  own 
noble  heart;  but  the  genius  of  evil  soon  took  possession  of  these  philan- 
thropic conceptions,  and  turned  them  against  himself.  The  assem- 
blage in  the  "Plaine  de  Vertus"  (14  September,  1815)  of  a  Russian 
army  of  160,000  men  ready  for  the  field,  struck  with  amazement  the 
diplomatic  corps  of  Europe,  who  were  present  at  the  imposing  spectacle; 
but  such  an  exhibition  of  the  military  strength  of  a  vast  empire  alarmed 
them  much  less  than  the  invisible  power  and  perfect  moral  influence 
which  the  greatness  of  soul  and  well-known  principles  of  the  monarch 
who  now  reviewed  his  troops  had  created.  At  this  period,  indeed,  from 
north  to  south,  from  east  to  west,  the  eyes  of  the  oppressed  were  turned 
towards  Alexander  I;  but  from  this  moment  also  is  to  be  dated  the  con- 
spiracy which  secretly  plotted  to  strip  him  of  that  formidable  moral 
power,  which  gave  him  for  auxiliaries  every  friend  of  enlightenment  and 
humanity — the  universal  cooperation  of  honest  men.  Disposed  by  the 
native  moderation  of  his  character  to  consent  to  anything  which  might 
remove  fears  of  his  preponderating  influence,  and  willing  at  any  price 
to  dissipate  the  alarm  that  was  feigned  or  felt,  he  consented  to  the 
establishment  of  a  court  of  Areopagus,  where  a  majority  of  votes  should 
decide  the  measures  to  be  taken  in  common  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
general  tranquillity.  The  genius  of  evil  quickly  caught  a  glimpse  of  the 
advantage  he  might  reap  from  so  generous  an  abrogation  of  this  pre- 
ponderating influence.  Thanks  to  the  troublesome  and  vexatious  turn 
the  members  managed  to  give  to  the  progress  of  ordinary  aff'airs,  the 
confidence  of  the  nations  was  impaired,  and  the  magnanimous  monarch 
who  had  so  well  deserved  it  saw  it  lost,  amid  the  impious  acclamations 
of  the  enemies  to  his  glory,  who  did  not  hesitate  to  impute  to  his  obstinate 
and  absolute  will,  measures  the  most  unpopular  which  they  dictated  in 
their  Areopagus.^ 

The  suspicions  and  distrust  v^^ith  w^hich  his  declaration  of  peace 
and  good  will  was  received  by  the  Powers  of  Europe^  caused 
Alexander  to  take  decisive  measures  to  correct  the  impression 
that  his  "Great  Enterprise"  was  intended  to  hide  a  policy  of 
self-interest.  On  March  18,  1816  (following  an  Imperial  ukase 
ordering  that  a  manifesto  summarizing  the  treaty  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  be  read  in  all  the  churches  of  the  Empire),  Alexander 
wrote  a  long  letter  to  his  Ambassador  in  London,  Count 
Lieven,  disclaiming  any  intention  of  hostile  action  "against 
non-Christian  nations."     He  protested  with  pathetic  vehemence 

'Schnitzler,  Secret  History  of  the  Court  and  Government  of  Russia,  vol.  r,  pp.  70-72. 

'^Writing  under  date  of  October,  1815,  de  Maistre  describes  the  effect  produced  in  St. 
Petersburg  by  the  signing  of  the  Holy  Alliance:  "This  document  has  not  yet  been  printed, 
but  has  been  read  at  Gastchina  in  the  presence  of  the  Empress  .  .  .  Its  author  is  Alex- 
ander himself,  who  writes  with  great  facility  and  elegance."  Joseph  de  Maistre,  Lettres, 
vol.  I,  p.  360. 


THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE         41 

against  the  calumny  which  persisted  in  considering  this  act  of 
Christian  love  and  fraternity  as  masking  a  plan  for  further  con- 
quest.^ 

In  this  declaration,  written  by  Alexander's  own  hand,  we  may 
recognize  not  only  the  spirit  of  mystical  ardor  which  lay  at  the 
root  of  the  "Holy  Treaty,"  but  also  the  very  style  and  dialect  of 
this  extraordinary  document. 

The  letter  to  Lieven  was,  moreover,  a  renewed  appeal  to  Great 
Britain  to  join  the  chief  Powers  of  Europe  in  their  Pact  of  Peace. 
At  the  time  the  Holy  Alliance  was  promulgated  the  Prince  Regent 
had  refused  to  become  a  party  to  this  supplemental  treaty,  "not 
because  of  the  principles  set  forth,"  but  because  (as  he  declared 
in  a  letter  of  October  6,  1816)  "the  Act  of  September  26,  1815,  was 
personally  concluded  by  the  signatory  sovereigns  while  the  British 
Constitution  demanded  that  treaties  should  be  signed  by  the 
responsible  Ministers."^ 

Liberal  opinion  in  Great  Britain  had  shown  itself  immediately 
suspicious  of  this  Brotherhood  of  Sovereigns,  and  indeed  of  the 
whole  language  and  tone  of  the  "Holy  Pact."  Partisan  spirit  and 
a  desire  to  embarrass  the  government  were  undoubtedly  at  the 
bottom  of  many  of  the  fiery  speeches  made  by  the  Liberals  in 

^The  letter  is  given  in  full  in  Grand  Due  Nicolas  Mikhailowitch,  L' Empereur  Alex- 
andre /«^  vol.  I,  pp.  171-172: 

St.  Petersburg,  March  i8th. 
To  MY  Ambassador,  Count  Lieven,  Sir: 

Having  considered  it  advisable  to  give  wide  currency  to  the  Act  of  Fraternal  and 
Christian  Alliance  concluded  the  14th  of  September  last  (old  style)  with  my  Allies,  H.  M. 
the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  H.  M.  the  King  of  Prussia,  I  have  decided  to  expose  both  its 
spirit  and  true  meaning  to  the  persons  who,  like  yourself,  are  charged  with  interpreting  my 
intentions,  at  the  courts  allied  with  Russia.  The  explanations  which  I  will  now  give,  will 
allow  of  no  further  misconceptions  with  respect  to  the  act  itself,  nor  of  the  manifesto 
announcing  it  to  my  people. 

The  mass  of  rumors  which  have  reached  me  respecting  the  false  interpretations  given  to 
this  guarantee  of  union  and  harmony  show  the  high  importance  of  some  more  precise 
explanation  regarding  the  motives  upon  which  it  is  based.  The  Genius  of  Evil,  over- 
thrown by  the  hand  of  a  Providence  which  disposes  as  it  wills  of  both  sovereigns  and  their 
people,  now  makes  a  final  effort  to  besmirch  the  terms  of  this  Declaration  by  suggesting 
political  motives  as  incompatible  with  the  intentions  which  have  inspired  it  as  they  are 
contrary  to  the  salutary  end  it  is  destined  to  fulfil.  My  allies  and  myself,  moved  by  the 
same  noble  purposes  which  inspired  the  last  great  European  struggle,  have  had  no  other  end 
in  view  than  the  means  of  applying  more  efficaciously  to  both  the  civil  polity  and  external 
relations  of  States  the  principles  of  Peace,  Concord  and  Love,  which  are  the  fruit  of  the 
Christian  Religion. 

It  has  been  our  pleasure  to  consider  this  act  a  means  of  associating  ourselves  with  the 
very  essence  of  these  saving  precepts — rules  of  conduct  which  have  been  too  long  confined 
to  the  sphere  of  private  relationships. 

^Pasquier,  Memoires,  vol.  iv,  p.  22.  Except  for  this  obvious  and  informal  approval  of 
the  Christian  principles  affirmed  in  the  Holy  Alliance  there  is  no  other  ground  for  the 
statement  that  Great  Britain  ever  adhered  to  this  pact. 


42  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Parliament  and  the  denunciations  that  soon  appeared  in  the 
newspapers  of  the  day.  During  the  two  brief  sessions  of  ParHa- 
ment  which  considered  the  question  of  the  new  treaty  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  the  opposition  fully  realized  the  importance  of  the 
subject  upon  which  they  poured  forth  their  critical  eloquence. 
This  was  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  Brougham.  It  was  the 
old  grievance  of  "secret  diplomacy"  and  the  "clique"  directing 
the  policy  of  the  Foreign  Office  which  excited  his  wrath. 

In  the  session  of  the  House  of  Commons  held  February  8,  1816, 
Mr.  Brougham  stated  that  he 

would  now  move  for  the  production  of  two  papers  which,  though  he 
had  reason  to  believe  they  existed,  were  not  to  be  found  in  the  great  mass 
laid  before  the  House.  The  first  he  considered  with  great  jealousy  and 
alarm,  coupled  with  the  speech  made  from  the  Throne  and  the  declara- 
tions of  the  Noble  Lord.  It  was  a  treaty  (dated  September  25,  1815)^ 
between  Austria,  Russia  and  Prussia,  a  treaty  to  which  this  country  was 
not  a  party,  nor  yet  France.  It  was  ratified  the  25th  of  December,  a 
day  ostentatiously  mentioned  as  the  Birthday  of  our  Saviour,  The 
treaty  was  of  a  very  general  nature  and  seemed  to  have  no  definite  prac- 
tical or  secular  object  but  professed  to  relate  to  the  interests  of  the  Chris- 
tian nations.    He  suspected  more  was  meant  by  this  than  met  the  eye.^ 

Formally  answering  the  above  statement,  Lord  Castlereagh 
merely  stated :  "I  believe  the  treaty  had  no  evil  views  whatsoever." 

Referring  to  a  treaty  alleged  to  have  been  signed  between 
France  and  Austria  and  some  other  Power  "to  which  Mr.  Brougham 
had  referred  in  an  earlier  part  of  his  speech,"  Lord  Castlereagh 
somewhat  superciliously  declared  "he  could  not  understand  to 
what  paper  the  former  referred."  He  closed  his  formal  acknowl- 
edgment of  Brougham's  interpellation  by  declaring  that  the 
treaties  as  he  understood  them  were  "concluded  in  the  mildest 
spirit  of  Christian  tolerance,"  although  he  admitted  "that  they 
were  drawn  up  in  a  manner  rather  unusual." 

During  the  session  of  the  House  of  Commons  held  on  February 
9,^  Brougham  renewed  his  attack  upon  the  treaty,  which,  it  is 
to  be  noted,  still  remained  unnamed.  "The  sovereigns,"  he  began, 
"have  merely  bound  themselves  to  observe  their  mutual  engage- 
ments and  to  promote  the  Christian  faith."  "What  engagements," 
he  asked,  "are  these,  and  why  is  it  necessary  to  protect  the  Chris- 
tian faith.?" 

'The  "Noble  Lord"  was  Castlereagh — the  treaty,  that  of  September  14/26,  1815. 
"^  London  Times,  February  9,  1816,  p.  2,  col.  2. 
'''Ibid.,  February  10,  1816,  p.  2,  cols.  3-4. 


THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE  43 

"Something  in  the  very  language  adopted,  though  it  professed 
no  practical  or  secular  object,  bears  in  itself  a  character  of  sus- 
picion." Continuing  in  the  same  tone  of  biting  sarcasm  he  re- 
ferred with  telling  effect  to  the  fact  that  the  very  Powers  which 
had  become  a  party  to  the  League  were  those  which  had  joined  in 
the  great  international  infamy  of  the  partition  of  Poland.  "Even 
the  language  of  diplomacy,"  he  declared,  "can  not  disguise  the 
fact  that  a  similar  intention  is  probably  maintained  at  the  present 
moment."  Here  the  speaker  was  interrupted  by  loud  Liberal 
cheering.  When  this  had  died  away,  Brougham  moved  an  address 
to  the  Prince  Regent,  asking  both  for  the  production  of  the  treaties 
and  of  another  treaty  dated  January  26,  1815,  concerning  "guar- 
antees against  Russia." 

Castlereagh's  reply  was  a  model  of  moderation  and  debating 
skill.  "If  the  sovereigns  had  not  coalesced,"  he  advanced, 
"Europe  w^ould  never  have  been  relieved."  The  success  of  the 
Confederation  was  due  "entirely  to  the  present  conferences  of  the 
sovereigns.  At  Chaumont  the  sovereigns  had  expressly  reserved 
the  right  to  make  separate  engagements  not  contrary  to  the 
general  objects  of  the  war."  Castlereagh  felt  he  could  even  admit 
that  the  Emperor  of  Russia  had  shown  him  a  rough  draft  of  the 
agreement  referred  to,  before  it  was  submitted  to  the  other  sover- 
eigns, and  at  the  same  time  had  requested  him  to  invite  the  Prince 
Regent  to  accede  to  the  treaty.  His  answer  to  this  request  had 
been  that  it  was  not  usual  for  the  British  Government  to  be  a 
party  to  treaties  concluded  in  such  a  form.  At  the  same  time  he 
added  his  assurances  that  every  good  disposition  was  felt  toward 
the  object  of  the  arrangement,  which  was  not  directed  against  "an 
un-Christian  Power,"  as  was  very  generally  believed. 

Mr.  Bennett,  another  prominent  leader  of  the  Liberal  opposi- 
tion, now  took  up  the  line  of  attack  where  Brougham  had  left  off. 
"Lord  Castlereagh's  arrogant  tone,"  he  declared,  "seems  to  con- 
sider independent  states  at  his  disposal  so  that  he  decides  their 
fate  according  to  his  will;  one  to  be  weakened,  the  third  divided, 
etc."  He  then  censured  the  Noble  Lord  for  the  tone  of  eulogy 
which  he  had  used  in  connection  with  the  Alliance  which  Mr. 
Brougham  had  brought  to  his  attention.  He  characterized  it  as  a 
compact  "conspicuously  against  the  freedom  and  rights  of  the 
subjects  of  the  sovereigns  concerned." 


44  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

This  brief  outburst  of  Liberal  hostility  to  the  first  announce- 
ment of  the  Holy  Alliance  appears  to  have  been  without  imme- 
diate result.  For  many  weeks  all  further  discussion  of  the 
matter  was  avoided  in  Parliament.  By  a  party  vote  of  30  against 
104  (a  division  along  party  lines),  Brougham's  motion  was 
defeated.  The  deep  waters  of  the  ministerial  majority  closed 
silently  over  the  whole  matter.  A  brief  editorial  appeared  in  the 
Times  of  February  9,  generally  unfavorable  in  its  tone  to  the 
principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  But  even  the  Thunderer  kept 
silence  in  the  face  of  the  governmental  policy  which  counseled 
Great  Britain  to  consolidate  a  necessary  friendship  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  Tsar  of  Russia. 


Just  one  hundred  years  ago  the  young  philosopher  Emerson 
wrote  concerning  the  states  of  Europe  in  his  Concord  Diaries: 

Aloof  from  contagion  during  the  long  progress  of  their  decline,  America 
hath  ample  interval  to  lay  deep  and  solid  foundations  for  the  great- 
ness of  the  New  World. ^ 

Let  the  young  American  withdraw  his  eyes  from  all  but  his  own  coun- 
try, and  try,  if  he  can,  to  find  employment  there  ...  In  this  age 
the  despots  of  Europe  are  engaged  in  the  common  cause  of  tightening 
the  bonds  of  monarchy  about  the  thriving  liberties  and  the  laws  of  men; 
and  the  unprivileged  orders,  the  bulk  of  human  society,  gasping  for 
breath  beneath  their  chains,  and  darting  impatient  glances  towards  the 
free  institution  of  other  countries.  To  America,  therefore,  monarchs 
look  with  apprehension,  and  the  people  with  hope.^ 

During  the  great  crisis  of  reconstruction  following  the  Napo- 
leonic Wars,  Emerson  in  voicing  the  liberal  opinion  of  New 
England  but  repeated  the  warnings  of  Washington.  Yet  many 
reasons  insistently  urged  a  "moral  participation"  in  European 
aflFairs.  Moreover,  the  invitation  extended  to  the  United  States 
to  share  in  the  councils  of  Europe,  as  we  shall  have  cause  to  note 
in  the  present  chapter,  was  no  less  insistent  than  at  the  present 
day. 

The  decision  which  the  statesmen  of  the  Washington  Cabinet 
were  called  upon  to  take  with  respect  to  American  participation  in 
the  affairs  of  Europe  during  the  period  from  1815  to  1818  recalls 
the  no  less  momentous  problems  of  the  present  time. 

During  the  period  of  reconstruction  preceding  the  Congress  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle,   Alexander  was    apparently   convinced   that   in 

1  Emerson,  Journals,  vol.  1820-1824,  p.  201.  ^Ibid.,  pp.  246-247. 


THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE         45 

order  to  obtain  the  "universality"  which  he  desired  for  his  system, 
the  "Holy  League"  must  include  not  only  the  Christian  Powers 
of  the  continent,  but  also  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
His  efforts  to  persuade  the  two  English-speaking  nations  to  adhere 
to  his  pact  of  "Justice,  Christian  Charity  and  Peace"  form  an 
interesting  chapter  in  the  development  of  internationalism.  It 
soon  became  evident  that,  in  spite  of  the  duties  laid  upon  her  by 
the  Treaties  of  Chaumont,  Paris  and  Vienna,  England  was  de- 
termined to  return  as  quickly  as  possible  to  her  policy  of  inde- 
pendent action — and  as  Canning  subsequently  announced,  to 
"resume  her  isolation." 

Conservative  opinion  in  England  may  have  leaned  to  the  side  of 
the  Powers  of  the  Holy  Alliance  when  these  concerted  their  meas- 
ures against  revolution.^  So  far  as  revolution  against  the  Bour- 
bons in  France  was  concerned  they  were  indeed  bound  to  con- 
certed action  by  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance.-  It  was 
not  until  after  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  that  the  British 
Cabinet  were  called  upon  to  draw  line  distinctions  between  what 
a  constitutional  government  might  or  might  not  do  to  assist 
a  group  of  reactionary  allies  in  applying  broad  measures  of 
repression  in  every  corner  of  Europe.  But  from  the  beginning 
Alexander  seems  to  have  been  suspicious  of  the  spirit  shown  by  the 
opposition  in  Parliament  ^  towards  his  League,  and  to  have  sought 
to  exploit  the  differences  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  in  a  sense  favorable  to  his  own  policy  of  an  "unalterable" 
union  among  the  Great  Powers. 

In  the  United  States  the  policy  debated  by  the  Monroe 
Cabinet  and  the  conclusions  arrived  at  were  to  fix  the  course  of 
American  foreign  affairs  until  our  own  day.  When  the  repeated 
appeals  of  the  Tsar's  envoys  had  failed  to  obtain  results  which 
their  master  so  ardently  desired,  Alexander's  sensitive  pride  caused 

^But  even  Lord  Castlereagh  was  early  "obliged  to  pretend  to  disapprove  of  the  conti- 
nental system  of  the  Holy  Alliance."  Greville,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  p.  105.  See  also 
Hansard's  Debates,  vol.  ii,  p.  359. 

^Article  II  of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  bound  the  signatory  Powers  to  common  action 
against  the  "same  revolutionary  principles  that  caused  the  recent  usurpation  in  France." 
Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil  des  traites  de Paix,  vol.  Ii,  pp.  735-736. 

^  The  confusion  of  modern  writers  with  respect  to  British  policy  towards  the  Quadruple 
Alliance  which  she  signed  and  the  Holy  Alliance  which  she  diplomatically  opposed  is 
scarcely  understandable.  Often,  however,  in  writings  of  the  time  "the  expressions 
Holy  Alliance  and  Quadruple  Alliance  are  used  synonymously."  Cf.  Boyce,  The  Diplomatic 
Relations  of  England  with  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  1815-1830,  University  of  Iowa  Studies, 
vol.  VII,  no.  1. 


46  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

him  to  bury  in  the  limbo  of  his  secret  official  dossiers  all  traces  of 
these  negotiations.  But  in  the  archives  of  the  Russian  Foreign 
Office  proofs  are  not  lacking  of  the  long  and  patient  efforts  made 
between  the  years  1816  and  1819  to  induce  the  great  American 
Republic  to  abandon  her  policy  of  "isolation"  and  to  play  a  part 
in  an  "international"  system. 

At  a  time  when  the  fear  of  Napoleon  had  united  the  powers  of 
Europe  in  common  measures  of  political  and  military  action, 
the  United  States  were  already  separated  and  estranged  from  the 
victorious  Powers  of  the  Grand  Alliance  by  reasons  arising  from 
the  great  war  itself.  The  neutrality  of  the  principal  American 
state,  maintained  with  the  greatest  difficulty,  had  ended  in  a 
quarrel  with  both  antagonists.  The  problems  which  arose  from 
the  enforcement  of  the  British  Orders  in  Council  (May,  1806) 
and  of  Napoleon's  retaliatory  Berlin  Decrees  (November,  1806) 
had  found  a  poor  solution  in  Jefferson's  Non-Intercourse  Act 
(1809),  Yet  in  1810  Napoleon's  ready  diplomacy  had  success- 
fully committed  the  United  States  to  a  course  favorable  to  the 
French  view  of  this  doubly  declared  "blockade."  Although  in 
practice  the  Emperor  had  relaxed  none  of  the  severity  of  the 
Rambouillet  Decrees  under  which  American  shipmasters  groaned, 
the  wrongs  of  the  "quasi-war"  with  France  were  forgotten  in  an 
open  breach  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  Dur- 
ing the  War  of  1812  the  ports  of  Havre  and  Brest  became  the 
home  stations  whence  American  privateers  sailed  forth  to  prey 
upon  British  commerce.^  When  two  years  later  the  treaties  of 
Kalisch,  Toeplitz  and  Chaumont  had  gathered  the  Powers  of 
Europe  in  progressively  strengthening  bonds  of  international 
solidarity,  the  young  American  Republic  found  itself  inter- 
nationally "suspect" — bound  by  an  unsatisfactory  and  informal 
truce  to  the  tottering  Napoleonic  colossus  and  at  open  war  with 
one  of  the  principal  members  of  the  coalition. 

It  was,  however,  Great  Britain's  desire  to  sit  with  her  allies  at 
the  council  table  of  Vienna,  backed  by  the  full  force  of  her  land 
and  sea  power.  This  desire,  indeed,  was  a  chief  factor  in  bringing 
to  a  close  the  indecisive  quarrel  of  1812.     Lord  Castlereagh,  on 

^Cambridge  Modern  History,  vol.  vii,  pp.  324-332.  An  interesting  proof  of  the  care 
with  which  the  development  of  AnKlo-American  relations  was  followed  by  the  Tsar  is 
afforded  by  the  long  report  drawn  up  by  the  diplomatic  free  lance  Gentz  for  Nesselrode,  in 
April,  1812,  re  the  Orders  in  Council.  Nesselrode,  Letters  and  Papers,  1760-1850,  vol.  iv, 
p.  223. 


THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE         47 

his  way  to  attend  the  Great  Council  at  Vienna,  had  stopped  at 
Ghent  (in  August,  1814)  to  hasten  the  British  negotiations  toward 
the  signing  of  a  treaty.^  In  view  of  his  own  friendly  efforts  to 
bring  about  an  earHer  reconcihation-  between  his  ally  and  the 
young  republic,  Alexander  may  readily  have  believed  that  it 
would  be  no  difficult  task  to  persuade  the  American  Government 
to  adhere  to  a  wider  system  of  world  peace. 

The  general  invitation  addressed  to  "all  Powers  who  shall 
choose  to  avow  its  sacred  principles"  contained  in  the  final 
articles  of  the  Holy  Treaty  had  now  been  accepted  by  an  im- 
posing number  of  "minor  Powers."  The  first  among  these  was  the 
liberal-minded  Kingof  Wiirttemberg  (August  17, 1816).  The  King 
of  Saxony  adhered  to  the  declarations  (in  May,  1817),  as  well  as  the 
Kings  of  Sardinia  and  the  Netherlands.  Soon  the  Free  Hanseatic 
cities  and  the  Republic  of  Switzerland — precedents  of  interest  to 
the  United  States — followed  their  example.^  Moreover,  one  of 
the  chief  objections  made  in  England  to  the  terms  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  lacked  force  in  America.  This  was  the  reference  to 
"Christian  Powers"  so  often  repeated  in  its  phraseology — a  refer- 
ence which  was  believed  by  the  diplomatic  circles  of  the  Tsar's 
capital  to  contain  some  secret  menace  against  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  Yet  even  this  threat  gave  no  apprehension  to  the 
Government  at  Washington,  where  Russian  support  of  our  policy 
in  the  Mediterranean  against  the  Barbary  pirates  was  not  for- 
gotten. The  personal  popularity  of  Alexander  and  the  aureole  of 
liberalism  which,  though  growing  fainter,  still  hovered  about  the 
head  of  the  pupil  of  the  Republican  philosopher  Laharpe,  probably 
caused  phrases  and  expressions  of  his  manifesto,  considered  omi- 
nous by  liberal  opinion  abroad,  to  pass  unnoticed. 

The  Holy  Alliance  was  formally  made  public  through  the 
Imperial  ukase  of  January  1,  1816.  Although  its  obscure  inten- 
tions caused  a  stir  all  over  Europe,  several  months  elapsed  before 
the  matter  was  noticed  in  the  American  newspapers  of  the  day. 
On  August  26,  1816,  the  New  York  Evening  Post  announced  that 
"the  King  of  the  Netherlands  has  acceded  to  the  Holy  League, 
considering  that  it  will   have   a   beneficial   effect   on   the    state 

^  Dunning,  The  British  Empire  and  the  United  States,  p.  9. 

^For  the  details  of  this  negotiation,  see  Colder,  "The  Russian  Offer  of  Mediation 
in  the  War  of  1812,"  in  Political  Science  Quarterly,  vol.  xxxi.  No.  3. 

^Martens,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  659.  The  Pope  from  reasons  of  religious  policy  still 
refused  to  join  the  "Pact." 


48  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

of  society  and  the  reciprocal  relations  between  nations."  On 
September  4  of  the  same  year  a  meeting  of  the  sovereigns  of  the 
Holy  Alliance  is  reported  by  the  same  paper  "as  likely  to  take 
place  at  Carlsbad."  To  this  notice  was  added  the  following 
comment — certainly  far  from  hostile  in  tone:  "No  doubt  matters 
of  great  importance  will  be  discussed  at  this  assembly,  and  if  dis- 
cussions run  upon  the  means  of  consolidating  the  peace  of  the 
world  .  .  .  and  removing  the  burden  of  taxes  and  unwieldy 
military  establishments  which  press  at  this  moment  upon  every 
country,  the  members  of  the  Holy  League  will  establish  an  im- 
perishable claim  on  the  gratitude  of  mankind."^ 

In  Niles  Register^  a  gazette  published  in  Baltimore,  may  be 
found  (April  6,  1816)  definite  expression  of  the  generous  approval 
which  public  opinion  in  America  seems  always  ready  to  accord  to 
schemes  promising  an  increment  of  international  solidarity  and 
good  will.  The  Massachusetts  Peace  Society,  writing  to  the 
Emperor  Alexander  under  date  of  April  9,  "recalls  to  the  attention 
of  His  Imperial  Majesty  that  the  Society  was  founded  in  the  very 
week  in  which  the  Holy  League  of  the  three  sovereigns  was 
announced  in  Russia,"  and  has  as  its  object  ''to  disseminate  the 
very  principles  avowed  in  the  wonderful  Alliance.'^  In  the  same 
issue  appears  an  announcement  that  the  American  Minister  at 
St.  Petersburg  "is  treated  with  great  distinction.  It  is  thought 
important  negotiations  are  in  progress."^ 

The  not  unfavorable  impression  which  the  Tsar's  project 
made  in  American  diplomatic  circles  is  shown  in  the  correspond- 
ence of  Levett  Harris,  the  American  charge  d'affaires  at  the 
Court  of  St.  Petersburg: 

The  Treaty  of  triple  alliance  concluded  at  Paris  will,  before  this  comes 
to  hand,  be  already  known  to  you  .  .  .  This  treaty,  which  originated 
with  the  Emperor  Alexander,  and  which  does  equal  honor  to  his  head  and 
heart,  I  fear  will  not  answer  the  magnanimous  purposes  for  which  it 
was  designed.  If  such  were  the  case  we  should  behold  Europe  ready 
to  embrace  the  arts  of  peace,  and  see  dissolving  at  once  those  monstrous 
combinations  which  have  already  lifted  the  world  from  its  axis  and  now 
threaten  to  consummate  the  work  of  human  woe." 

Levett  Harris  was  one  of  the  body  of  trained  and  experienced 

^  Files,  New  York  Public  Library. 

^  Mr.  Harris  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  January  4/16, 1816.     MS.  Dispatches,  American 
Embassy,  Petrograd. 


THE    RECEPTION    OF   THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE  49 

I* 

diplomats  who  founded  on  a  solid  basis  of  good  sense  and  good 
will  the  early  foreign  relations  of  the  United  States.  He  was  too 
well  aware  of  the  deep  rivalry  separating  the  Allied  Powers  to 
believe  in  the  cementing  power  of  fine  phrases — but  he  neverthe- 
less seems  to  share  the  hopes  entertained  by  a  large  number  of 
his  countrymen  that  Alexander's  League  might  result  in  some 
permanent  guarantee  of  European  tranquillity.  Harris,  however, 
did  not  fail  to  note  in  his  dispatches  the  commonly  credited  rumors 
that  the  six  hundred  thousand  Russian  troops  still  under  arms 
"proved  that  the  Tsar  was  meditating  offensives  in  the  Danubian 
provinces,  if  not  elsewhere."^ 

The  task  of  maintaining  the  friendly  relations  which  already 
existed  between  Russia  and  the  United  States  and  of  obtaining 
their  accession  to  the  League  was  actively  pursued  by  Alexander 
during  the  summer  of  1816.  On  July  24/August  5,  1816,  Mr. 
Levett  Harris  further  reported  to  Secretary  Monroe  the  following 
interesting  conversation  held  the  day  before  with  one  of  the  Tsar's 
principal  advisers: 

The  Count  Capo  D'lstria,  who  engaged  me  at  this  interview  in  a 
conversation  of  an  hour  and  a  half's  length,  closed  it  by  acquainting  me 
that  he  had  been  preparing  a  communication  to  me  relative  to  the  Tri- 
partite Treaty  of  the  Sovereigns  of  Russia,  Austria  and  Prussia  (the 
treaty  called  the  "Holy  Treaty")  with  a  view  to  know  the  sentiments  of 
the  American  Government  on  the  subject.  That  if  the  United  States 
chose  to  yield  their  assent  to  this  treaty  the  Emperor  would  receive  it 
with  deference.  That  notwithstanding  many  opinions  had  gone  abroad, 
on  the  subject  of  this  League,  it  was  none  the  less  a  solemn  compact 
formed  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  that  whilst  Russia  con- 
tinued to  hold  her  present  power  this  peace  would  not  be  troubled.  I 
observed  that  it  was  notorious  that  peace  had  been  a  leading  feature  of 
our  policy,  and  that  we  had  reason  to  hope  that  we  should  not  again 
be  soon  forced  to  depart  from  this  policy.  As  Mr.  Pinkney,  I  trusted, 
would  soon  feel  himself  justified  to  repair  here — I  begged  that  any 
communication  of  the  nature  now  suggested  might  be  reserved  for  the 
period  of  his  arrival.^ 

From  his  correspondence  with  Dashkov,  the  Russian  envoy  to 
the  United  States  (1817),  the  Tsar  appears  to  have  had  every 
reason  to  suppose  that  his  overtures  were  meeting  with  a  friendly 
reception  in  Washington.     "It  is  assured,"  wrote  Dashkov  to 

*Mr.  Harris  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  January  4/16,  1816.  MS.  Dispatches,  American 
Embassy,  Petrograd. 

*Mr.  Harris  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  July  24/August  5,  1816.  MS.  Dispatches,  Amer- 
ican Embassy,  Petrograd. 


50  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Lieven,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London,  in  an  important 
dispatch,  "that  the  American  Government  intends  asking  to  be 
associated  with  the  Holy  League."  ^ 

Dashkov,  a  diplomat  of  mediocre  intelligence,  was  perhaps 
unduly  impressed  by  the  expressions  of  approval  with  which 
American  idealists  welcomed  his  master's  policy.  A  pact  which 
in  its  actual  form  merely  obligated  its  signers  to  render  each 
other  vague  "reciprocal  service"  and  to  cooperate  "in  accordance 
with  the  direction  of  the  Holy  Scriptures"  for  the  attainment  of 
the  better  practice  of  "religion,  peace  and  justice,"  would  naturally 
appeal  to  the  generous  sentimentality  so  often  controlling  public 
opinion  in  the  United  States  with  respect  to  foreign  affairs.  The 
absurdity  of  being  treated  as  "brothers"  by  the  three  most  re- 
actionary sovereigns  of  Europe  would  probably  have  deterred 
but  few  among  the  kindly  majority  of  the  Massachusetts 
Peace  Society  from  expressing  their  sympathy  for  the  Tsar's 
"League  of  Peace."  The  vague  and  impracticable  language  in 
which  this  manifesto  was  couched  might  appear  ominous  to 
diplomats,  but  uninformed  public  opinion  could  hardly  foresee  the 
true  meaning  and  inner  significance  of  a  pact  apparently  so  gen- 
erous, or  that  the  future  policy  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  as  applied 
during  Alexander's  later  reactionary  "phase,"  was  destined  to 
become  an  unqualified  support  of  "legitimist  principles"  abhor- 
rent to  American  ideals. 

Dashkov  neglected  the  fact  that  public  opinion  in  the  Repub- 
lic during  the  existing  internal  "Era  of  Good  Feeling"  had 
little  time  to  worry  about  foreign  affairs.  With  respect  to  such 
matters  the  Tsar's  envoy  complains  to  Lieven  that  "they  do  not 
worry  any  more  about  me  than  if  I  were  the  Emperor  of  Japan."  ^ 
He  also  complains  that  his  opportunities  for  negotiations  were 
nearly  nil. 

In  the  same  connection  he  noted  in  an  earlier  dispatch  his  own 
version  of  the  attention  with  which  the  cautious  diplomacy  of 
Adams  and  Monroe  was  following  the  development  of  the  Euro- 
pean situation.  "It  would  seem  that  the  government  is  not 
without  anxiety  concerning  the  effect  that  some  of  its  actions  will 

1  February  22/March  6,  1817.  MS.  United  States,  Russian  Foreign  Office.  Many  o 
the  MS.  documents  quoted  relatinp;  to  the  United  States  have  been  listed  in  Golder's  Guii 
to  Materials  in  American  History  in  Russian  Archives. 

'Dashkov  to  Lieven,  MS.  United  States,  1817,  Russian  Foreign  Office. 


THE  RECEPTION  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE  51 

have  upon  Europe,  and  the  way  in  which  their  aggressive  projects 
will  be  considered.  However,  a  certain  cunning  and  great  ability 
characterizes  the  present  administration."^  He  also  noted  the 
significant  fact  that  "an  increase  of  the  naval  forces  and  a  more 
direct  interest  in  the  commerce  of  the  American  continent  forms 
the  basis  of  the  President's  policy  with  respect  to  the  other 
nations."^ 

In  spite  of  the  apathy  and  lack  of  interest  in  European  affairs 
which  Dashkov  had  reported,  the  Tsar  now  decided  to  recall  the 
young  Republic  to  a  sense  of  international  obligations.  In  the 
instruction  addressed  to  Baron  De  Tuyll,  the  Russian  Minister, 
whom  he  intended  to  send  to  the  United  States,  in  May,  1817,^ 
to  succeed  the  unpopular  Dashkov,  the  following  minute  directions 
were  given  to  guide  him  in  his  policy  with  respect  to  this  matter: 

The  relations  existing  between  the  United  States  and  Russia  are  ' 
commercial  rather  than  political.  The  only  exception  occurs  through 
the  proposed  mediation  which  the  Emperor  has  been  asked  to  undertake 
as  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.*  America  is  geo- 
graphically out  of  the  European  system.  Her  only  political  bonds  are 
with  England,  the  Spanish  Colonies  and  France.* 

Referring  to  the  latter  historical  bond,  Tuyll  was  directed  to 
proceed  to  his  post  by  way  of  Paris.  If  the  occasion  permitted 
he  was  to  see  Richelieu,  "and  to  obtain  some  notion  from  him  of 
his  ideas  respecting  the  desirability  and  utility  of  renewing  rela- 
tions between  the  Cabinet  of  the  Tuileries  and  the  United 
States."^  With  respect  to  Spanish  relations,  Tuyll  was  also  to 
use  the  utmost  circumspection.  The  Emperor's  interest  con- 
cerning this  matter  is  to  be  expressed,  but  "the  Envoy  of  H.  M. 
must  not  allow  himself  any  direct  intervention  unless  especially 
authorized."  ®  With  respect  to  Anglo-American  policy  the  in- 
structions are  equally  specific,  if  obviously  less  sincere.  Baron 
De  Tuyll  is  to  confine  himself  to  expressing  His  Majesty's  "pleas- 
ure" should  any  improvement  occur  in  the  relations  existing 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 

*  Dashkov,  MS.  United  States,  1816,  Russian  Foreign  Office. 

*Hildt,  Early  Diplomatic  Negotiations  of  the  United  States  with  Russia,  p.   110. 
'As  regards  certain  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent. 
*MS.  United  States,  1817,  Russian  Foreign  Office. 

'See  later  RicheHeu's  invitation  to  the  United  States  to  send   a    representative  to 
Aix-la-Chapelle. 

»MS.  Uniud  States,  1817,  Russian  Foreign  Office. 


52  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

The  instructions  quoted  now  enter  at  length  into  an  interesting 
discussion  of  the  policy  which  the  Tsar's  Minister  should  follow 
in  order  to  reconcile  the  Russian  and  American  views  concerning 
the  "Holy  Miance": 

In  respect  to  the  policy  set  forth  in  this  agreement,  which  was  entered 
upon  in  a  spirit  of  Christian  and  fraternal  alliance  between  the  states  who 
were  signatory  to  the  Acts  of  Vienna  and  Paris,  a  difference  is  apparent 
between  the  latter  and  other  states,  who  by  their  isolated  positions  or  on 
account  of  the  desire  of  their  government,  have  abstained  from  this  act. 
It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  observe  that  the  United  States  belongs  to  this 
second  category.  Nevertheless,  as  the  United  States  is  to  be  considered 
a  Christian  Power,  they  should  necessarily  accede  to  the  Act  of  14th/26th 
September.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  such  adherence  should  be 
characterized  by  a  purely  spontaneous  desire,  and  should  arise  from  a 
wish  inspired  by  a  sincere  conviction  that  the  spirit  of  this  agreement  is 
not  only  salutary  for  the  powers  of  the  world  but  also  in  no  ways 
coercive.  As  the  Emperor  has  not  had  any  opportunity  of  judging  of 
the  true  disposition  of  the  American  Government,  and  is  also  ignorant 
of  the  obstacles  which  the  Constitution  of  that  country  might  oppose  to 
an  agreement  of  this  character.  His  Majesty  has  not  extended  any  formal 
invitation  to  the  United  States.  Nevertheless,  the  Envoys  of  His 
Majesty  are  now  authorized  to  make  a  careful  inquiry  concerning  the 
opinions  of  the  American  Government.  In  treating  of  this  matter,  he 
should  bear  in  mind  that  a  similar  invitation  might  be  extended  along 
the  line  of  the  overtures  made  to  the  Swiss  Diet.  Before  taking  any 
final  steps  he  will,  of  course,  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  Secretary  of 
State.  In  these  negotiations  he  will  advance  the  fact  of  the  desire 
manifested  by  several  of  the  Cantons  to  be  admitted  to  take  part  in  the 
Act  of  14th/26th  September  and  of  the  enthusiasm  with  which  they  have 
signed — fully  convinced  of  its  utility.  Following  the  above  routine, 
(in  case  the  proposal  should  appear  acceptable  to  the  American  Secre- 
tary), the  Minister  will  develop  more  at  length  the  purposes  of  the 
Treaty  of  Brotherly  and  Christian  Alliance,  pointing  out  the  motives 
which  lay  at  the  bottom  of  this  Pact  and  especially  Indicating  that  its 
main  purpose  is  to  preserve  peace.  In  this  exposition  he  may  make  use 
of  His  Majesty's  circular  dated  March  22,  1816,  and  the  considerations 
contained  In  the  document  dated  May  4,  1817.  He  will  accompany  his 
explanation  by  the  assurance  that  the  Emperor  would  receive  with 
great  pleasure  the  adherence  of  the  United  States  to  the  act  mentioned. 

He  must,  however,  take  no  steps  without  first  assuring  himself  that 
the  adherence  of  the  United  States  will  not  be  opposed  by  public  opinion 
in  that  country  ...  In  a  word.  It  is  Important  that  he  should  be  con- 
vinced of  the  success  of  his  mission  before  entering  into  any  long  dis- 
cussions concerning  the  matter,  a  discussion  which  would  be  unworthy 
of  the  united  spirit  and  purity  of  intentions  which  have  dictated  the  Act 
of  14th/26th  September,  1815.  ^ 

While  Baron  De  Tuyll's  mission  to  the  United  States  was  inter- 
rupted by  the  unfortunate  diplomatic  situation  arising  from  the 

'MS.  Instructions,  United  States,  1817,  Russian  Foreign  Office. 


THE    RECEPTION    OF   THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE  53 

imprisonment  of  the  Russian  Consul  Koslov  in  Philadelphia  by  a 
local  judge,  his  instructions  show  the  interest  felt  by  his  Imperial 
master  in  securing  the  adherence  of  the  United  States  to  the 
Holy  Alliance.  Dashkov's  efforts  to  win  the  approval  of  the  young 
Republic  not  proving  satisfactory,  he  was  replaced  by  the  Cheva- 
lier Poletica  (June,  1819),^  whose  instructions,  as  we  shall  later 
observe,  were  even  more  urgent  in  their  appeal  to  the  Washington 
Government  to  join  the  European  "League  of  Peace." 

1  Secretary  of  State  to  Mr.  Campbell,  June  3,  1819.     MS.  Instructions,  Russia. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  EARLY  POLICY  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE: 
THE  AMERICAN  MONARCHY 

In  ancient  times  among  the  more  civilized  peoples  it  was  held  to  be  the 
greatest  of  all  crimes  to  make  war  upon  those  who  were  willing  to  submit 
to  arbitration  the  settlement  of  their  difficulties;  but  against  those  who  de- 
clined so  fair  an  offer  all  others  turned,  and  with  their  combined  resources 
overwhelmed  them,  not  as  enemies  of  any  one  nation,  but  as  enemies  of 
them  all  alike.  So  for  this  very  object  we  see  that  treaties  are  made  and 
arbiters  appointed.     Grotius,  Mare  Liberum,  1608. 

Although  no  formal  declaration  of  policy  accompanied  the  sign- 
ing of  the  Holy  Alliance,  this  very  reticence  had  aroused  general 
distrust  in  the  liberal  circles  of  Europe  and  the  United  States. 
The  growing  suspicion  that  the  "Act  of  September  14,  1815," 
was  but  the  credo  of  a  revived  dogma  of  legitimacy  was  proved 
by  subsequent  events  to  be  well  founded  in  fact.  Metternich, 
even  while  turning  to  his  own  devious  and  complicated  diplomatic 
purposes  the  bond  of  indiscriminate  solidarity  which  bound 
the  signers  of  this  Pact  of  Kings,  feigned  to  distrust  the  Tsar's 
"Jacobinism,"  3'et  he  alone  among  the  statesmen  of  Europe 
appears  to  have  held  this  belief.  He  was,  moreover,  confident  of 
his  ability  to  control  the  Autocrat's  liberal  vagaries.^ 

Alexander's  early  liberalism  had  in  fact  given  place  to  a  new 
concept:  the  "Divine  Right"  of  rulers  "placed  in  the  same  relation 
to  their  people  as  a  father  to  his  family."  ^  Moreover,  in  a  clause 
of  the  Quadruple  Treaty  of  Alliance,  the  Tsar  saw  a  means 
to  make  effective  this  paternal  spirit  through  "reunions  devoted 
to  the  great  common  interests."  ^  He  now  urged  that  the  sover- 
eigns of  Europe  and  their  representatives  should  continue  the 
practice  developed  by  the  politico-military  conclaves  which  had 
followed  the  wars  of  the  coalition.  In  following  out  this  inter- 
national policy,  Alexander  was  the  first  to  show  an  exam- 
ple to  his  fellow  monarchs  by  his  constant  willingness  to  make 

1  During  a  long  journey  from  Frankfort  to  Paris  (July  1/12,  1815)  upon  which  the  Tsar 
and  the  Austrian  statesmen  were  traveling  companions,  Alexander,  "talking  about  the 
matter  for  hours  at  a  stretch,"  had  developed  his  new  theories  with  all  the  enthusiasm  of  a 
convert.  He  now  believed  "that  a  sacred  bond  should  join  the  sovereigns  of  Europe  to  the 
exclusion  of  all  other  influences."  Conversation  with  Metternich  quoted  by  Baron 
Josika  in  his  "Memoires"  in  Revue  de  Hongrie,  vol.  ii,  Aug.-Dec,  1908,  p.  542. 

2  Regarding  the  Tsar's  "liberalism,"  Levett  Harris  reported  at  that  time  from  St. 
Petersburg:  "There  appear  no  responsible  Ministers.  He  now  acts  by  the  exclusive 
influence  of  his  own  judgment  and  opinions."  Mr.  Harris  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 
December  13,  1816,  MS.  Dispatches,  Russia. 

3  The  Treaty  of  Alliance,  Art.  vi,  Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil  des  Traites,  vol.  ii,  p.  737. 

55 


56  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

the  journey  from  his  distant  capital  whenever  the  needs  of 
Europe  seemed  to  require  the  assembhng  of  a  Congress.  And 
Europe,  following  the  great  meeting  at  Vienna,  seemed  likely  to 
profit  by  these  ministrations. 

With  the  disappearance  of  the  Napoleonic  danger  the  motive 
of  mutual  defense  had  disappeared.  But  another  international 
peril  soon  presented  itself.  Like  the  so-called  "wave  of  Bol- 
shevism" which  followed  the  recent  World  War,  Europe  after 
the  Napoleonic  struggle  believed  itself  menaced  by  the  workings 
of  an  occult  and  world-wide  conspiracy  fomented  by  the  "Sects" 
and  other  revolutionary  societies.  The  monarchs  of  Europe 
were  again  to  be  united  in  the  face  of  revolution. 

Metternich's  criticisms — that  Alexander's  policy  during  this 
period  was  contradictory  if  not  opportunistic — were  to  a  great 
degree  justified.  In  Spain  the  Tsar  tolerated  the  political  folHes 
of  Ferdinand  VII,  even  when  that  reactionary  monarch  restored 
the  prerogatives  of  absolutism  and  reestablished  the  Inquisition. 
Again,  in  France,  where  Louis  XVIII  was  attempting,  honestly 
enough,  to  restore  the  prestige  of  "legitimacy"  and  to  govern 
under  the  limitations  of  the  "Charter,"  his  growing  fear  of 
revolution  caused  him  to  interfere  with  Richelieu's  electoral 
reforms  in  an  "aristocratic  sense."  In  Poland,  where  the  mandate 
of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  had  given  him  full  right  to  indulge  his 
earlier  ideals  for  reform,  he  adopted  a  contrary  policy.  In  the 
latter  country,  moreover,  Metternich  felt  that  the  Tsar's  liberal 
"expansions"  were  directly  opposed  to  the  interests  of  the  neigh- 
boring Austrian  Empire. 

He  did  not  fail  to  point  out  that  Alexander's  example  in  Poland 
furnished  renewed  support  to  the  fast-reviving  liberal  spirit  in 
Germany.  Without  great  difficulty  the  Austrian  statesman  had 
succeeded  in  bringing  the  wavering  policy  of  Frederick  William  III 
entirely  within  his  own  control.  The  Prussian  monarch  had 
solemnly  promised  a  constitution  to  his  people  (on  May  22,  1815, 
just  before  Waterloo),  but  under  Metternich's  influence  he  indefi- 
nitely postponed  the  fulfilment  of  his  pledge.^  The  Liberal  group 
which  surrounded  him  during  the  heroic  days  of  the  Napoleonic 
struggle — Stein,  Hardenberg  and  Humboldt — saw  their  influence 
rapidly  give  place  to  that  of  more  reactionary  Ministers.    The 

'  Debidour,  Ilisioire  Diplomatique  de  I' Europe,  vol.  i,  p.  114. 


THE  EARLY  POLICY  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE        57 

first  Federal  Diet,  which  was  held  on  November  5,  1816,  was, 
in  fact,  a  mere  diplomatic  gathering  of  the  Princes  of  Germany, 
In  all  the  minor  German  states  a  profound  irritation  was  felt 
throughout  all  classes  of  society  with  respect  to  the  Austro- 
Prussian  policy  of  repression. 

The  Sultan  Mahmoud  of  Turkey  (who,  judged  even  by  Euro- 
pean standards,  might  well  have  considered  himself  a  "reformer")  ^ 
could  not  contemplate  without  natural  anxiety  the  Emperor 
Alexander's  appeal  through  a  Holy  Alliance  to  the  "Christian" 
nations  of  Europe.  This  was  considered  by  the  Sublime  Porte, 
and  also  by  the  nations  interested  in  the  integrity  of  the  Turkish 
dominions,  as  hiding  a  secret  menace  toward  the  Caliph  of  the 
Mussulmans,^ 

Aside  from  the  traditional  Oriental  policy  pursued  by  the  Tsars 
of  Russia,  there  was  additional  cause  for  anxiety  to  the  supporters 
of  the  status  quo  in  the  East  from  the  natural  sympathy  openly 
expressed  by  the  Russian  Orthodox  Church  in  the  fate  of  their 
coreligionists  of  Serbia,  now  openly  struggling  for  liberty  against 
the  Turkish  Government.  Capo  dTstria,  Alexander's  favorite 
adviser  with  respect  to  Eastern  affairs,  was  already  forming  the 
Pan  Grecian  Association  of  the  Hetairie  in  St,  Petersburg, 
whose  agents  and  propaganda  were  active  in  all  the  countries 
bordering  the  Aegean.  The  Sultan's  growing  anxiety  regarding 
a  possible  Orthodox  crusade  was  shared  by  Metternich  and  Castle- 
reagh,  who  were  determined  that  questions  of  sentiment  must  be 
rigidly  excluded  from  their  policy  towards  the  Ottoman  dominion. 

The  traditional  policy  of  the  English  Cabinet  since  the  days  of 
Pitt  had  considered  the  integrity  of  the  Turkish  Empire  as  the 
cornerstone  of  England's  colonial  hegemony  in  the  East,  Even 
the  action  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  respecting  the  pirates  of  the 
Barbary  Coast — who  acknowledged  the  Sultan  as  their  suzerain — 
was  opposed  by  Great  Britain  on  the  ground  that  such  a  step 
would  menace  her  self-appointed  guardianship  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean.^ In  the  pretensions  now  advanced  by  Alexander  (Decem- 
ber, 1816)  that  the  "Great  Family  of  Christian  nations"  should 

'  Debidour,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  101. 

*  The  armies  which  the  Russian  Emperor  maintained  upon  a  war  footing,  long  after  the 
other  nations  of  Europe  had  demobilized  their  forces,  with  the  exception  of  the  armies  of 
occupation  in  France,  amounted  in  all  to  nearly  600,000  men.  Mr.  Harris  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  January  4/16,  1816.     MS.  Dispatches,  American  Embassy,  Petrograd. 

'  See  Schuyler,  American  Diplomacy,  p.  226. 


58  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

take  their  part  in  repressing  these  piratical  outrages  upon  the 
world's  commerce,  England  saw  another  attack  upon  her 
jealously  guarded  supremacy.^ 

As  the  first  united  action  to  be  taken  by  the  Powers  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  and  the  European  Directorate,  Alexander  formally  pro- 
posed that  unless  the  Sultan  w^as  prepared  to  give  immediate 
guarantees  for  the  good  behavior  of  his  vassals,  the  Beys  of  Tunis 
and  Algiers,  the  European  Powers  should  proceed,  without  further 
formalities,  to  destroy  their  fleets  and  "remove  all  means  whereby 
they  might  reconstruct  the  same." 

The  opposition  of  Great  Britain  and  Austria  caused  the  Tsar 
to  withdraw  this  proposal,  but  during  the  month  of  March,  1817, 
rumors  spread  among  the  Courts  of  Europe  that  a  secret  treaty 
had  bound  the  King  of  Spain  to  cede  Port  Mahon  to  Russia,  and 
possibly  other  naval  bases  in  the  Mediterranean.  It  was,  indeed, 
only  by  some  such  tangible  advantage  to  Russian  policy  that  the 
growing  intimacy  between  the  Courts  of  St.  Petersburg  and 
Madrid  could  be  explained,^  TatistchefF,  the  Russian  Ambassa- 
dor to  the  Court  of  Ferdinand  VII,  had  been  instructed  (in  spite  of 
Alexander's  scarcely  concealed  personal  antipathy  to  this  narrow- 
minded  and  reactionary  Monarch)  to  cultivate  Ferdinand's  good 
graces  even  to  the  extent  of  approving  his  stupid  and  brutal 
administration  in  interior  affairs.  Another  reason  for  this  intimacy 
soon  became  apparent. 

During  the  early  revolt  of  the  juntas  of  South  America  in  1810 
"to  preserve  the  rights  of  King  Ferdinand"  against  the  power  of 
King  Jerome,  Great  Britain  had  profited  by  the  state  of  practical 
autonomy  existing  in  the  Spanish  colonies  to  break  down  in  favor 
of  her  own  commerce  the  profitable  trade  monopoly  which  the 
Spanish  Crown  had  always  rigorously  maintained.^  In  this 
matter  the  Tsar  saw  a  fresh  cause  of  future  difference  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  It  was  especially  as  an  ally 
against  the  preponderating  influence  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
councils  of  the  nations  that  he  desired  the  Government  at  Wash- 
ington to  join  his  new  League  of  Peace.    Besides  appealing  to  the 

^  See  the  report  of  an  interview  between  Levett  Harris  and  Capo  d'Istria  contained  in 
the  former's  dispatch  No.  19  of  July  24,  1816,  American  Embassy,  Petrograd,  the 
Russian  Minister  expressing  his  indignation  that  "Lord  Exmouth  had  neglected  noth- 
ing at  Algiers  to  have  the  American  treaties  changed." 

*  Debidour,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  100. 

*  Shepherd,  Latin  America,  pp.  72-74. 


THE  EARLY  POLICY  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE        59 

hostile  feelings  that  persisted  after  the  Peace  of  Ghent,  and  to  the 
ready  jealousy  between  the  mother  country  and  her  former  colo- 
nies (a  sentiment  whose  depth  and  nature  has  always  been 
misunderstood  by  outside  Powers),  Alexander  probably  believed 
that  he  could  count  on  this  new  cause  of  difference  to  secure  the 
acquiescence  of  the  Washington  Cabinet  in  an  antirevolutionary 
program  in  the  Spanish  colonies. 

Following  the  Congress  of  Vienna  the  particularistic  views  and 
"traditional  interests"  of  the  Great  Powers  had  further  postponed 
the  consideration  of  the  Turkish  question  and  the  affairs  of 
the  German  Confederation.  Intervention  in  America  doubtless 
appeared  to  Alexander  a  less  dangerous  source  of  possible  inter- 
national friction.  Indeed,  as  we  shall  later  see,  American  affairs 
became  not  only  a  convenient  issue  but  also  the  first  matter  with 
which  the  newly  constituted  "Confederation"  was  to  concern 
itself  during  the  three  years  preceding  the  Congress  of  Aix-Ia- 
Chapelle  and  throughout  the  succeeding  Era  of  International 
Conferences.  The  policy  favored  by  the  Tsar  led  to  the  formal 
mediation  which  the  European  monarchs  now  undertook  with 
respect  to  South  American  affairs. 

Spain,  Russia  and  Great  Britain  were  all  at  this  time  great 
American  Powers.  The  King  of  Spain  was  nominally  (actually, 
in  the  eyes  of  legitimist  Europe)  the  ruler  of  a  territory  geo- 
graphically the  most  important  in  the  New  World.  His  title  of 
Emperor  of  the  Indies  represented  a  claim  which,  although 
disputed  by  a  vigorous  minority,  was  still  respected  by  a  large 
part  of  the  population  of  South  America.  In  the  beginning  of 
this  struggle,  hardly  a  fraction  of  the  population  was  interested 
in  throwing  off  the  Spanish  allegiance.  The  dominant  classes, 
including  an  all-powerful  clergy,  were  generally  hostile  or  indif- 
ferent to  a  revolution  which,  in  its  natural  course,would  eventually 
attack  their  own  privileges.  The  Indians  and  half-castes  forming 
the  bulk  of  the  population  were  neutral  or  inclined  to  favor  the 
home  government.^ 

On  the  northern  continent  of  America  the  Tsar  of  Russia  was 
the  ruler  of  vast  possessions  whose  vague  frontiers  stretched 
from  Alaska  far  down  the  coast  to  California.  In  1812,  Baronov, 
the  Russian  governor  whose  aggressive  policy  had  earned  for  him 
the  name  of  the  "Little  Tsar,"  succeeded  in  establishing  a  colony 

^  Shepherd,  op.  cii.,  p.  70. 


60  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

not  far  from  Bodega  Bay,  but  30  miles  to  the  north  of  San  Fran- 
cisco.^ The  Russian-American  company  (instituted  by  the  ukase 
of  July  8,  1799)  had  been  granted  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the 
American  coast  north  of  the  55th  degree  of  north  latitude.  These 
claims  had  been  the  basis  for  Russian  diplomatic  protests  in  1808 
and  1810  against  the  encroachment  of  traders  from  the  United 
States,^  which  had  received  respectful  attention  in  Washington. 

While  the  Government  at  Washington  was  prepared  to  treat 
with  consideration  the  claims  of  Powers  long  established  on  the 
American  Continent,  this  toleration  had  no  application  to  Powers 
like  Austria,  Germany  and  France,  who  now  began  to  consider 
Ferdinand's  plight  with  sympathy.  The  influence  of  all  Europe — 
except  a  negligible  minority — ^was  to  be  exercised  to  counteract 
the  growing  triumph  of  the  republican  spirit. 
^  The  unavowed  principle  underlying  the  attitude  of  the  Powers 
of  the  Holy  Alliance  towards  the  revolutionaries  of  Venezuela 
and  La  Plata  was  their  interest  in  maintaining  the  monarchical 
principle.^ 

In  this  connection  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  long  after 
the  tyranny  of  Ferdinand  VII  had  rendered  his  further  rule 
odious  and  impossible,  a  strong  sentiment  persisted  throughout 
South  America  for  a  monarchical  form  of  government.  Even 
Bolivar,  the  Liberator,  was  far  from  being  a  convinced  republican: 

Would  to  God  (he  exclaimed  in  a  letter  which  foreshadows  an  American 
"League  of  Peace")  that  some  day  we  might  enjoy  the  happiness  of 
having  there  an  august  congress  of  representatives  of  the  republics, 
kingdoms  and  empires  of  America  to  deal  with  the  high  interests  of 
peace  and  of  war,  not  only  between  the  American  nations  but  between 
them  and  the  rest  of  the  globe.'* 

In  a  work  entitled  La  Monarquia  en  Jmerica,  Senor  C.  A. 
de  Villanueva  has  considered  at  length  the  early  history  of  this 
movement.  The  first  separatist  movement  "to  preserve  the  throne 
of  the  Indies  for  Ferdinand  VII"  found  itself  without  a  leader 

1  Cleland,  "The  Early  Sentiment  for  the  Annexation  of  California."  Reprint  from 
Thg  Southwestern  Historical  Quarterly,  xviii,  Nos.  1,  2  and  3  (1914-1915),  p.  7. 

2  Hildt,  Early  Diplomatic  Negotiations  of  the  United  States  with  Russia,  p.  47. 

^  Writing  at  a  somewhat  later  period,  Chateaubriand,  the  French  Ambassador  in 
London  (May,  1821),  voiced  their  policy  as  follows:  "If  Europe  is  obliged  to  recognize  the 
de  facto  governments  of  America,  its  whole  policy  should  be  aimed  toward  the  encouraging 
of  the  establishment  of  monarchies  instead  of  republics,  whose  principal  exports  would  be 
their  principles."     Chateaubriand,  Memoiresd' outre  tombe,  vol.  vii,  pp.  400-401. 

*  Moore,  "Henry  Clay  and  Pan-Americanism,"  Columbia  University  Quarterly,  Sep- 
tember, 1915,  p.  347. 


THE    EARLY   POLICY   OF   THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE  61 

after  the  abdication  of  Bayonne  and  the  assumption  of  the  royal 
authority  by  Joseph  Bonaparte.  A  strong  desire  was,  however, 
manifested  all  over  South  America  to  replace  the  dethroned 
Bourbons  by  monarchs  of  the  same  dynasty.^  The  monarchical 
movement  was,  however,  defeated  by  the  partisans  of  the  Junta 
of  Cadiz  in  Buenos  Aires;  while  in  Caracas  (December,  1811), 
acting  under  the  advice  of  the  American  Consul  Lowry,  the  revolu- 
tionists adopted  a  republican  form  of  constitution.^  According 
to  the  same  author,  the  Congress  of  Tucuman  (1816)  "was  openly 
monarchical,"  ^  although  it  eventually  decided  for  a  republican 
form  of  government. 

At  a  later  date  Hyde  de  Neuville,  Louis  XVIII's  Minister  at 
Washington,  filled  his  dispatches  to  Richelieu  with  plans  for 
founding  one  or  more  monarchies  in  South  America — thrones 
which  should  be  occupied  by  princes  of  the  House  of  Bourbon.  He 
even  entertained  hopes  of  securing  the  acquiescence  of  the  United 
States  in  this  plan  in  exchange  for  the  good  offices  of  France  with 
respect  to  the  cession  of  Florida.'' 

Until  the  real  situation  was  revealed  after  the  opening  of  the 
debates  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  the  policy  followed  by  Russia  with 
respect  to  South  America  (rather  than  that  pursued  by  their 
commercial  rival  Great  Britain)  was  believed  in  the  United  States 
to  be  most  favorable  to  the  cause  of  "Liberty."  This  was  largely 
due  to  a  persistent  belief  in  the  Tsar's  liberalism.  Instructions 
from  the  Department  of  State  to  John  Quincy  Adams  in  London 
(December  10,  1815)  report  with  apprehension  the  rumor  that 
"Spain  had  ceded  Florida  to  Great  Britain,"  and  that  a  British 
expedition  was  on  its  way  to  that  quarter.^ 

Referring  to  the  revolution  already  "making  rapid  progress  in^ 
South  America,"  Mr.  Adams  is  directed  to  inquire:  "What  are  the 
views  and  intentions  of  Great  Britain  regarding  this  important 
subject?     Is  it  not  to  the  interest  of  Great   Britain  that  the 

1  A  strong  royalist  faction  in  Buenos  Aires  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  court  ot 
Portugal  (which  had  found  refuge  in  Rio  de  Janeiro,)  seeking  to  come  to  an  understanding 
with  the  Prince  Regent  which  would  enable  his  Consort,  Carlotta  (sister  of  the  dethroned 
Spanish  monarch),  to  assume  the  government  "pending  the  return  of  Ferdinand."  In 
Venezuela  the  patriots  sought  "to  erect  the  old  Captain-Generalcy  into  an  independent 
province  with  a  king  of  its  own — choosing  preferably  a  prince  of  the  old  Spanish  dynasty." 
Villanueva,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin  (La  Monarquia  en  America,  vol.  i),  p.  10. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  18. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  45. 

*  Hyde  de  Neuville,  Memoires,  vol.  i,  pp.  267-279. 
*MS.  Instructions,  Department  of  State. 


62  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Spanish  provinces  become  independent?  .  .  .  In  case  of  a  rupture 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain  at  any  future  time  what 
part  will  Great  Britain  take  in  the  contest,  it  being  understood 
that  we  shall  ask  in  regard  to  the  Spanish  provinces  no  privileges 
in  trade  which  shall  not  be  common  to  all  nations?"  ^  The  Secre- 
tary of  State  soon  after  informed  the  American  charge  that  "a 
strong  suspicion  is  entertained  here  by  many  that  the  Spanish 
Government  relies  on  the  support  of  the  British."  ^ 

Instructions  of  the  same  date  direct  Levett  Harris  in  St.  Peters- 
burg to  confirm  the  views  that  he  had  previously  expressed  of  the 
Tsar's  disposition  regarding  the  independence  of  the  Spanish 
provinces,  viz.,  that  he  was  "believed  to  favor  it."  At  the  close 
of  the  year  1816  Harris  reported  from  St.  Petersburg  that  the  Tsar 
was  more  interested  in  preserving  the  tranquillity  of  Europe  than 
in  inviting  the  hostility  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
by  representations  concerning  the  conduct  of  private  individuals 
and  the  depredations  of  the  so-called  revolutionary  privateers.^ 

Thus  in  1817  the  Tsar's  dilemma  lay  between  his  desire  to 
secure  the  support  of  the  United  States  against  Great  Britain 
and  his  fear  that  both  with  respect  to  Florida  and  in  their  conduct 
towards  the  South  American  insurgents  the  American  Government 
might  act  in  a  fashion  to  contravene  the  monarchical  "mediation."* 
Dashkov,  the  Russian  representative  at  Washington,  reported 
to  his  government  through  Count  Lieven  (February  22/March  6, 
1817)  that  "Monroe  is  proclaimed  President  and  is  resolving  to 
seize  Florida  by  fair  means  or  foul.  The  fleet  will  be  employed  in 
the  Mediterranean  before  Spain  can  expect  it." 

*  MS.  Instructions,  Department  of  State. 

^  Secretary  of  State  to  Mr.  Adams  in  London,  February  2,  1816.     MS.  Instructions. 

^  "The  only  object  of  high  interest  that  has  recently  attracted  attention  here  is  the  dif- 
ference which  at  present  exists  between  Spain  and  Portugal.  The  Emperor  showed  great 
solicitude  on  this  occasion,  and  at  the  last  circle  spoke  to  the  Envoys  of  those  Courts, 
especially  the  Portuguese,  in  a  tone  to  lead  to  the  impression  that  any  attempt  made  to 
disturb  the  tranquillity  (sic)  of  Europe  would  not  be  overlooked  by  His  Majesty.  Each  of 
these  ministers  have  made  official  communication  to  the  Russian  Ministry  of  the  views  and 
pretensions  of  their  respective  courts."  Mr.  Harris  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  December 
14/26,  1816.     MS.  Dispatches,  Russia. 

■*  Re  the  Tsar's  foreign  policy.  In  a  rare  anonymous  pamphlet  entitled  A  Sketch  of 
the  Military  and  Political  Power  of  Russia  in  the  Year  1817,  published  in  New  York  by  Kirk 
and  Mercein  (1817),  a  copy  of  which  is  preserved  in  the  files  of  the  Library  at  West  Point 
Military  Academy,  occurs  an  interesting  contemporary  appreciation  of  the  role  played  by 
Alexander  during  this  period:  "Alexander  now  wields  the  huge  sceptre  of  Russia,  and  dis- 
plays an  ability  equal  to  the  task.  His  philosophical  views  have  indeed  been  enfeebled 
by  pernicious  advisers,  but  those  who  have  known  him  in  other  days  still  cling  to  the  hope 
that  he  will  not  substitute  an  unfeeling  policy,  of  which  the  pillars  are  tyranny,  ignorance 
and  fanaticism. 


THE  EARLY  POLICY  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE        63 

In   September,   1817,  the  newly-appointed   Minister   Pinkney 

wrote  from  St.  Petersburg  as  follows: 

Very  friendly  relations  (displayed  occasionally  with  some  parade) 
exist  between  the  Emperor  and  the  King  of  Spain,  and  although  it  might 
naturally  be  expected  that  out  of  Europe  the  Emperor  would  leave  him 
to  manage  his  own  affairs  as  he  could,  this  case  of  resistance  by  subjects 
to  the  King's  rule,  and  of  an  effort  to  multiply  republics  may  be  thought 
to  call  for  a  general  combination  in  Europe  to  discourage  and  repress 
it.  .  .  .  If  it  is  true  that  a  New  Congress  or  rather  interview  of 
sovereigns  is  to  take  place  next  summer  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  (as  I  con- 
fidently said  and  as  I  believe)  the  affairs  of  South  America  will,  I  presume, 
be  talked  of  on  that  occasion.^ 

Both  countries  were  anxiously  alert  to  each  other's  moves. 
In  May,  1817,  Dashkov  had  again  written  to  Lieven: 

Certainly  the  moral  effect  which  America  can  exercise  upon  the  whole 
world  merits  more  attention  than  Europe  appears  disposed  to  give 
.  .  .  Pernambuco  has  declared  its  independency  as  a  republic.  This  is 
certainly  no  sudden  commotion,  but  a  well  prepared  revolution  which 
should  give  cause  for  apprehension  to  the  Portuguese  Government  and 
all  of  Brazil. 

And  again  on  September  24/26,  1817,  he  notes: 

The  Americans  continue  to  send  help  to  the  Spanish  insurgents,  lend- 
ing them  privateers  and  helping  them  in  various  ways.^ 

The  anxiety  of  the  State  Department  with  respect  to  the  Tsar's 
rumored  intentions  to  intervene  in  America's  affairs  now  became 
more  marked.  Mr.  Pinkney,  instructed  to  study  the  policy  of 
Russia,  reported  the  following  ominous  event:  *'There  is  no  doubt 
a  Russian  fleet  will  very  soon  proceed  to  Cadiz."  ^  This  refers  to 
a  none  too  creditable  transaction  through  which  Tatistcheff  had 
sold  (not  without  profit  to  his  own  purse)  five  unseaworthy  ships 
of  the  line  to  Ferdinand  to  be  used  to  transport  troops  to  South 
America.^    His  subsequent  dispatch  was  more  reassuring: 

The  sale  of  the  fleet  mentioned  in  my  last  .  .  .  can  scarcely  be 
termed  a  perfectly  neutral  proceeding  with  respect  to  the  Colonies,  but, 
if  it  be  a  sale,  it  seems  to  show  that  the  Emperor  does  not  mean  to 
embark  as  a  party  in  the  contest.^ 

^Mr.  Pinkney  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  September  13/25,  1817.  MS.  Dispatches, 
Russia. 

*  Dashkov  to  Lieven,  MS.  United  States,  1817,  Russian  Foreign  OflBce. 

'Mr.  Pinkney  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  September  2S/October,  7  1817.  MS.  Dis- 
patches, Russia. 

*  Cambridge  Modern  History,  vol.  x,  p.  210. 

5  Mr.  Pinkney  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  September  29/October  11,  1817.  MS.  Dis- 
patches, Russia. 


64  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

In  the  beginning  of  the  year  1818  the  situation  had  become  fur- 
ther compHcated  by  General  Jackson's  invasion  of  the  Spanish 
territory  of  Florida  and  his  capture  of  St.  Mark  and  Pensacola. 
Growing  popular  sentiment  in  the  United  States,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Henry  Clay,  soon  demanded  recognition  by  the  United 
States  Government  of  the  independence  of  the  South  American 
colonies.^  It  appeared  that  the  United  States  was  prepared  to 
challenge  not  only  the  power  of  Spain  but  also  the  monarchical 
combinations  of  Europe. 

Meanwhile  the  "mediation"  by  the  great  Powers  with  respect 
to  Ferdinand's  differences  with  his  revolted  subjects  in  South 
America — whose  possible  consequences  were  not  unnaturally 
feared  in  Washington — was  actually  taking  place.  The  mediators 
were  the  Council  of  the  Ministers  of  the  Allied  Powers  in  Paris — 
now  virtually  forming  a  European  Directorate.  These  represented 
the  Cabinets  of  the  Powers  who  had  signed  the  "Treaty  of  Alliance." 
Ferdinand  VII,  at  the  instigation  of  Tatistcheff,  had  formally 
asked  for  their  aid  in  bringing  about  a  forced  reconciliation  between 
his  throne  and  the  revolted  colonies."  In  proposing  this  course 
the  King  of  Spain  also  demanded  that  military  measures  against 
Portugal  should  be  taken  by  the  European  Powers.^  In  these 
pretensions  Alexander  and  his  protege  found  themselves  checked 
by  the  policy  of  Great  Britain,  The  English  Cabinet  from  the 
beginning  were  unalterably  opposed  to  any  form  of  "eventual 
action"  tending  to  armed  intervention.  The  Tsar  chose  to  con- 
sider this  policy  as  deliberately  opposing  his  schemes  for  inter- 
national action  in  the  interest  of  world  peace.'' 

During  the  early  part  of  the  Spanish  mediation  the  British 
envoy  was  none  other  than  the  redoubtable  Duke  of  Wellington, 

>Hildt,  p.  119. 

2  Debidour,  vol.  i,  pp.  108-109. 

'  The  revolt  of  the  South  American  colonies  was  complicated  by  the  Portuguese  sup- 
port of  the  revolutionaries  in  the  Banda  Oriental. 

*  Under  the  date  of  June  30/July  12,  1818,  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  protesting  against  Great 
Britain's  attitude,  writes  to  Count  Nesselrode:  "Jealous  of  the  interest  that  our  August 
Master  has  shown  in  the  cause  of  justice  and  of  the  Spanish  interest,  England  has  en- 
deavored for  two  years  to  prove  to  the  Cabinet  of  Madrid  that  further  deference  to  the 
Councils  of  Russia  would  react  against  their  own  interest.  The  plan  of  the  English 
Minister  has  been,  first,  to  tire  out  the  Spanish  negotiators,  using  for  that  purpose  the 
talents  of  the  Portuguese  plenipotentiary;  then  to  oblige  both  parties  to  have  recourse  to 
the  arbitration  of  Great  Britain  (alone),  thus  enabling  her  to  control  the  measures  taken 
to  reconcile  the  two  powers  of  the  Peninsula,  and  for  the  pacification  of  America."  Pozzo 
di  Borgo  to  Count  Nesselrode,  in  Y'iAo\^to\,  Correspondence  diplomatique  des  ambassadeurs 
et  ministres  de  France  en  Russie  et  de  Russie  en  France  de  JS14  a  jSjo,  vol.  1818,  No.  387. 


THE  EARLY  POLICY  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE        65 

who,  in  spite  of  the  presence  of  the  British  Ambassador,  personally 
conducted  the  negotiations.  Pozzo  di  Borgo  somewhat  queru- 
lously complains  of  his  "colleagues  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  whose 
conduct  leads  me  to  suppose  that  their  instructions  are  but 
directions  to  adhere  to  the  opinions  advanced  by  Great  Britain."  ^ 

The  unfortunate  Russian  envoy  during  this  first  essay  of  the 
great  principles  of  "International  Administration,"  found  his 
path  beset  with  difficulties.  Alexander  now  believed — and  acted 
as  though — these  principles  legally  obtained  through  the  signature 
of  the  Treaty  of  Alliance,  "consecrated"  by  the  "Holy  League." 
Pozzo  di  Borgo  was  manfully  striving  in  the  face  of  formidable 
opposition  to  direct  the  debates  in  a  sense  that  would  not  only 
satisfy  the  ends  of  Russian  policy  but  also  his  own  ideas  of  the 
preponderating  deference  due  to  the  "internationalist"  theories 
of  his  August  Master.  In  comparing  the  Russian  contentions 
with  those  of  Great  Britain,  he  declares:  "Those  emanating  from 
our  Cabinet  appear  simple,  easy  and  intelligible,  and  offer  a  means 
to  attain  their  end,  frank,  mutual  and  friendly.  I  hope  I  shall 
not  be  accused  of  prejudice  in  admitting  that  those  of  our  allies 
appear  to  me  to  be  equivocal,  filled  with  the  marks  of  jealousy  and 
tending  to  desire  ends  impossible  to  reconcile."  ^ 

He  also  complains  that  "the  whole  policy  pursued  by  the  Allied 
Powers  seems  to  tend  towards  maintaining  the  principle  of  a 
quadruple  alliance,  excluding  France  and  Spain,  an  arrangement 
whereby  Russia  would  be  reduced  to  a  minority  of  one  against 
three."  With  frank  satisfaction  he  now  noted  that  in  the  face 
of  Great  Britain's  support  of  the  Portuguese  demands,  M.  Pizarro, 
the  Spanish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  had  communicated  to  the 
mediators  that  he  had  found  it  necessary  to  consider  an  arrange- 
ment with  the  United  States  with  regard  to  Florida,  "allowing  it 
to  be  understood  that  this  not  impossible  transaction  could  not 
but  react  contrary  to  the  interests  of  Great  Britain's  systematic 
policy  in  the  New  World."  ^ 

At  this  juncture,  "with  the  prospect  of  a  close  to  this  tedious 
negotiation,"  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  in  a  fit  of  impatience, 
hastened  off  to  London,  leaving  Sir  Charles  Stuart  in  his  place. 
Freed  from  his  Jove-like  presence,  a  lively  squabble  immediately 

'Ibid. 

^  Pozzo  di  Borgo  to  Count  Capo  d'Istria,  in  Ibid.,  No.  663. 

2 Capo  d'Istria  to  Nesselrode,  in  Ibid.  (June  30/July  12),  No.  752. 


66  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

arose  between  the  envoys  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  wherein,  by 
the  use  of  subtle  dialect  and  the  transparent  arts  of  intrigue 
proper  to  a  diplomacy  already  passing  out  of  date,  each  sought  to 
gain  some  slight  advantage  over  his  adversary.  "Despairing  of 
any  issue  from  this  labyrinth  of  duplicity,  ineptitude  and  extrava- 
gance," writes  Pozzo,  *'the  mediators  (at  least  those  whose 
dynamic  was  the  spirit  of  Justice  and  Right)  wishing  to  carry 
out  the  mandates  of  their  respective  courts  (and  rather  with  the 
end  of  complying  with  their  instructions  than  with  any  hope  of 
satisfying  the  parties  interested)  .  .  .  applied  themselves  to  the 
elaboration  of  a  treaty  and  convention  the  terms  of  which 
appeared  to  them  the  most  likely  to  conciliate  the  rights  with  the 
interests  of  the  two  Peninsular  Sovereigns  in  the  New  World."  ^ 
Shortly  after,  Pozzo  di  Borgo  writes  to  Nesselrode  concerning 
the  progress  of  the  mediators: 

The  mediation  to  put  an  end  to  the  differences  existing  between 
Spain  and  Portugal  has  until  the  present  brought  forth  only  voluminous 
notes  and  sophistical  and  dilatory  arguments.  The  plenipotentiaries 
of  Spain  and  Portugal  had  at  last  agreed  to  exchange  confidential 
notes  to  be  reciprocally  signed,  by  the  terms  of  which  Brazil  bound 
herself  not  to  recognize  the  insurgents  of  Buenos  Aires,  and  to  cooperate 
by  every  means  short  of  war  to  determine  them  to  submit  to  the  mother 
country.  The  representative  of  Spain  at  the  same  time  gave  assurances 
that  in  view  of  the  services  offered  by  his  Very  Faithful  Majesty  to 
His  Catholic  Majesty,  the  latter  was  willing  to  make  certain  territorial 
concessions  which  would  rectify  the  frontiers  of  the  two  countries  in 
America.^ 

The  dispatch  closes  with  a  long  account  of  a  personal  quarrel 
which  had  unfortunately  arisen  between  TatistchefF  and  the 
Spanish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  following  eloquent 
lament  concering  the  spectacle  offered  to  the  mediators  by  the  two 
Peninsular  Kingdoms,  once  the  greatest  colonizing  empires  of  the 
world,  now  reduced  to  undignified  impotency.  "The  Cabinet  of 
Madrid  assisting  like  a  mere  spectator  at  the  demolition  of  its 
own  greatness,  wastes  its  time  combating  phantoms  in  the  midst 
of  the  deluge  which  is  sweeping  it  away,  while  the  Court  of  Brazil 
busily  sets  up  for  itself  a  terrible  neighborhood  of  'demagogy  and 
disorder.'  "  ^ 

In  September,  Pozzo  communicated  to  St.  Petersburg  the  import- 
ant news  that  "after  three  weeks  of  delay  the  British  Government 

'  Pozzo  di  Borgo  to  Nesselrode,  in  Polovstov,  op.  cit.,  vol.  1818  (July  25/August  6), 
No.  698. 


THE  EARLY  POLICY  OF  THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE        67 

has  finally  pronounced  an  absolute  negative  with  respect  to  the 
Spanish  proposition."  This  refers  to  Ferdinand's  desire  to  be 
present  at  a  Congress  where  the  Tsar  wished  to  submit  the 
Spanish  case  to  a  solemn  conclave  of  the  Powers  assembled. 
The  Spanish  envoy,  with  a  curious  misunderstanding  of  the 
situation,  had  even  "made  his  demand  for  the  participation 
of  his  Master  at  Aix-Ia-Chapelle  conditional  upon  another,  viz., 
*that  Great  Britain  should  promise  to  declare  itself  openly  against 
the  insurgents  in  case  these  latter  should  refuse  to  accept  the 
means  of  conciliation  offered  them.'  "  ^  Pozzo  closes  his  dis- 
patch with  a  prophetic  warning  regarding  the  influence  of  the 
United  States  on  European  affairs: 

The  result  of  these  misunderstandings  is,  on  the  one  hand,  the  progress 
of  the  insurrection,  on  the  other,  the  advantages  which  accrue  therefrom 
to  the  United  States.  For  a  long  time  I  have  had  the  honor  to  announce 
to  the  Imperial  Ministry  that  the  dismemberment  of  the  Spanish- 
American  Continent  would  result  to  the  advantage  of  the  Federal 
Government.  There  is  no  longer  doubt  that  the  Florid  as  will  be  ceded 
to  them,  and  that  the  Union  will  extend  its  possessions  along  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  until  it  has  developed  and  dominated  through  the  possession 
of  the  neighboring  positions  the  whole  extent  of  that  vast  body  of  water 
which  is  destined  to  become  its  absolute  property.^ 

The  European  debates  regarding  the  mediation  between  Ferdi- 
nand and  the  Portuguese  Government  (together  with  their  differ- 
ences in  the  Banda  Oriental)  and  the  "pacification"  asked  for  by 
Ferdinand  with  respect  to  the  revolted  Spanish  colonies  were  to 
be  continued  at  Aix-la-Chapelle.  The  Tsar,  with  increasing 
obstinacy,  persisted  in  his  view  that  the  Spanish  King's  troubles 
in  South  America  offered  an  opportunity  for  the  Powers  of  Europe 
to  apply  and  assert  the  principles  of  "concerted  action"  a  view 
which  he  had  been  the  first  to  advance  in  his  Instructions  to 
Novosiltzov  and  now  believed  to  be  binding  upon  the  signa- 
tories of  the  Holy  Alliance.  The  whole  question  of  a  European 
Directorate  and  the  "mutual  guarantee"  it  might  afford  to  the 
status  quo  was  about  to  be  formally  raised.  Alexander  was  deter- 
mined that  his  "Great  Idea" — which  through  the  force  of  events 
he  had  seen  thrust  aside  at  Vienna — should  receive  the  considera- 
tion it  deserved.  To  "organize  Europe"  was,  in  his  conception, 
the  first  step  towards  securing  the  reign  of  "Justice,  Christian 
Charity  and  Peace." 

'  Pozzo  di  Borgo  to  Count  Nesselrode,  in  Polovstov,  op.  cit.,  vol.  1818  (August  27/ 
September  8),  No.  713,  p.  812. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  CONGRESS  OF  AIX-LA-CHAPELLE 

If  it  were  allowable  for  the  Allies  freely  to  separate  themselves  from  the 
Alliance  there  could  be  no  permanent  Society  of  Nations.  But  no  ally,  in  this 
case,  may  hope  to  separate  himself  .  .  .  and  not  be  considered  the  common 
enemy  of  all  the  Allies.  Abbe  de  St.  Pierre,  Projet  -pour  Rendre  la  Paix 
PerpetuelU  en  Europe,  1713. 

In  April,  1818,  a  circular  was  prepared  by  the  Russian  Foreign 

Office,  under  the  Tsar's  direction,  setting  forth   at  length  the 

beneficent  ends  already  attained  through  the  recognition  of  the 

principle  of  international  solidarity.     The  Powers  were  exhorted 

not  only  to  continue  an  unalterable  devotion  to  the  system  set  up 

by  existing  treaties,  but  also  to  unite  in  closer  bonds.    In  the  form 

of  a  "Confidential  Memoir,"  ^  this  document  was  communicated 

to  the  Cabinets  of  Europe.     As  proof  of  the  reactionary  spirit 

already  prevailing  in  the  councils  of  the  Russian  Emperor,  and 

as  a  credo  of  his  intimate  beliefs,  the  following  extract  is  of  the 

highest  interest,  especially  when  compared  with  the  declarations 

that  subsequently  completed  the  conference  of  Aix-la-Chapelle: 

During  this  memorable  epoch,  a  united  Europe  has  been  able  to 
smother  the  spirit  of  revolution  and  to  create  a  new  order  of  things 
safeguarding  the  general  interest,  under  the  aegis  of  Universal  Justice. 
The  means  by  which  this  end  has  been  accomplished  are:  (a)  The  alliance 
of  the  Powers,  unalterable  in  its  principles,  yet  conformable  to  the  prog- 
ress of  events,  so  that  it  ma}^  develop  into  a  great  confederation  of  all 
the  states,  {b)  The  restoration  of  the  legitimate  government  in  France 
fortified  by  institutions  ^  which  unite  indissolubly  the  rights  of  the  Bour- 
bon dynasty  with  those  of  the  people,  (c)  The  declarations  following 
the  Congress  of  Vienna,  {d)  The  subsequent  declarations  made  at 
Paris  during  the  year  1815.^ 

Two  of  Alexander's  favorite  ideas,  grouped  in  the  following 
sentence,  find  a  prominent  place  in  the  "Memoir": 

The  wrongs  under  which  all  humanity  groaned  during  the  revolutionary 
struggle  were  the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  errors  of  the  past,  viz., 
individualism  and  partial  or  exclusive  political  combinations} 

The  conservative  nature  of  the  bond  which  formed  the  basis  of 
the   European  system   is   shown  in  the    concluding    paragraph. 

1  This  "Confidential  Memoir"  is  given  in  full  by  Polovstov,  Correspondence  Diplomatique 
des  Ambassadeurs  et  Ministres  de  France  en  Russie  et  de  Russie  en  France  de  1814  a  1830, 
vol.  1818,  p.  832. 

2  The  Charter  imposed  upon  Louis  XVIII. 
^  Polovstov,  op.  cii.,  p.  833. 

69 


70  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

This  was  intended  only  for  the  perusal  of  the  diplomatic  chancel- 
leries of  the  Allied  Powers: 

This  association  of  states  has  assured  the  inestimable  advantages  of 
civil  order  and  the  inviolability  of  persons  and  institutions.  It  has 
consecrated  and  guaranteed  everywhere  legitimacy/  ab  antiquo,  and 
recognized  by  the  treaties  now  in  force,  the  territorial  possessions  of 
every  state.  In  order  to  maintain  this  end,  the  principle  of  a  General 
Coalition  must  be  established  and  developed  by  further  eventual  action.^ 

Alexander's  conversion  from  republican  liberalism  to  a  philoso- 
phy of  monarchical  paternalism  was  now  complete.  Yet  a  private 
letter  from  Count  Capo  dTstria  to  General  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  the 
Russian  Minister  in  Paris,  written  just  before  the  Congress  now 
proposed,  proves  the  Tsar's  high-minded  intentions  towards  his 
allies.  In  connection  with  the  Memoir  it  shows  Alexander's  real 
aspirations  regarding  a  concert  of  Europe  at  this  critical  time. 
Quoting  the  Tsar's  own  words,  Capo  d'Istria  wrote: 

I  desire  the  prosperity  of  the  French  Monarchy  and  the  progressive 
strengthening  of  its  influence,  not  for  myself,  nor  for  Russia,  but  in  the 
interest  of  the  entire  universe.  It  is  Europe  that  has  suffered  from  the 
loss  and  misfortunes  of  France,  and  Europe  is  therefore  greatly  interested 
in  the  future  happiness  of  France  and  the  maintenance  of  the  order  there 
established.  All  the  Powers,  consequently,  should  cooperate  to  this 
end,  at  the  same  time  respecting  the  plighted  faith  of  treaties.  This  is 
the  chief  aim  to  which  the  efforts  of  each  one  of  the  Foreign  Ministries 
should  be  directed,  and  aside  from  it,  there  is  no  hope  either  for  France 
or  for  Europe. 

While  General  Pozzo  endeavors  to  follow  these  principles,  so  often 
impressed  upon  him,  he  feels  otherwise.  Read  his  dispatches.  They 
are  written  in  the  language  of  a  devoted  and  zealous  servant  of  the  Crown 
who  seeks  by  his  foresight  to  profit  by  every  possible  combination  the 
future  may  hold.  He  knows  that  Austria,  England  and  Prussia  have 
always  disputed  our  right  to  share  in  affairs  of  general  interest.  In 
anticipation  of  the  condition  of  affairs  which  may  arise  after  France  is 
wholly  restored,  he  prepared  to  oppose  them  by  winning  to  our  side  the 
support  of  French  diplomacy,  and  if  necessary  that  of  Spain  as  well. 
With  these  auxiliaries,  he  looks  confidently  upon  the  future. 

This  fashion  of  judging  of  men  and  affairs  can  not  but  impede  the 
progress  of  the  general  system,  and  is  not  consistent  with  the  purity  of 
its  guiding  sentiments.  Once  known  to  the  other  Ministries,  such  con- 
duct will  infallibly  engender  jealousy  and  suspicion.  In  adopting  such 
a  line,  we  should  be  drawn  in  spite  of  ourselves  into  a  by-road.  Instead 
of  working  towards  eminently  disinterested  ends,  and  by  legal  and 
avowed  means  maintaining  concord  and  union  between  the  Great  Powers, 
our  efforts  would  become  devoted  to  a  line  of  conduct  entirely  selfish, 
veiled  in  mystery  and  moving  by  devious  ways.     We  should  inevitably 

'  F"or  an  interesting  discussion  of  the  principle  of  Legitimate  Monarchy,  see  Goebel, 

Thf  Recognition  Policy  of  the  United  States. 
^  I'olovstov,  op.  cit.,  p.  834. 


THE    CONGRESS    OF   AIX-LA-CHAPELLE  71 

be  driven  to  aim  at  Power,  in  order  to  make  the  other  chancelleries  dance 
to  our  tune.  We  should  begin  by  thinking  that  all  this  was  to  preserve 
Europe  in  the  way  of  Peace.     But  where  would  such  a  path  lead  us?  ^ 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  in  judging  these  utterances,  that  they 
were  not  part  of  a  public  manifesto.  They  are,  indeed,  but  the 
report  of  a  private  conversation  between  the  Tsar  and  the 
writer.  They  were  addressed  to  one  who,  from  the  nature  of  the 
rebuke  they  implied,  would  probably  be  the  last  person  to  publish 
them  abroad.  As  such,  they  offer  valuable  evidence  of  Alexander's 
good  faith  and  sincerity  of  purpose  at  a  time  when  his  motives 
were — and  still  are — most  frequently  called  into  question.  They 
explain  why,  even  in  the  face  of  a  policy  they  could  not  but  deplore 
and  oppose,  the  Tsar  maintained  the  respect  and  admiration  of 
such  men  as  Monroe  and  Adams.  They  lead  us  to  understand 
the  verdict  of  Chateaubriand,  whose  faculties  of  criticism,  at 
least,  no  one  can  deny,  that  Alexander  of  Russia,  after  Napoleon, 
was  the  greatest  man  of  his  time. 

The  difficulties  of  continuing  a  common  direction  to  the  foreign 
policy  of  a  group  of  states  differing  widely  in  political  development 
and  civilization  became  every  day  more  apparent.  From  the  very 
beginning,  the  Tsar's  conception  of  a  fraternal  pact  general  in 
its  terms — such  as  that  uniting  the  monarchs  of  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance— was  opposed  by  the  decision  of  the  British  Cabinet  to  base 
its  whole  course  of  action  on  the  actual  text  of  the  agreements 
signed  at  Chaumont,  Vienna  and  Paris.  Castlereagh,  at  first  far 
from  hostile  to  the  Holy  Alliance,  was  soon  convinced  that  in 
following  such  a  course  lay  the  only  means  of  remedying  the 
defects  of  a  system  largely  based  on  "eventual"  decisions.  Great 
Britain  from  the  first  found  it  hard  to  reconcile  parliamentary 
principles  and  a  traditional  foreign  policy  with  the  Tsar's  ideals 
of  "European  action."  ^ 

It  was  the  Tsar's  contention  that  the  Treaty  of  Alliance  of 
November  20,  1815,  had  provided  (Article  VI)  the  machinery  for 
a  real  European  government.  In  a  series  of  congresses — wherein 
the  representatives  of  the  Powers  might  deliberate  in  common 
upon  all  matters  concerning  the  general  welfare — he  saw  the 
inception  of  a  European  legislature.  In  spite  of  the  example 
afforded  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  he  would  apparently  set  no 

'  Letter  from  Count  Capo  d'Istria  to  Gen.  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  July  10/22,  1818,  quoted  by 
Polovstov,  op.  cit.,  vol.  1818,  p.  774. 
^  Pasquier,  Memoires,  vol.  iv,  pp.  254-255. 


72  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

limits  to  the  usefulness  of  international  debate.  But  in  the  appli- 
cation of  this  policy  he  found  himself  opposed  not  only  by  Great 
Britain  but  even  by  Austria  and  Prussia.^  Both  of  these  Powers 
believed  that  a  Congress  such  as  the  Tsar  proposed — one  including 
Spain  and  the  lesser  Powers — might  readily  lead  to  embarrassing 
complications  with  respect  to  the  participation  of  France.  Per- 
sistent rumors  emanating  from  St.  Petersburg  even  affirmed 
that  the  Tsar,  dissatisfied  with  the  conduct  of  his  allies,  was 
meditating  an  alliance  with  the  restored  dynasty  of  the  Bour- 
bons.^ The  outcome  of  this  situation  was  a  compromise:  Alexan- 
der obtained  the  Congress  he  so  ardently  desired,  set  for  Septem- 
ber 30,  at  Aix-la-Chapelle.  But  in  spite  of  Spanish  protests  and 
Ferdinand's  complaints  that  Russia  had  abandoned  him,  it  was 
decided  to  restrict  this  gathering  to  the  representatives  of  the 
four  great  Powers.  Before  this  tribunal  Richelieu,  the  French 
Prime  Minister,  was  invited  to  appear  to  give  an  account  of  the 
state  of  affairs  existing  under  the  restored  monarchy. 

Although  the  conduct  of  the  Bonapartists  and  other  "revolu- 
tionaries" still  gave  cause  for  serious  anxiety  to  all  the  signatories 
of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,^  Richelieu  by  this  time  had  gained  the 
entire  confidence  of  the  Tsar.  This  was  the  end  aimed  at  when 
the  former  Russian  official  was  chosen  by  the  politic  Louis  XVIII 
to  replace  Talleyrand.^  For  nearly  a  year  Richelieu  had  flattered 
Alexander's  favorite  theories  by  pointing  out  that  on  all  occasions 
the  federal  system  of  Europe  which  must  grow  out  of  the  present 
state  of  things  could  always  force  France  to  be  just  in  case  she 
sought  to  be  unjust.  He  insisted,  however,  that  to  secure  this 
end,  France  must  form  part  of  this  system.* 

The  growing  intimacy  between  the  courts  of  France  and  Russia 
was  viewed  by  the  Powers  with  some  apprehension.  But  after 
an  interview  with  the  Tsar  at  Aix,  Castlereagh  reported  with 
some  relief  the  fact  that  Alexander  had  declared  to  Wellington  as 
well  as  to  Metternich  and  himself:  "My  army,  as  well  as  myself, 
is  at  the  disposal  of  Europe."  ^ 

1  Debidour,  Ilistoire  Diplomatique  de  V Europe,  vol.  i,  p.  118. 

^Gentz,  Depeches  inedites  du  Chevalier  de  Gentz  aux  Hospodars  de  Valachie,  vol.  I, 
pp.  398-400. 

^  Richelieu  had  for  some  time  been  Governor  of  Odessa,  while  an  emigre  in  Russia. 

*  For  the  details  of  this  negotiation,  see  Pasquier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  254-255. 

^  Dispatch,  Castlereagh  to  Bathrust,  October  3,  No.  2,  quoted  in  Phillips,  The  Con- 
federation of  Europe,  p.  168. 


THE    CONGRESS    OF   AIX-LA-CHAPELLE  73 

Since  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  November  20,  France  had 
shown  every  disposition  exactly  to  fulfil  the  terms  of  the  financial 
arrangement  imposed  upon  her  by  the  Allies.  Not  only  had  the 
scheduled  payment  of  the  indemnities — considered  enormous  at 
the  time — been  rigorously  fulfilled,  but  internationally  her  finan- 
cial position  was  even  sounder  than  before.  By  the  end  of 
April,  1818,  her  debt  to  the  Allies  (500,000,000  francs)  was  com- 
pletely liquidated.^  Through  the  reorganization  of  the  army, 
the  government  of  Louis  XVIII  was  firmly  established  upon  the 
throne.  No  real  excuse  could  now  be  invoked  for  maintaining 
the  great  Army  of  Occupation  within  the  borders  of  France. 
Moreover,  signs  were  becoming  apparent  of  a  dangerous  Liberal 
disaffection  among  the  foreign  troops  long  quartered  in  France — 
in  not  unfriendly  contact  with  the  people  who  had  led  the  revolu- 
tionary movement  throughout  Europe.^ 

But  before  finally  relinquishing  their  hold  upon  the  French 
Government,  the  Allied  Powers  desired  to  exact  from  Richelieu 
some  guarantee  of  future  good  conduct.  The  first  sessions  of  the 
Congress  were,  therefore,  almost  entirely  devoted  to  securing 
this  end. 

The  discussions  with  respect  to  the  evacuation  of  French  terri- 
tory by  the  Allied  armies  were  brief  and  to  the  point.  Nearly 
all  the  requirements  determining  this  action  had  been  carried  out. 
A  protocol,  dated  October  2,  informed  Louis  XVHI  that  the 
foreign  garrisons  would  leave  not  later  than  November  30.  This 
news  was  received  w^ith  joy  throughout  the  whole  country.^ 

The  question  now  arose  upon  w^hat  terms  the  representatives  of 
Louis  XVIII  might  be  admitted  to  take  actual  part  in  the  council. 
To  make  France  a  party  to  the  treaty  of  Chaumont  would  asso- 
ciate her  as  an  ally  in  an  agreement  aimed  chiefly  against  her  own 
interests — and  her  own  possible  military  rehabilitation.  On 
October  3,  Castlereagh  made  a  formal  proposal  "that  France 
be  admitted  under  the  terms  of  Article  VI  of  the  Treaty  of 
Alliance,"  which  had  established  "a  deliberating  system  for  the 
purpose  of  consulting  at  fixed  periods  and  upon  common  inter- 
ests." ^ 

*  Debidour,  op.  cit.,  vol.  I,  p.  117. 

2  Cretenau-Joly,  Histoire  des  Traites  de  l8is,  preface. 
2  Debidour,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  120. 

*  Martens,  Nouveau  Recueil  des  Traites  de  Paix,  vol.  ii,  p.  737. 


74  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

On  October  8  a  Russian  memorandum,  drafted  by  Pozzo  di 
Borgo,  was  presented  to  the  Allies,  and  on  November  1  a  protocol 
openly  concluded  with  Richelieu  declared  that  France  was 
"admitted  under  the  terms  of  Article  VI  of  the  treaty  of  Novem- 
ber, 1815." 

In  the  eyes  of  Europe,  Louis  XVIII  was  thus  allowed,  through 
his  representatives,  to  take  a  full  share  in  the  ensuing  debates. 
After  Richelieu  had  formally  accepted  the  Allied  terms  (Novem- 
ber 12),  a  further  protocol,  dated  November  15,  establishing  the 
mutual  relations  of  the  Five  Great  Powers,  was  considered  secret.^ 

Pasquier,  referring  to  Richelieu's  answer  of  November  12  and 

of  the  protocol  of  November  15,  says: 

These  two  remarkable  documents  should  be  studied  by  all  who  desire 
to  form  an  exact  opinion  of  the  affairs  of  this  period.  They  are  filled 
with  the  principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance.^ 

The  terms  of  this  protocol,  wholly  in  accord  with  the  Tsar's 
theories  of  concerted  action,  were,  however,  accompanied  by  cer- 
tain significant  reservations  on  the  part  of  the  British  representa- 
tive. Castlereagh  presented  a  Memorandum  to  the  Congress 
setting  forth  the  views  of  his  Cabinet.  After  recalling  the  terms 
of  the  previous  agreements  that  bound  the  Allies,  he  declared  that 
Great  Britain  could  only  consider  as  a  casus  foederis  the  return  of 
Bonaparte  or  an  attempt  to  restore  his  dynasty.  In  every  other 
situation  that  might  arise  she  would  be  guided  by  circumstances.^ 
The  Island  Empire  was  already  tending  towards  the  policy  which 
Canning  afterwards  characterized  as  "resuming  her  isolation." 
In  Castlereagh's  opinion  it  was  time  to  call  a  halt  on  Concerted 
Action.  The  Tsar  was  already  planning  an  Allied  General  StaflF. 
In  this  idea  he  was  warmly  supported  by  the  Prussians,  and  was 
only  dissuaded  by  Wellington.^  In  the  eyes  of  all  the  Allies  of 
Chaumont,  however,  except  the  Tsar,  the  return  of  France  to  the 
European  system  was  contingent  on  her  good  behavior.    As  Gentz 

'  Pasquier,  Memoires,  vol.  iv,  p.  SOL  This  document,  described  by  Gentz,  as  a  "protocol 
reserve"  [Depeches  inedites,  vol.  I,  p.  410),  is  quoted  in  full  in  Pasquier,  op.  cit.,  yo\.  iv, 
pp.  501-502:  "The  five  Powers  have  decided  not  to  depart,  either  in  their  relations  with  each 
other  or  with  other  states  from  the  principles  of  intimate  union  which  until  now  have 
presided  over  the  common  interests,  a  union  become  more  strong  and  indissoluble  from  the 
bonds  of  Christian  Brotherhood  which  join  them."  Article  2  states, "  that  this  union  is  only 
more  real  and  durable  because  it  has  in  view  no  particularistic  interests  or  temporary 
combination." 

"^  Pasquier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  262. 

'Gentz,  Depeches  inedites,  vol.  i,  p.  409. 

*  Gentz,  Ibid.,  vol.  I,  p.  413. 


THE    CONGRESS    OF   AIX-LA-CHAPELLE  75 

remarks  in  his  account  of  the  proceeding,  "it  was  not  a  Quintuple 
Alliance.     Indeed  the  idea  came  to  no  one's  mind."  ^ 

It  soon  became  evident  that  Great  Britain  also  desired  a  definite 
understanding  with  respect  to  the  limits  of  her  future  policy  con- 
cerning the  mediation  the  Powers  had  undertaken  in  South  Amer- 
ica. American  affairs  were  indeed  inevitably  to  become  the  chief 
concern  of  this  formal  gathering  of  European  Powers.  On 
October  27,  "Lord  Castlereagh  first  brought  to  the  attention  of 
the  Congress  the  question  of  the  mediation  desired  by  Ferdinand 
between  Spain  and  its  revolted  colonies."  ^ 

In  the  report  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Congress  addressed  to 

Alexander  we  read  of  the  difficulties  encountered  in  the  course 

of  this  mediation,  the  progress  of  which  was  closely  followed  by 

the  Tsar: 

The  long  statement  of  the  British  Plenipotentiary  made  all  present 
feel  that  the  British  Government  would  consult  only  its  own  interests  in 
the  matter.  His  point  of  view  was  echoed  by  the  Plenipotentiaries  of 
Austria  and  Prussia  .  .  .  Richelieu  remained  silent,  but  the  Russian 
Plenipotentiaries  now  made  the  following  statement :  'At  a  moment  when 
the  eyes  of  all  Europe  and  the  interest  of  two  hemispheres  are  fixed  upon 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  Spain  again  asks  the  Courts  of  Austria,  France,  Great 
Britain,  Prussia  and  Russia  to  consider  her  case.  She  has  proposed  a 
general  basis  of  settlement  and  asks  to  participate  in  their  councils. 
Russia  has  not  taken  any  attitude  in  this  matter,  but  is  nevertheless 
desirous  of  supporting  the  King  of  Spain.  Great  Britain  has  sought  to 
develop  the  same  ends  through  negotiations  with  the  Duke  of  San 
Carlos.  If  a  plan  can  be  agreed  upon,  Spain  appears  willing  to  forward 
its  execution  through  friendly  negotiations  with  her  colonies.  It  is 
only  in  case  that  these  offers  of  mediation  should  be  refused  that  Spain 

1  Gentz,  Depeches  inedites,  vol.  I,  p.  408. 

^See  MS.  Russian  Y  o^e\gnOSict,  Archive  sd'Etat,\m.  The  following  unpublished  docu- 
ments referring  to  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  are  contained  in  a  Folio  marked  Precis 
du  Travail  de  la  Conference  d'Aix-la-Chapelle .  The  report  to  the  Emperor,  quoted  above, 
is  contained  in  Cartons  2  and  3  of  this  Folio.  The  Tsar's  misgivings  with  respect  to 
English  support  of  his  plan  for  a  "Confederation  of  States"  is  shown  by  the  terms  of 
an  interesting  document  presented  by  the  Russian  plenipotentiary  to  the  Ministers  of 
Austria,  France,  Great  Britain  and  Prussia  (dated  November  11/23,  1818).  In  this 
document  Alexander  reiterated  with  doctrinaire  persistency  the  ideals  of  solidarity  and 
"brotherhood"  of  nations  and  sovereigns  contained  in  the  manifesto  of  the  Holy  Alliance. 
He  once  more  expressed  his  belief  that  "reciprocal  guarantees"  alone  could  insure  the 
status  quo  of  Europe.  At  the  same  time  he  suggested  as  the  surest  basis  for  future  peace 
a  "Territorial  Guarantee"  of  the  respective  possessions  of  the  Allied  Powers  and  the  fol- 
lowing significant  clause  with  respect  to  British  participation  was  added:  "They  agree  to 
notify  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  of  the  above  clause,  inviting  H.  B.  M.'s  Gov- 
ernment to  use  its  good  offices  to  obtain  the  results  desired  if  necessary  without  requiring 
its  active  cooperation  or  full  adhesion."  This  treaty  draft,  which  does  not  appear  to  have 
been  seriously  debated  by  the  Congress,  is  highly  interesting  not  only  as  showing  the 
Tsar's  persistent  devotion  to  the  principles  set  forth  in  Novosiltzov's  Instructions  but  also 
as  a  serious  attempt  to  make  a  territorial  guarantee  the  basis  of  a  general  treaty.  (Com- 
pare Article  X  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.)     See  Appendix. 


16  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

will  desire  the  intervening  powers  to  furnish  more  effectual  and  impera- 
tive cooperation.^ 

Spain,  as  a  party  to  the  proceedings,  continued  to  insist  on 
being  admitted  to  the  Congress.  To  such  a  step — and  to  the 
"intervention"  hinted  at  in  the  Russian  statement — the  British 
representative  strongly  objected.  "Castlereagh  explained  that 
Great  Britain  would  only  'intervene'  with  good  offices,  and  refused 
to  consent  to  the  Spanish  envoy  being  admitted  to  the  de- 
bates." ^  The  Russian  representatives  were  to  continue,  to  the 
end  of  the  Congress,  their  attempts  to  draw  the  English  Foreign 
Minister  into  the  Tsar's  plan  of  a  European  Directorate.  But 
besides  their  objections  to  vague  "eventual  action,"  the  British 
Cabinet  felt,  not  without  reason,  that  the  solidarity  between  the 
-"Russian  Court  and  the  Courts  of  France  and  Spain  would  but 
set  up  a  condition  of  "equilibrium"  wholly  to  the  Tsar's  advan- 
tage. Alexander's  efforts  to  force  Ferdinand  on  the  Congress 
defeated  his  own  ends.^ 

At  the  second  conference,  held  on  October  24,  consideration  of 
these  important  questions  was  continued.  "No  one  cared  to 
open  the  discussion" — or  to  oppose  the  Tsar's  desires.  France 
and  Russia  were  alone  in  favor  of  making  an  "international 
question"  of  Ferdinand's  domestic  troubles.  It  was  Castlereagh 
'  who  finally  proposed  a  solution.  "Let  us,"  he  said,  "decide 
collectively  that  the  role  of  Mediator  be  accepted  by  the  Five 
Courts,  at  the  same  time  announcing  to  Spain  thai  only  good 
offices  are  possible;  let  us  propose  that  she  begin  by  granting  to  the 
colonies  still  under  her  sceptre  the  advantages  she  is  disposed  to 
offer,  and  make  similar  offers  to  those  which  are  in  a  state  of 
insurrection."^  Greatly  to  Alexander's  chagrin,  Austria  and 
Prussia  seconded  Castlereagh  in  the  above  proposal. 

Richelieu,  inspired  by  the  Tsar's  interest  in  Spain,  now 
made  a  last  attempt  to  include  Ferdinand  in  the  debates.     He 

'  "Report  to  the  Emperor,"  Carton  2,  he.  cit. 

^  Pasquier  is  careful  to  point  out  that  this  meeting  in  which  sovereigns  and  their 
plenipotentiaries  took  part  remained  in  reality  a  reunion.  It  had  been  "positi'^ely 
announced  that  it  was  not  the  intention  of  the  sovereigns  to  hold  a  Congress."  "In 
London  it  was  feared  that  Russian  influence  in  a  Congress  would  be  preponderant." 
Pasquier,  Memoires,  vol.  iv,  pp.  254-255.  The  Tsar's  doctrinaire  efforts  (renewed  at  Lay- 
bach)  to  give  a  formal,  legislative  tone  to  the  debates  but  aroused  opposition  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain  and  Austria.  This  was  perhaps  the  chief  cause  that  made  Aix-la-Chapelle 
the  closing  chapter  of  the  "coalition"  rather  than  the  opening  of  a  new  era. 

^"Report  to  the  Emperor,"  Carton  2,  loc.  cit. 


THE    CONGRESS    OF   AIX-LA-CHAPELLE  11 

opposed  the  British  plan  for  the  following  reason:  "In  using  such 
language  to  Spain  she  will  be  forced  to  refuse  the  mediation." 
His  closing  reason — in  view  of  subsequent  events — is  also  signifi- 
cant: He  objected  to  Castlereagh's  attitude  because  "this  will 
be  serving  the  purposes  of  the  growing  democracy  of  the  other 
hemisphere."  ^ 

The  discussions  "now  became  general  and  vague."  The 
Russian  envoy  (Capo  d'Istria)  fell  back  on  a  classic  strategem  of 
diplomacy.  After  speaking  at  length  in  support  of  Richelieu's 
motion,  he  desired  "an  adjournment  pending  further  instructions 
from  the  Emperor."  ^  The  latter  evidently  still  pinned  his  faith 
to  the  form  which  the  "mediation"  should  assume.  Indeed,  from 
the  very  beginning  the  real  interest  of  the  sovereigns  grouped 
in  the  "Holy  Alliance"  was  evident.  Their  anxiety  for  Ferdinand  ' 
was  dependent  on  preserving  the  institution  of  European  mon- 
archy in  the  New  World. 

Capo  d'Istria  now  proposed  as  a  substitute  for  the  English 
scheme  a  collective  note  asking  Madrid  to  "suggest  remedies  in 
detail,"  adding,  in  a  burst  of  frankness:  "It  is  realized  that  no 
one  knows  the  real  situation  in  America  or  the  circumstances  of 
the  insurrection  well  enough  to  judge  whether  the  remedies  pro- 
posed would  be  effectual."^ 

The  indispensable  Gentz — who  was  considered  an  authority  on 
American  affairs — ^was  charged  with  drawing  up  a  full  "report" 
for  the  Congress.  This  High  Priest  of  Legitimacy  ^  was,  there- 
fore, to  frame  the  solution  by  which  Europe  might  crush  the 
growing  Constitutional  movement — based  on  the  example  of  the 
United  States — which  was  threatening  all  South  America! 

The  French  proposal  regarding  the  form  which  the  mediation 
should  assume  (contained  in  the  instructions  given  to  Richelieu) 
but  continued  the  monarchical  thesis.  It  laid  down  the  following 
propositions: 

*  "Report  to  the  Emperor,"  loc  cit. 

^  Gentz  in  his  youth  had  written  a  remarkable  thesis  on  "The  Effect  of  the  Discovery 
of  America  on  Europe."  See  de  Clery,  Un  diplomats  d'il  y  a  cent  ans:  Frederick  de 
Gentr,  p.27.  See  also  a  pamphlet  in  the  Congressional  Library  in  Washington  concern- 
ing The  Origin  and  Principles  of  the  American  Revolution  compared  with  the  Origin  and  Prin- 
ciples of  the  French  Revolution,  written  by  Gentz  and  translated  by  J.  Q.  Adams.  Gentz' 
later  anti-Americanism  is  shown  in  his  reports  to  the  Russian  Foreign  Office.  See 
Nesselrode,  Letters  and  Papers,  1760-1S50,  vol.  v,  p.  39. 


78 


THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 


(1)  The  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Buenos  Aires,  on  condition 
that  a  constitutional  monarchy  be  established  with  a  Spanish  Prince 
occupying  the  throne,  and  of  certain  concessions  being  granted,  favorable 
to  Spanish  trade. 

(2)  Political  and  commercial  concessions  to  be  granted  to  Caracas, 
Venezuela  and  the  provinces  of  Grenada  which  have  achieved  inde- 
pendence from  Spain. 

(3)  The  immediate  adoption  towards  Peru  and  Mexico  of  a  more 
liberal  system  of  commerce,  and  especially  the  apppointment  of  native 
Americans  to  public  office. 

Commenting  on  the  above  "points,"  King  Louis  made  the  fol- 
lowing admissions: 

His  Majesty  believes  that  these  are  the  three  means  of  preventing 
the  general  conflagration  by  which  America  is  menaced,  a  disaster 
whose  reactions  on  Europe  would  be  terrible.  Thus  the  progressive 
emancipation  of  this  great  continent,  because  it  is  in  line  with  the 
inevitable  order  of  things,  will  be  restrained  and  rendered  less  dangerous 
to  the  European  system  by  conserving  the  forms  of  monarchical  govern- 
ment.^ The  important  matter  is  to  have  (the  above)  adopted  as  the  basis 
of  Aix-la-Chapelle.  The  details  of  the  plan  can  only  be  elaborated  in 
accord  with  Spanish  views,  and  at  a  reunion  where,  in  order  to  secure  the 
widest  discussion,  not  only  the  envoys  of  Brazil,  but  also  those  of  the 
United  States,  should  be  invited  to  attend.  The  King  is  persuaded  that 
by  admitting  the  latter  Powers  to  a  conference  when  this  important 
question  will  be  treated,  measures  best  calculated  to  insure  its  success 
will  have  been  taken. 

The  concluding  paragraph  of  the  instructions  was  wholly  in 
accord  with  the  desire  of  Alexander  to  open  these  debates  directed 
by  the  spirit  of  the  "Holy  Alliance"  to  the  Christian  and  civilized 
nations  of  the  world.  Richelieu,  as  Castlereagh  had  foreseen, 
was  working  "in  combination"  with  the  Russian  delegation.  The 
French  instructions  show  that  Alexander  still  hoped  to  obtain  not 
only  the  adherence  of  the  United  States  to  the  "Holy  Alliance" 
but  also  their  participation  in  the  "World  Congress,"  where  they 
might  act  as  a  counterpoise  to  British  policy. 

As  will  be  seen  from  the  above  instructions,  Franco-Russian  policy 
was  not  opposed  to  including  the  principal  American  Powers — 
notably  the  United  States — in  the  European  debates  concerning 
the  Spanish  insurgents.  Sound  as  this  policy  appears  upon  the 
surface,  there  were  reasons  which  caused  it  to  be  viewed  with 

'  "Instructions  de  Louis  XVIII  au  Due  de  Richelieu,  Plenipotentiare  Fran^ais  au  Con- 
gres  I'Aix-la-Chapelle,"  Polovstov,  Correspondence  Diplomatique  des  Ambassadeurs  et 
Ministres  de  France  en  Rusjie  et  de  Russie  en  France  de  1814  a  iSjo,  vol.  1818,  No. 
367,  p.  820. 


THE    CONGRESS    OF   AIX-LA-CHAPELLE  79 

suspicion  by  the  Washington  Cabinet.  We  may  now  consider 
some  hitherto  unpublished  evidence  of  the  dangers  which  con- 
fronted the  young  Republic  in  formulating  a  policy  with  respect 
to  European  affairs.  The  secret  dossiers  of  the  Russian  Foreign 
Office  offer  proofs  that  the  trained  diplomacy  of  Adams  and 
Monroe,  in  clinging  to  the  policy  of  isolation  set  forth  by  Wash- 
ington and  refusing  their  adhesion  to  this  earlier  League  of  Peace, 
adopted  a  course  in  accord  with  the  best  interests  of  the  whole 
American  Continent. 

The  Russian  plan  of  mediation  (complementary  to  the  above) 
is  a  highly  interesting  document.  It  brings  to  the  attention  of  the 
European  Powers  the  importance  of  a  new  factor  in  international 
affairs:  the  growing  power  of  the  young  American  Republic.  The 
original  is  marked  "Confidential,"  and  "Submitted  by  the  Pleni- 
potentiaries of  France  and  Russia  to  their  colleagues  as  wholly 
confidential  and  reserved  for  their  own  information."  It  was  also 
further  stated  that  this  document  is  "in  no  case  to  be  inserted  in 
the  Protocols  of  the  Conference."  ^ 

A  cautious  preamble  set  forth  the  Tsar's  views  of  the  attitude 
to  be  adopted  by  the  Powers  of  Europe  towards  America.  The 
general  line  of  policy  thus  laid  down  was  probably  no  secret  to 
the  Washington  Cabinet.  It  was  a  policy  which,  as  the  Russian 
Memorandum  admits,  was  more  suitable  for  "verbal  communica- 
tion" than  for  written  notes: 

Spain's  confidence  must  be  gained,  not  forced.  This  is  indispensable 
because  she  alone  has  the  power  to  act  directly  .  .  .  An  event  which 
would  cause  irremediable  differences  in  the  development  of  the  situation 
would  be  the  recognition  by  any  power  of  the  government  set  up  by  the 
insurgents.  Unfortunately,  this  is  not  an  improbable  event.  The 
popular  party  in  the  United  States,  much  strengthened  of  late,  is  pre- 
paring to  make  a  strong  effort  to  secure  the  recognition  of  the  indepen- 
dence of  Buenos  Aires  during  the  next  session  of  Congress.  Considera- 
tion of  their  actions  reveal  their  ambitions  to  make  of  the  American 
Continent  one  Grand  Confederated  Republic  at  the  head  of  which  will 
be  found  the  United  States.  In  the  actual  state  of  affairs,  the  United 
States  centralizes  all  its  efforts  in  developing  its  resources  and  population. 
It  is  directed  by  a  moderate  policy  and  does  not  offer  a  menace  to 
Europe.  This  would  not  continue  to  be  the  case  should  a  large  portion 
of  South  America  adopt  its  institutions.  A  whole  republican  world, 
young,  ardent  and  enriched  by  the  production  of  every  climate,  will  then 
set  itself  up  in  opposition  to  an  old  monarchical  Europe,  overpopulated 
and  shaken  by  thirty  years  of  revolution.     This  is  a  perspective  worthy 

^MS.  Aix-la-Chapelle,  Russian  Foreign  0£Bce,  Petrograd. 


80  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

of  the  earnest  consideration  of  all  European   statesmen.     The  conse- 
quences of  all  this  might  be  incalculable. 

The  Russian  Memorandum  then  proceeds  to  prove  with  what 

care  Europe  should  seek  to  prevent,  or  at  least  retard,  the  growing 

relations  between  North  America  and  the  new  states  formed  in 

the  south: 

The  essential  point  is  to  gain  time;  a  united  representation  by  the 
Powers  of  Europe  would  undoubtedly  have  a  great  effect  on  the  American 
Government  .  .  .  It  is  believed  that  the  Plenipotentiaries  of  the  Five 
Powers  at  Washington  should  take  the  steps  necessary  to  persuade  public 
opinion  in  the  United  States,  as  well  as  the  Executive,  to  adopt  their 
point  of  view.  This  delicate  negotiation  should  be  conducted  with 
much  care.  Verbal  communication  would  be  preferable  to  written 
notes — in  order  to  avoid  giving  ammunition  to  the  opposition,  who 
would  seize  upon  the  idea  of  foreign  influence  as  contrary  to  American 
institutions  .  .  . 

The  closing  paragraph  of  this  extraordinary  diplomatic  docu- 
ment is  not  without  a  certain  enduring  significance: 

It  would  be  advisable  that  these  overtures  be  made  only  with  the 
intention  of  examining  more  carefully — before  taking  action — the 
results  which  might  follow  an  intervention  in  America.  These  results 
would  probably  be  obtained  most  easily  should  the  United  States  finally 
be  invited  to  send  a  Plenipotentiary  to  confer  with  the  other  Powers. 
They  could  be  told  they  were  themselves  a  European  people.  Christians, 
and,  therefore,  like  Europe,  interested  in  questions  of  a  general  nature.  ^ 

As  will  later  appear,  the  terms  of  the  Russian  secret  "Memoran- 
dum" present  a  startling  contrast  to  the  tone  subsequently 
adopted  by  Poletica  in  his  renewed  negotiations  to  induce  the 
Government  at  Washington  to  accede  to  the  "Holy  Alliance." 
Had  the  invitation  to  form  part  of  the  European  system  (already 
conveyed  through  Capo  dTstria  at  St.  Petersburg  ^  and  Dashkov 
at  Washington)  been  accepted,  the  envoys  of  the  United  States 
would  have  found  themselves  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  either  in  a 
minority  with  Great  Britain,  opposing  the  mediation  asked  for  by 
Ferdinand,  or  else  (as  Alexander  hoped)  throwing  the  weight 
of  their  influence  in  support  of  the  Russian  proposals.  To  accede 
to  the  latter  would  have  ended  in  limiting  the  action  of  the  United 
States  in  America,  while  the  Powers  of  the  Holy  Alliance  imposed 
their  own  policy  through  "concerted  action." 

'  MS.  Aix-la-Chapelle,  Russian  Foreign  Office,  Petrograd. 

^  See  j-Mpra. 


THE    CONGRESS    OF   AIX-LA-CHAPELLE  81 

Early  in  the  sessions  of  the  Congress  (October  24)  Castlereagh 
had  cleverly  annexed  to  the  Spanish  colonial  questions  (by  a 
reference  to  Ferdinand's  promise  to  end  the  traffic  in  negroes 
in  the  year  1820)  the  whole  matter  of  the  slave  trade.  This 
was  placing  the  negotiations  on  a  new  footing,  wherein  sentiment 
rather  than  expediency  determined  the  issue.  Realizing  the  dan- 
ger of  this  line  of  conduct,  the  Russian  envoys  attempted  to  have 
the  slave  trade  made  the  object  of  a  "Special  Association,"  in 
which  all  the  states  would  have  a  part.  In  this  connection  they 
suggested  a  central  international  rendezvous  for  an  Allied  fleet 
on  the  African  coast.  This  proposal  for  forming  an  International 
Maritime  Police  naturally  brought  up  the  matter  of  the  general 
safety  of  the  seas,  and  notably  the  vexed  question  of  the  Barbary 
pirates.  In  view  of  the  English  policy  in  the  Mediterranean,  there 
was  a  return  to  debatable  ground.  The  European  Powers  found 
it  convenient  to  overlook  their  own  particularistic  interests  and 
to  join  once  more  with  cheerful  unanimity  in  renewed  admonitions 
to  the  United  States. 

In  the  meeting  of  November  11  the  conference  took  cogni- 
zance of  a  Memoir  drawn  up  by  Count  Palmella,  the  Portuguese 
envoy,  concerning  "the  piratry's  exercise  by  a  band  of  scoundrels 
navigating  under  unrecognized  flags."  ^  By  this  term  was  in- 
tended not  only  the  insurgents  of  South  America  but  also  alleged 
privateers  fitted  out  in  North  American  ports  to  aid  the  revolu- 
tionists. Palmella  proposed  "that  the  Ministers  of  the  Five 
Powers  in  Washington  should  be  instructed  to  act  in  accord  with 
the  Ministers  of  His  Most  Faithful  Majesty  (the  King  of  Portugal) 
in  order  to  obtain  the  renewal  of  the  Act  of  August  3,  1793,  by 
which  the  arming  of  corsairs  in  the  United  States  was  forbidden, 
and  that  such  clauses  necessary  to  secure  the  execution  of  this 
act  should  be  added."  He  also  proposed  "that  all  colonial  powers 
of  America  should  take  steps  to  forbid  the  equipment  of  corsairs 
in  their  ports,  the  sale  of  prizes  illegally  detained,"  etc.  On 
November  13  the  Duke  of  Richelieu,  to  whom  Palmella's  memoir 
had  been  referred,  reported  that  the  "United  States  shou  d  be 
included    in    the    proposed    League    of   International    Maritime 

^MS.  Aix-la-Chapelle,  Russian  Foreign  Office,  Petrograd. 


82  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Police."  "But  such  an  invitation,"  he  continued,  "could  not  be 
well  extended  until  Spanish  America  was  pacified."^ 

On  November  14  the  League  to  Suppress  Piracy  was  considered 
a  proper  subject  "for  a  general  treaty  of  alliance,  which  should 
determine  the  ports  to  which  each  contingent  should  be  assigned." 
The  latter,  it  was  proposed,  should  each  have  a  separate  cruising 
ground,  which  was  to  be  changed  at  frequent  intervals.  As  a 
measure  of  precaution  "the  whole  strength  of  the  squadron  should 
never  be  united  unless  necessary  for  action  against  the  Barbary 
States."  1 

Great  Britain's  reluctance  to  lend  the  support  of  her  sea  power 
to  these  "international"  naval  measures  ended  in  their  abandon- 
ment. Upon  her  jealously  guarded  "hegemony"  turned,  moreover, 
the  whole  success  or  failure  of  an  armed  intervention  in  South 
American  affairs.  The  "League  to  Suppress  Piracy"  was  indeed 
but  the  Armada  of  Legitimacy  and  monarchical  solidarity.  Had 
Britain  not  curtailed  the  theoretical  "freedom  of  the  seas," 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  fleets  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
would  have  sailed  unhampered  upon  a  crusade  chiefly  aimed  at 
upholding  the  "European  principle"  and  extending  its  benefits 
to  the  Latin-American  Continent.^ 

^  MS.  Aix-la-Chapelle,  Russian  Foreign  Office,  Petrograd.  As  part  of  the  same 
debates,  Metternich  now  proposed  to  restore  their  island  fortresses  to  the  Order  of  the 
Knights  of  Malta  as  a  nucleus  of  the  international  fleet  operating  against  the  Barbary 
States.  "Such  an  institution  of  permanent  police,"  he  maintained,  "is  preferable  to  a 
political  and  military  combination."  The  Emperor  of  Austria  offered  the  port  of  Lissa 
as  a  base  of  operations  for  the  Order.  Under  Metternich's  scheme,  the  old  order  of 
Knighthood  was  to  be  accessible,  not  alone  to  members  of  the  nobility,  but  also  to 
"youths  of  good  family."  It  would  thus  become  a  school  for  young  sailors  and  a  place 
where  veteran  seamen  could  be  usefully  employed.  "Placed  under  the  protection  of  a 
permanent  neutrality,  the  flag  of  the  Order  would  be  respected  by  all  of  the  other  fleets." 

*See  supra,  p.  91,  Mr.  Campbell  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  April  21/May  3,  1819. 
Disappointed  in  his  eflf"orts  to  challenge  and  control  Great  Britain  upon  an  element  she 
had  made  her  own,  the  Tsar  nevertheless  pursued  his  intention  to  open  the  debates  of  the 
Congress  to  all  matters  of  international  concern.  The  meeting  of  November  21  was  entirely 
devoted  to  another  question  of  abiding  interest  at  the  present  day.  This  was  a  communica- 
tion of  a  report  by  Mr.  Way  "On  the  wrongs  and  political  disabilities  of  the  Jews  in  the 
difl^erent  nations  of  Europe."  Here  again  particularistic  interests  interfered  and  no  prac- 
tical steps  to  ameliorate  the  postion  of  this  unfortunate  people  appear  to  have  been 
proposed. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   UNITED   STATES   AND   THE    POLITICAL 
RECONSTRUCTION  OF   EUROPE,    1815-1820 

"Some  days  before  he  left  Paris  he  said  to  us:  'I  am  about  to  quit  France, 
but  I  wish,  before  I  go,  to  render  by  a  public  act  the  homage  which  we 
owe  to  God  .  .  .  and  to  invite  the  nations  to  devote  themselves  to  the 
obedience  of  the  Gospel.  I  have  brought  with  me  the  outline  of  this  act, 
and  I  wish  you  would  examine  it  attentively  .  .  .  You  will  join  with  me  a 
prayer  to  God  that  my  Allies  may  be  disposed  to  sign  it.'  "  Tsar  Alexander 
to  Empaytaz,  1815. 

The  Tsar's  gratification  with  respect  to  the  accompHshments 
of  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  was  complete  and  openly- 
expressed.  A  document  preserved  in  the  files  of  the  Russian 
Foreign  Office  contains  the  following  summary  of  the  results 
obtained: 

The  conferences  of  Aix-Ia-Chapelle  have  beyond  the  power  of  any 
denial  added  to  the  progress  of  the  European  system.  This  system  is 
now  based  upon  existing  common  transactions,  and  the  Cabinets  of 
Europe  have  been  able  to  recognize  and  appreciate  its  governing 
principles.  In  the  future  no  questions  of  a  general  nature  can  be  too  difficult 
or  complicated  for  its  application.  Precedents  for  the  treatment  of  such 
questions  will  be  found  in  the  Acts  and  Transactions  of  the  Congress  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle. 

The  Grand  Alliance,  therefore,  has  gained  in  two  ways:  First,  a  fresh 
proof  has  been  given  of  its  solidarity,  and,  secondly,  new  rules  of  conduct 
applicable  to  the  future  have  been  deduced,  ensuring  the  maintenance 
of  peace  and  union  between  the  Allied  Powers.^ 

It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  even  at  this  time  Alexander's 
optimism  was  wholly  justifiable.  Once  the  question  of  readmit- 
ting France  to  the  councils  of  Europe  had  been  decided,  the 
arguments  of  the  Tsar's  representatives  had  aimed  to  secure 
from  their  reluctant  colleagues  of  Prussia,  Austria  and  Great 
Britain  some  formal  recognition  of  the  principle  of  international 
duty  and  solidarity.  This  policy  was  viewed  with  suspicion  by 
the  other  signatories  of  the  treaties  forming  the  System  of  1815. 
Castlereagh's  "reservations"  held  England  obstinately  apart 
from  any  Alliance  Solidaire.  Metternich's  grudging  recognition 
of  the  advantages  of  such  a  pact  were  of  little  practical  value. 
Aplatonic  "mediation,"  not  an  "intervention,"  had  been  the  only 
form  of  "concerted  action"  approved  by  the  Powers  in  the  ques- 

^  Contained  in  the  "Report  to  the  Emperor,"  MS.  Aix-la-Chapelle,  1818,  Russian 
Foreign  Office,  Petrograd. 

83 


84  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

tion  of  the  Spanish  Colonies.^  A  brief  review  of  the  diplomatic 
policy  of  the  United  States  preceding  Aix-Ia-Chapelle  throws 
much  light  upon  the  European  situation. 

Although  Castlereagh  had  intimated  that  an  American  rep- 
resentative would  not  be  unwelcome  at  the  Congress  and  the 
same  proposal  had  been  made  in  Richelieu's  instructions,  the 
United  States  had  held  resolutely  aloof  from  all  participation  in 
the  "Acts  and  Transactions"  of  Europe.  The  foreign  policy  of 
the  Washington  Cabinet  was  one  of  extreme  complication.  While 
public  opinion  was  pressing  for  some  open  expression  of  sympathy 
with  the  South  American  insurgents,  the  American  Minister  in 
Madrid  was  doing  all  in  his  power  to  secure  from  Ferdinand  some 
practical  settlement  of  the  Florida  question. 

An  interesting  contemporary  judgment  on  the  conduct  of  the 
United  States  at  this  time  is  to  be  found  in  the  Abbe  de  Pradt's  ^ 
UEurope  apres  le  Congres  (T Aix-la-Chapelle.  To  oppose  the 
European  system  the  author  welcomes  an  American  system 
based  on  a  liberal  conception  of  diplomacy  and  government. 
He  seems  to  have  been  the  first  European  writer  to  realize  the 
benefits  that  might  accrue  to  the  Old  World  by  the  desire  of  the 
United  States  to  remain  apart  from  combinations  principally 
concerned  with  particularistic  interests  in  which  it  had  no  share. 
He  summed  up  this  policy  as  follows: 

To  remain  apart  from  European  affairs;  to  oppose  any  intervention  of 
Europe  in  the  affairs  of  America;  and  to  build  up  a  universal  American 
system. 

Pradt's  works  on  foreign  policy  were  widely  read  and  doubtless 
led  liberal  opinion  abroad  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  policy 
of  the  Washington  Cabinet.  But  in  the  opinion  of  the  chief 
protagonist  of  "concerted  action"  the  absence  of  an  American 
representative  from  the  Congress  of  1818  was  a  regrettable  neglect 
of  international  duty.     The  Tsar  was  determined  to  renew  the 

*  Nevertheless  the  American  Minister  in  St.  Petersburg  was  informed  by  his  British 
colleague  "that  an  adjustment  of  the  quarrels  between  Spain  and  her  colonies  would 
doubtless  be  attempted  under  the  auspices  of  the  Allied  Powers."  Mr.  Campbell  to  the 
Secretary  of  State,  September  25,  1819.     MS.  Dispatches,  ^Mjjza. 

2  L'Abbe  de  Pradt  (Archbishop  of  Malines)  wrote  (with  truly  astonishing  prolixity) 
concerning  the  relations  of  Europe  and  America.  His  best  known  works  are  L' Europe 
apres  le  Congris  d' Aix-la-Chapelle  (published  in  1819),  L' Europe  et  rAmerique  en  1821 
(published  in  1821,  with  a  second  enlarged  edition  in  1822).  These  studies  were  quickly 
followed  by  another  concerning  Le  Vrai  Systeme  de  ['Europe  relativement  d'Amerique  et  la 
Grece  (published  in  1825). 


THE    POLITICAL   RECONSTRUCTION    OF    EUROPE  85 

negotiations  unsuccessfully  carried  on  by  Dashkov  to  secure  the 
adherence  of  the  United  States  to  the  Holy  Alliance.  Early  in 
the  year  1818  he  chose  the  Chevalier  de  Poletica  for  the  difficult 
task  of  again  urging  the  Washington  Government  to  form  some 
more  intimate  connection  with  the  European  system.  Poletica 
was  impressed  with  the  importance  of  his  task.  His  correspond- 
ence, preserved  in  the  Archives  of  the  Russian  Foreign  Office, 
shows  that  before  leaving  Europe  he  made  a  careful  study  of  the 
American  situation  in  all  its  bearings;  for  unlike  Dashkov — a 
careless  petty  official — Poletica  had  been  trained  in  the  most 
subtle  traditions  of  European  diplomacy. 

He  wisely  considered  that  the  key  to  the  mediation  regarding 
the  Spanish  colonies  lay  in  the  hands  of  the  Cabinet  in  Washing- 
ton rather  than  in  Europe.  Any  formal  recognition  of  the  insur- 
gents would  be  fatal  to  the  cause  of  Ferdinand — and  indirectly 
to  the  system  of  "concerted  action"  regarding  South  American 
affairs  desired  by  the  Tsar.  To  persuade  the  Government  at 
Washington  that  their  duty  as  members  of  the  great  family  of 
nations  required  them  to  respect  the  decisions  reached  by  the 
common  deliberations  of  the  Powers  became  his  chief  end. 

Before  leaving  for  his  post  Poletica  was  directed  to  attend  the 
meetings  at  Aix-la-Chapelle.  The  fate  of  the  mediation  at  this 
conference  was  disappointing.  But  the  Tsar  was  still  hopeful  of 
the  results  that  might  be  obtained  by  opposing  the  United  States 
to  British  policy,  not  only  in  the  New  World  but  in  the  councils 
of  Europe.  The  above  aim  is  developed  at  length  in  Poletica's 
instructions: 

At  your  own  desire  you  have  been  able  to  assist  at  the  Congress  just 
ended  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  so  that  you  can  judge  of  the  results  of  these  dis- 
cussions. You  will  thus  be  able  to  use  this  knowledge  in  your  relations 
with  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  You  understand  the 
general  system  of  Europe,  both  in  its  details  and  its  general  policy. 
It  is  a  policy  of  preserving  peaceful  relations  adapted  to  all  civilized 
states,  no  matter  what  their  political  institutions  may  be,  or  the  place 
which  they  may  occupy  among  the  nations.  The  United  States  are 
called  upon  by  their  own  interest  to  adhere  to  this  sytem.  The  Imperial 
Chancellor,  counting  on  your  zeal,  does  not  hide  its  appreciation  of  the 
difficulties  arising  from  popular  prejudices  which  confront  you.  The 
Chancellor  knows  of  the  opinion  generally  held  in  the  United  States 
that  it  is  better  not  to  associate  that  country  with  the  political  systems  of 
Europe.  Indeed,  it  has  even  been  said  that  the  misfortunes  of  Europe 
are  the  cause  of  American  commercial  prosperity. 


86  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

The  last  war  between  England  and  America  must  be  considered  as 
resulting  from  this  system  of  isolation.  That  this  has  ended  more 
happily  for  the  United  States  than  could  be  expected  is,  however,  due 
rather  to  the  presumption  and  mistakes  of  their  adversaries  than  to  any 
other  cause.  It  seems  clear  to  us  that  even  if  the  United  States  should 
persist  in  her  present  system  of  isolation  from  the  European  system, 
they  will  inevitably,  sooner  or  later,  be  drawn  within  its  influence. 
Thus  the  state  of  things  which  led  to  the  War  of  1812  will  undoubtedly 
recur.  Upon  what  does  the  United  States  then  hope  to  base  her  future 
policy,  and  what  Power  will  intervene  in  her  behalf?  ^ 

The  above  instructions  were  in  line  w^ith  the  course  already 
recommended  by  Poletica  himself.  Proof  of  the  care  with  which 
this  diplomat  had  prepared  the  work  of  his  mission  is  offered  by 
his  earlier  personal  correspondence  with  Capo  dTstria,  which 
contains  an  interesting  appreciation  of  the  entire  situation: 

.  During  my  passage  through  Paris,  Mr.  Gallatin  touched  upon  this 
delicate  question.^  I  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  on  my  arrival  in 
Washington  it  will  be  the  first  subject  concerning  which  I  shall  have  to 
negotiate  with  the  United  States  Government.  ...  I  am  aware 
that  the  Emperor's  political  system — as  simple  in  conception  as  equitable 
in  its  motives — desires  nothing  except  the  general  interest  of  Europe  and 
hopes  to  gain  this  end  by  a  strict  observance  of  the  Pacts  which  form  the 
basis  of  the  European  system.  The  American  Government,  however, 
finds  itself  outside  of  this  center  of  political  action.  Like  all  new  states 
of  a  democratic  character  which  have  succeeded  in  proving  their  youth- 
ful strength,  the  United  States  seems  to  have  arrived  at  a  period  of 
development  wherein  they  find  themselves  impatient  of  all  peaceful 
restraint. 

The  Powers  most  directly  interested  feel  that  both  a  spirit  of  justice 
and  their  own  public  interest  require  that  a  strict  neutrality  be  observed 
in  the  struggle  between  Spain  and  her  colonies.  But  public  opinion,  all 
powerful  in  a  republic,  is  always  ambitious.  The  people  of  the  United 
States  demand  of  their  government  that  it  should  extend  its  already 
immense  territory  and  should,  therefore,  support  the  insurgents.  It  is 
without  doubt  a  veritable  catastrophe  that  the  imprudent  conduct  of 
the  reactionary  Court  of  Madrid,  in  the  Colon  affair  and  in  its  general 
colonial  system,  should  have  been  the  cause  of  so  much  exasperation. 
This  furnishes  fuel  for  England's  mercantile  cupidity  and  the  dema- 
gogues of  the  American  Congress. 

In  the  actual  state  of  affairs,  it  is  sufficient  to  point  out  that  the  un- 
conditional return  of  these  colonies  to  Spanish  tyranny  has  become 
impossible  and  that  their  partition  emanating  even  in  absolute  inde- 
pendence has  become  nearly  certain.  All  hypothesis  with  respect  to 
the  future  of  Spanish  America  must  lead  to  this  end. 

*The  above  document  forms  part  of  a  series  transmitted  through  the  Imperial  Russian 
Ambassador,  Mr.  George  Bakhmictiev,  published  in  American  Historic al  Review,  vol.  xvni, 
p.315.  The  above  project  is  endorsed:  "Signed  9th/21st  November,  1818."  yiS.  Aix-la- 
Chapelle,  Russian  Foreign  Office. 

^  The  question  of  the  Spanish  colonies. 


THE    POLITICAL    RECONSTRUCTION    OF    EUROPE  87 

Will  Your  Excellency  give  me  instructions  how,  without  departing 
from  His  Majesty's  intentions,  I  can  adjust  my  own  language  to  these 
probabilities?  It  is  only  the  more  essential  to  give  a  precise  and  direct 
statement  of  our  policy,  in  view  of  my  knowledge  of  the  Spanish  envoy 
in  Washington.  This  leads  me  to  believe  that  he  will  make  every  effort 
upon  my  arrival  to  have  it  publicly  known  that  a  complete  conformity 
of  views  exists  between  the  Court  of  Madrid  and  the  Court  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor,  at  least  so  far  as  the  policy  to  be  followed  in  the 
struggle  between  Spain  and  her  Colonies.  The  Chevalier  d'Onis  will 
presume  upon  the  intimacy  of  the  two  Courts  (which  has  been  the 
motive  of  so  many  diplomatic  explanations).  I  will  not  hide  from 
Your  Excellency  that  if  the  Spanish  envoy  succeeds  in  establishing 
this  opinion,  our  popularity  in  the  United  States,  where  the  honored  name 
of  the  Emperor  is  so  generally  respected  and  venerated,  would  suffer,  in 
a  sense  it  would  be  wise  to  avoid. ^ 

In  a  personal  letter  annexed  to  the  above,  Poletica  states  even 
more  explicitly  his  opinion  with  respect  to  European  and  American 
affairs.  After  expressing  his  conviction  that  England's  policy 
turns  upon  (1)  the  fear  of  a  new  general  war,  and  (2)  the  fear  of 
Russia  (shown  by  her  intrigues  with  Austria,  Prussia  and  even 
France),  he  concludes: 

England  will  always  be  found  opposed  to  Russia  and  in  league  with 
Austria,  seeking  to  isolate  us  so  that  we  may  be  without  allies.  With 
respect  to  the  conduct  of  America,  they  have  no  expression  strong 
enough  to  condemn  it.  The  occupation  of  Florida  has  a  parallel  only 
in  the  partition  of  Poland!  They  die  of  rage  here  over  it,  but  these 
feelings  they  will  control  until  the  day  of  reckoning.  The  relations 
between  England  and  the  United  States  should  make  our  future 
relations  with  North  America  more  and  more  interesting.  ^ 

This  letter  is  an  interesting  confirmation  of  the  view  that  it 
was  principally  with  the  intention  of  securing  a  diplomatic  ally 
opposed  in  policy  to  Great  Britain  that  the  Tsar  continued  his 
efforts  to  bring  the  North  American  Republic  into  closer  relations 
with  the  European  Powers.  Aside  from  the  probabihty  that  such 
a  participation  might  forestall  the  recognition  of  the  insurgents — 
an  event  possibly  fatal  to  the  success  of  the  European  "mediation" 
desired  by  Ferdinand — Alexander  at  first  based  great  hopes  on  the 
mutual  opposition  of  American  and  British  policy  in  the  New 
World. 

^  MS.  United  States,  Carton  8  (1818),  No.  13.  Diplomatic  Archives,  dated  Moscow, 
February  27,  1818. 

2  Poletica  to  Capo  d'Istria,  London,  August  1/13,  1818.  MS.  United  States,  Russian 
Foreign  Office. 


88  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

While  no  actual  invitation  had  been  extended  to  the  United 
States  to  join  in  the  debates  at  Aix-la-Chapelle/  it  is  probable 
that  Alexander  would  have  eagerly  welcomed  an  expression  of 
such  a  desire  by  the  Washington  Government.  As  shown  by 
Richelieu's  action  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  the  Tsar  seems  to  have 
considered,  logically  enough,  that  to  legislate  with  respect  to 
American  affairs  without  the  presence  pro  forma  of  the  principal 
American  Power  was  to  invalidate  the  measures  thus  determined.^ 

The  situation  as  viewed  in  Washington  may  be  gathered  from 
the  instructions  issued  by  the  State  Department  to  the  new 
Minister,  Mr.  George  W.  Campbell,  who  was  sent  in  April,  1818, 
to  St.  Petersburg  to  replace  Mr.  Pinkney.  In  spite  of  the 
good  feeling  in  the  United  States  towards  Russia,  there  were 
reasons  to  suspect  that  Alexander's  American  policy  was  not 
wholly  disinterested.  In  May,  1818,  Correa,  the  Portuguese 
Minister,  had  hinted  to  Adams  not  only  that  the  European  Alli- 
ance was  preparing  to  take  a  hand  in  settling  the  disordered  affairs 
in  South  America,  but  also  that  Russia  was  seeking  to  establish 
her  own  power  more  firmly  on  the  American  Continent.  Correa's 
"indiscretion"  may  have  been  intended  to  enlist  the  support  of 
the  United  States  in  favor  of  the  Portuguese  in  the  Banda  Oriental. 

^  Castlereagh  in  February,  1819,  told  Minister  Rush  "that,  during  the  discussions  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  he  had  found  France  and  Prussia  laboring  under  a  belief  that  the  United 
States  desired  to  be  associated  in  the  mediation"  .  .  .  until  undeceived  by  Rush's  com- 
munications.    Rush,  A  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London,  vol.  i,  p.  5. 

^  It  is  interesting  that  a  direct  appeal  to  be  represented  at  the  Congress  had  been 
received  by  the  Tsar  from  the  South  American  insurgents  themselves.  While  the  United 
States  had  consistently  refused — from  reasons  of  traditional  policy — to  associate  them- 
selves with  Alexander's  plan  of  a  World  Confederation  consecrated  by  a  Holy  Alliance, 
Rivadavia,  the  representative  in  Europe  of  the  Junta  of  Buenos  Aires,  addressed  himself 
to  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  terms  that  could  only  be  gratifying  to  the 
Tsar's  notions  of  the  role  reserved  for  the  "August  Sovereigns  of  Europe": 

"When  the  Congress  of  the  United  Provinces  of  South  America  learned  of  the  principles 
solemnly  recognized  in  the  act  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  of  June  9,  1815,  and  perceived 
with  joy  that  its  own  procedure  was  in  conformity  with  the  doctrines  advanced  by  the 
August  Sovereigns  of  Europe,  they  could  not  but  congratulate  themselves  on  the  prosperity 
they  were  bound  to  enjoy  through  the  application  of  these  beneficent  maxims.  The  news 
of  the  forthcoming  Congress  [Aix-la-Chapelle]  gives  reasons  to  hope  that  no  object  would 
be  considered  so  worthy  of  the  attention  of  the  August  Sovereigns  as  that  of  uniting 
America  and  Europe  by  bonds  other  than  those  of  a  colonial  system.  The  Powers  will 
not  judge  a  quarrel  upon  which  depends  the  happiness  of  twenty  million  inhabitants 
without  first  learning  the  circumstances." 

Rivadavia  then  desires  Nesselrode  to  make  known  to  his  august  master:  "I  am  authorized 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  Provinces  of  South  America  to  manifest  its  sincere 
desires  to  establish  relations  between  the  Old  and  New  Worlds  which  will  guarantee  a 
sound  basis  for  future  peace." 

Rivadavia  to  Nesselrode,  Paris,  October  14, 1818.  MS.  Aix-la-Chapelle,  Russian  Foreign 
Office.  In  view  of  the  subsecjuent  development  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  under 
the  terms  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  above  direct  appeal  by  the  South  American  repre- 
sentatives to  the  assembled  Powers  of  Europe  is  not  without  present  significance. 


THE    POLITICAL    RECONSTRUCTION   OF    EUROPE  89 

It  is  remarkable  (Adams  wrote  to  Campbell)  that  the  European 
Allies  have  hitherto  withheld  from  the  United  States  all  their  proceedings 
on  this  intended  mediation  between  Spain  and  her  colonies.^ 

Campbell  was  therefore  instructed  not  only  carefully  to  watch 

the  development  of  Russian  policy  towards  America,  but  also 

to  assure  the  Tsar's  Government  that  the  policy  of  the  United 

States  had  been  neutral  between  Spain  and  her  colonies  and  that 

the  United  States  wished  to  pursue  a  course  for  the  future  in 

harmony   with    that   of  the   Allies.      The    following    significant 

warning,  foreshadowing  Monroe's  Message,  formed  part  of  these 

instructions: 

We  can  not  participate  in,  and  can  not  approve  of,  any  interposition 
of  other  Powers  unless  it  be  to  promote  the  total  independence,  political 
and  commercial,  of  the  colonies.^ 

After  the  Congress  of  the  Powers  at  Aix-Ia-Chapelle  the  all- 
important  question  in  Washington  became:  How  far  the  Tsar 
might  be  prepared  to  go  in  the  support  of  his  favorite  theories, 
and  whether  an  active  intervention  by  Europe  in  American  aflPairs 
might  not  result  from  his  determination  to  impose  respect  for  the 
conclusions  arrived  at  during  this  conclave?  In  December,  1818, 
Mr.  Campbell  reported  at  length  with  respect  to  Alexander's  prob- 
able attitude.  It  was  his  reassuring  conviction  that  "he  would  not 
separately  unite  with  Spain  in  war  against  the  United  States."  ^ 

In  considering  the  probable  eflPect  of  the  influence  of  the  system 
of  congresses  inaugurated  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  upon  the  interna- 
tional situation — and  more  particularly  upon  American  affairs  and 
the  spread  of  republican  principles  in  the  New  World — Mr.  Camp- 
bell also  reported  at  length  under  date  of  December  10/22,  1818: 

The  new  quintuple  alliance  in  which  the  late  conference  at  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  resulted  may,  and,  it  is  believed,  will  for  some  time  greatly 
influence  if  not  entirely  control  the  conduct  of  all  the  Powers  of  Europe, 
whether  parties  thereto  or  not.  .  .  .^ 

1  Secretary  of  State  to  Mr.  Campbell,  June  28,  1818.     MS.  Instructions,  Russia. 

*  Campbell  added :  "It  is  therefore  most  probable  he  will  use  his  great  personal  influence 
(for  his  manner  is  said  to  be  very  prepossessing)  as  well  as  that  derived  from  the  immense 
physical  force  he  could  command  to  accomplish  his  ends  by  overawing  the  councils  of 
Europe  without  hazarding  his  present  high  standing.  That  the  views  of  this  great  and 
certainly  powerful  coalition  of  crowned  heads  in  relation  to  the  pending  contest  between 
Spain  and  her  colonies  will  soon  develop  themselves  there  can  be  little  doubt,  and  the 
importance  of  their  being  known  to  our  Government  previous  to  its  becoming  a  party  to 
the  contest  would  seem  entitled  to  serious  consideration."  Mr.  Campbell  to  the  Secretary 
of  State,  December  10/22,  1818.     MS.  Dispatches,  Russia. 

^  What  follows  is  in  cipher. 


90  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

The  diffusion  of  principles  having  a  tendency  to  endanger  or  in  any 
degree  weaken  the  cause  of  legitimacy — in  which  the  source  of  that 
alliance  is  to  be  sought  for — will  be  viewed  by  the  parties  thereto  with 
jealousy.^ 

The  same  communication  refers  to  Alexander  as  "the  great 
arbiter  of  the  politics  of  Europe,"  and  with  respect  to  his  inten- 
tions continues: 

It  is  my  present  opinion  that  the  EJmperor  of  Russia  will  use  his 
influence  to  reconcile  the  Spanish  Colonies  to  the  parent  state,  and  that 
he  would  view  in  an  unfavorable  light  an  acknowledgment  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  these  colonies  by  our  Government  and  would  in  such  an 
event  be  inclined  to  induce  the  Allied  Powers  to  interpose  if  there  was  a 
prospect  of  success  to  prevent  the  establishment  of  such  extensive 
independent  states  and  consequent  spread  of  republican  principles.^ 

It  is,  moreover,  in  a  tone  of  considerable  relief  that  this  perspica- 
cious observer  reported  the  substance  of  a  long  and  cordial 
intervievi^  w^ith  which  the  Tsar  favored  him  on  his  return  to  St. 
Petersburg.  Alexander  spoke  in  English,  in  which  language,  Mr. 
Campbell  reports,  "he  expresses  himself  quite  intelligibly." 

With  respect  to  the  recent  Congress,  Alexander  declared  that — 

he  was  happy  to  say  that  things  went  on  smoothly  .  .  .  that  every- 
thing depended  on  the  Powers  acting  up  to  their  engagements.  This 
he  expected  they  would  do,  with  the  possible  exception  of  France.  With 
respect  to  Spain,  the  Powers  had  contented  themselves  with  advice. 
They  had  proposed  the  appointment  of  Wellington  as  mediator  .  .  . 
but  no  answer  to  that  proposal  had  yet  been  received. 

Campbell  concludes: 

From  what  he  said  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  dispute  between 
Spain  and  her  colonies  was  made  the  subject  of  formal  deliberation  .  .  . 
that  Spain  is  not  inclined  to  offer  such  terms  for  adjusting  the  dispute 
as  will  be  likely  to  induce  the  Powers  to  embark  in  the  contest  for  the 
purpose  of  enforcing  their  acceptance  on  the  part  of  the  colonies.  It 
is,  however,  still  my  opinion  that  this  Government  would  view  in  an 
unfavorable  light  the  acknowledgment  of  the  independence  of  the  colo- 
nies, at  this  time,  by  the  United  States,  and  although  it  would  not,  in 
such  an  event,  engage  alone  on  the  side  of  Spain,  its  influence  would  be 
exerted  conjointly  with  that  of  the  other  Powers  to  maintain  the  cause 
of  legitimacy  and  prevent  the  establishment  of  such  powerful  independ- 
ent states.^ 

In  a  final  dispatch  resuming  the  above  matter  (written  in 
April,  1819),  the  Secretary  of  State  was  informed  of  the  lengths  to 

'  Mr.  Campbell  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  December  10/22,  1818.  MS.  Dispatches, 
Russia. 

2  Mr.  Campbell  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  February  6/18,  1819.    MS.  Dispatches,  Russia. 


THE    POLITICAL    RECONSTRUCTION    OF    EUROPE  91 

which  the  Tsar  had  been  prepared  to  go  in  his  enthusiasm  for  a 
universal  peace  based  upon  international  action: 

There  is  reason  to  believe  (wrote  Campbell  from  St.  Petersburg), 
that  about  the  close  of  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  instructions  were 
given  on  the  part  of  this  Government  to  put  into  a  state  of  preparation 
for  active  service  at  the  opening  of  spring,  twelve  ships  of  the  line, 
besides  other  vessels.  This  step  was  taken  with  the  view  of  being 
prepared  to  cooperate  with  Spain,  should  it  become  necessary  in  impos- 
ing measures  relating  to  her  revolted  colonies  as  might  be  adopted  in 
accordance  with  the  recommendations  of  the  Allied  Sovereigns,  and 
under  an  impression  that  she  would  acquiesce  in  the  course  proposed  by 
them  of  mediation,  as  stated  in  my  last.  Not  long  after  the  return  of  the 
Emperor,  however,  to  this  capital,  the  foregoing  instructions  were,  it  is 
said,  countermanded  and  the  usual  number  of  vessels  directed  to  be 
prepared,  in  consequence,  it  is  believed,  of  information  received  by  this 
Court  that  Spain  was  not  disposed  to  pursue  the  course  suggested  to 
her  by  the  crowned  heads  at  Aix-la-Chapelle.^ 


There  had  been  every  indication  that  ample  grounds  existed  for 
the  misgivings  of  the  American  Cabinet  concerning  the  inten- 
tions of  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  to  "legislate"  with  respect 
to  American  affairs  in  a  sense  favorable  to  a  European  "system" 
— rather  than  in  the  interests  of  the  colonies.  The  opposition  of 
Great  Britain  had  been  the  principal  obstacle  to  such  a  course.^ 

The  outcome  of  the  Congress  had  inevitably  ranged  the  United 
States  in  line  with  British  policy  as  opposed  to  the  Tsar's  designs 
of  "concerted  action." 

As  Poletica  had  foreseen,  it  was  only  by  sowing  distrust 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  that  plans  for  an 
all-controlling  World  System  could  be  pursued  after  the  failure 
of  the  "mediation"  proposed  at  Aix-la-Chapelle.  The  new 
Minister  reached  the  United  States  in  April,  1819 — and  imme- 
diately laid  his  program  before  Adams  ^  (May  24,  1819). 

^Mr.  Campbell  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  April  21/May  3,  1819.  MS.  Dispatches, 
Russia. 

^But  Castlereagh's  attiude  was  dictated  by  other  motives  than  solicitude  for  "con- 
stitutional" liberty.  The  commercial  advantages  arising  from  the  existing  situation  largely 
influenced  British  policy.  A  Tory  Cabinet  was  not  unwilling  to  see  the  power  of  a  legiti- 
mate monarch  restored,  if  these  advantages  could  be  maintained.  On  the  other  hand,  as 
early  as  June,  1818,  Campbell  had  been  instructed  clearly  to  express  the  desire  of  the 
United  States  to  "promote  the  total  independence,  political  and  commercial,  of  the  colo- 
nies," while  maintaining  "that  the  policy  of  the  United  States,  like  that  of  the  European 
Powers,  had  been  neutral." 

'Secretary  of  State  to  Mr.  Campbell,  June  3/19,  1819.  MS.  Instructions,  Russia, 
Dashkov  did  not  wait  for  Poletica's  arrival,  and  presented  his  letters  of  recall  March  6. 
1819. 


92  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

The  diplomacy  of  Monroe  had  meanwhile  profited  by  the  em- 
barrassments of  the  King  of  Spain  to  secure  what  appeared  to  be  a 
settlement  of  the  long-standing  difficulty  with  respect  to  the  pur- 
chase of  the  Floridas.^  Poletica,  on  his  arrival  in  Washington, 
found  a  treaty  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  already 
signed,  and  Spanish  affairs,  as  Adams  expressed  it,  standing  under 
a  very  different  aspect  from  that  which  it  wore  when  his  instruc- 
tions were  drawn.     Said  Adams: 

The  differences  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  were  assuming  a 
character  which  threatened  the  peace  of  the  world.  They  had  reached 
a  crisis  which  it  was  scarcely  possible  could  terminate  but  by  a  peace  or 
rupture.  When  Mr.  Poletica  received  his  instructions  they  were  at  the 
most  dangerous  and  menacing  period.  When  he  arrived  here,  they  were 
all  amicably  adjusted. ^ 

Almost  daily  interviews  now  took  place  between  Adams  and 
Poletica,  chiefly  concerning  Spanish  affairs.  Poletica — while 
assuming  a  tone  of  utmost  frankness — at  first  adopted  a  course 
curiously  at  variance  (as  we  may  now  see)  with  his  instructions. 
He  declared  that  he  had  been  instructed  to  prevent  the  United 
States  from  associating  themselves  with  the  European  Alliance — 
and  at  the  same  time  to  suggest  that  they  must  necessarily  follow 
a  course  in  accord  with  the  general  policy  of  Europe.^ 

Poletica's  somewhat  coercive  tone  was  accepted  in  good  part 
by  the  Secretary  of  State.  Adams  declared  that  it  was  the  earnest 
desire  of  his  Government  not  to  be  associated  with  the  European 
Alliance,  but  to  follow  a  policy  wholly  in  unison  with  it,  and  that 
they  were  deeply  impressed  with  the  importance  of  preserving  the 
general  tranquillity  of  the  world.  He  seems  fully  to  have 
recognized  the  fact  that  so  long  as  Spain,  Russia  and  Great 
Britain  remained  American  Powers,  any  real  isolation  was  im- 
possible. Moreover,  during  the  recent  Napoleonic  struggle, 
America  had  become  the  great  "carrying  nation,"  and,  in  spite  of  a 
scrupulous  respect  for  neutrality,  had  become  involved  in  a  war 
with  Great  Britain,  and  in  the  "quasi-war"  with  the  latter's  great 
opponent.     Yet  even  faced  with  the  active  displeasure  of  the 

'The  Treaty  of  Washington  was  signed  February  22,  1819,  but  its  ratification  was 
delayed  by  Spain  till  February,  1821.  Before  ceding  Eastern  Florida  to  the  United  States, 
Ferdinand  desired  a  guarantee  that  the  independence  of  the  revolted  colonies  would  not 
be  recognized.  Cf.  McMaster,  A  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  vol.  iv,  pp. 
474  et  seq. 

^Secretary  of  State  to  Mr.  Campbell.     MS.  Instructions,  Russia,  1819. 

'  Adams,  Memoirs,  vol.  iv,  pp.  379-381. 


THE    POLITICAL   RECONSTRUCTION    OF    EUROPE  93 

Continental  Powers,  Adams  persisted  in  remaining  aloof  from 
their  combinations.  In  answer  to  Poletica's  intimations  with 
respect  to  possible  European  action,  the  Secretary  of  State 
ventured,  as  a  private  opinion,  that  if  the  King  of  Spain  should 
still  decline  to  ratify  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  the  next  Congress 
would  probably  authorize  the  forcible  occupation  of  the  Floridas 
and  a  recognition  of  the  Government  of  Buenos  Aires.  The  only 
way  for  the  Powers  to  avoid  such  a  course  was  in  forbearing  to  use 
force  in  a  sense  contrary  to  the  liberties  of  the  insurgents.^ 

The  weakness  of  Poletica's  contentions  was  becoming  more  and 
more  apparent.  He  suggested  that  Great  Britain's  breaches  of 
maritime  law  (notably  Castlereagh's  proposal  of  a  mutual  right 
of  search  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade)  must  range  the 
United  States  upon  the  side  of  the  Tsar.^  It  was  intimated  that 
if  any  questions  should  arise  between  the  United  States  and  the 
governments  of  Europe,  the  Emperor  Alexander,  desirous  of  using 
his  influence  in  their  favor,  would  have  a  substantial  motive  and 
justification  for  interposing  if  he  could  regard  them  as  allies,  which, 
as  parties  to  the  Holy  Alliance,  he  would. 

A  natural  community  of  interest,  however,  and  the  converging 
policy  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  with  respect  to 
South  America  were  inevitably  closing  the  breach  caused  by  the 
War  of  1812.  Poletica  found  that  to  base  his  diplomatic  policy 
upon  this  "ancient  grudge"  was  a  matter  of  increasing  difficulty. 
Not  only  had  the  differences  arising  from  the  summary  execution 
of  two  British  subjects  (Ambrister  and  Arbuthnot)  by  the  United 
States  forces  in  Florida  been  amicably  settled,  but  the  British 
Minister  in  Madrid  had  even  offered  to  use  his  good  offices  to 
secure  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Washington. 

Poletica  felt  his  negotiation  losing  ground.  With  respect  to  any 
combined  action  of  Russia  and  Spain  against  the  colonies,  Poletica 
said  that  by  selling  ships  to  Spain,  Russia  had  not  intended  to  take 
sides  with  her  against  the  colonies.  Falling  back  on  Alexander's 
well-known  desire  for  international  action,  he  also  declared  that 
the  Tsar  was  utterly  averse  to  all  "exclusive  or  partial  alliances."  ^ 

1  Ibid.,  p.  381. 

^Secretary  of  State  to  Mr.  Middleton,  July  5,  1820.  MS.  Instructions,  American 
Embassy,  Petrograd.  Quoted  in  full  in  Moore,  Digest  of  InUrnational  Law,  vol.  vi, 
p.  376. 

^  Adams,  Memoirs,  vol.  iv,  pp.  380-381. 


94  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

His  previous  attitude  with  respect  to  the  United  States  and  the 
"European"  AlHance  was  suddenly  changed.  A  proposal  was  now 
renewed  that  the  United  States  should  join  the  "Holy  League." 

On  June  17,  1819,  he  mentioned  "inofficially  and  confiden- 
tially" the  Emperor's  desire  that  the  United  States  should 
accede  to  the  Pact  of  September  26,  1815;  Adams  stated  that 
the  same  reasons  which  had  caused  Great  Britain  to  withhold  her 
signature  to  this  pact  governed  the  policy  of  the  United  States; 
that  the  agreement  was  a  personal  one  between  sovereigns  and 
therefore  not  appropriate  for  the  consideration  of  a  constitutional 
state.^ 

Finally  when  Poletica  urged  that  "the  treaty  was  nothing  in 
specific  engagement,"  and  that  the  Holy  Alliance  was  a  "league  of 
peace"  and  had  hitherto  preserved  a  universal  peace  in  Europe," 
Adams — a  sound  constitutionalist — replied  that  before  taking 
any  further  steps  in  the  matter  it  would  be  "advisable  to  ascertain 
what  were  the  dispositions  of  the  members  of  the  Senate."^ 

^  Adams,  Memoirs,  vol.  iv,  p.  394. 
2  Ibid.y  pp.  394-395. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  ERA  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS 

"To  a  world  gone  mad  must  be  opposed  a  new  order,  a  new  system  inspired 
by  wisdom,  reason,  justice  and  correction."  (Unpublished  letter  from 
Metternich  to  Alexander,  written  at  Troppau,  December  15,  1820.  From 
the  Archives  of  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.) 

In  July,  1820,  Adams,  in  instructions  to  Middleton,  resumed 
the  policy  of  the  United  States  in  their  relation  with  the  Powers 
of  Europe;  and  their  attitude  towards  the  Tsar's  League  of  Peace: 

The  political  system  of  the  United  States  is  .  .  .  essentially  extra- 
European.  To  stand  in  firm  and  cautious  independence  of  all  entangle- 
ments in  the  European  system  has  been  a  cardinal  point  of  their  policy 
from  the  peace  of  1783  to  this  day  .  .  . 

Yet  in  proportion  as  the  importance  of  the  United  States  as  one  of  the 
members  of  the  general  society  of  civilized  nations  increases  in  the  eyes 
of  the  others,  the  difficulties  of  maintaining  this  system  and  the  temp- 
tations to  depart  from  it  increase  and  multiply  .  .  . 

Should  renewed  overtures  on  this  subject  ^  be  made,  Russia  would  be 
answered  that  the  organization  of  our  government  is  such  as  not  to 
admit  of  our  acceding  formally  to  that  compact.  But  it  may  be  added 
that  the  President,  while  approving  of  its  final  principles  and  thoroughly 
convinced  of  the  benevolent  and  virtuous  motives  which  led  to  the  con- 
ception and  presided  at  the  formation  of  this  system,  by  the  Emperor 
Alexander,  believes  that  the  United  States  will  more  effectually  contrib- 
ute to  the  great  and  sublime  objects  for  which  it  was  concluded  by 
abstaining  from  formal  participation  in  it.  As  a  general  declaration 
of  principles,  the  United  States  not  only  give  their  hearty  assent  to  the 
articles  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  but  they  will  be  among  the  most  earnest 
and  conscientious  in  observing  them.^ 

Even  this  qualified  approval  of  Alexander's  pact — a  diplomatic 
evasion  of  Poletica's  renewed  proposals — ^would  hardly  have 
been  made  a  few  months  later.  The  Powers  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
were  already  entering  upon  a  policy  of  reactionary  repression 
which  was  to  estrange  them  from  all  more  liberal  states.  Taking 
as  his  excuse  the  necessity  for  prompt  and  decisive  action  against 
the  forces  of  revolution,  Metternich  had  undertaken  a  campaign 
of  propaganda  among  all  the  principal  courts  of  Europe,  arguing 
the  necessity  of  taking  common  measures  to  crush  out  the  fast- 
reviving  spirit  of  "Jacobinism"  and  the  pernicious  doctrines  of  the 
"Sects."  His  artful  diplomacy  was  ably  seconded  by  the  pen  of 
Frederick  Gentz.  This  living  arsenal  of  gossip,  epigram  and 
satirical  observations,  was  a    political   philosopher   of  no  mean 

^  Poletica's  overtures  to  induce  the  United  States  to  join  the  Holy  Alliance  set  forth  in 
the  preceding  chapter. 

*  Secretary  of  State  to  Mr.  Middleton,  July  5,  1820.     MS.  Instructions,  Russia. 

95 


96  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

attainments.  He  possessed  an  extraordinary  talent  for  the  tech- 
nique of  diplomacy,  and,  had  he  been  able  to  win  the  respect  of 
his  fellow  statesmen,  might  have  filled  a  much  more  important 
place  than  history  has  accorded  him.  It  is  as  Metternich's 
alter  ego  and  familiar  that  he  is  best  known. ^ 

Metternich's  first  idea  had  been  to  allow  the  newly  formed 
Federal  Diet  created  at  Vienna  to  take  action  against  the  "perils" 
which,  he  believed,  confronted  the  German  Federation.  Gentz, 
however,  realized  the  danger  of  allowing  the  voice  of  Liberalism 
an  opportunity  to  be  heard  in  public  places.  His  own  plan  in- 
volved a  diplomatic  solution  in  line  with  the  Tsar's  international 
programs.  Two  private  reunions  of  the  interested  Powers  were  to 
be  held.  In  the  first  of  these,  the  Conference  of  Carlsbad,  only 
Austria  and  Prussia  were  to  take  part,  together  with  the  repre- 
sentatives of  four  or  five  minor  German  states,  without  influence 
or  voice  in  the  chapter.  A  second  conference,  he  suggested,  might 
then  safely  be  held  in  Vienna,  formed  of  chosen  delegates  from  all 
the  member  states  of  the  Confederation.  This  would  in  turn 
modify  the  fundamental  laws  sufficiently  to  enable  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  Carlsbad  Conference  to  be  carried  out. 

Gentz's  program  was  carried  out  almost  to  the  letter.  Metter- 
nich's first  step  was  to  warn  Frederick  William  that  unless  he 
adopted  without  reserve  the  plans  of  the  Emperor  Francis,  the 
latter  would  retire  from  the  German  Confederation. 

Events  in  Germany  again  helped  to  forward  this  policy.  At 
Toeplitz,  the  King  of  Prussia  heard  that  enthusiastic  meetings 
were  being  held  all  over  Prussia  in  favor  of  Liberal  reforms, 
and  as  a  protest  against  the  rumored  measures  taken  by  the  Prus- 
sian Government.  In  three  days  Metternich  imposed  upon  the 
now  terrified  and  repentant  Hohenzollern  not  only  the  program 
he  had  drawn  up,  but  even  exacted  a  promise  that  he  would  perma- 
nently renounce  all  plans  of  granting  constitutional  representa- 
tion to  his  people.  The  vacillating  monarch  promised  his  help 
to  extend  these  principles  of  reaction  to  the  whole  of  Germany. 
The  celebrated  "Decrees  of  Carlsbad"  were  the  fruits  of  these 
interviews.^ 

While  the  Tsar  (together  with  the  Cabinets  of  Great  Britain 

^  De  Clery,  Un  Diplomate  d'il  y  a  Cent  Ans:  Frederic  de  Gentz,  pp.  219  et  seq. 

*  In  France,  Metternich's  reactionary  program  was  forwarded  by  the  political  assassi- 
nation of  Kotzebue  in  Germany  and  that  of  the  Duke  of  Berry,  heir  to  the  French  throne 
(February  13,  1820). 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS       97 

and  France)  viewed  with  growing  alarm  the  preponderating  power 
exercised  by  Austria  and  Prussia  over  the  newly  "united"  states 
of  Germany,  their  concerted  action  was  nevertheless  inevitably 
forced  to  follow  the  reactionary  lines  laid  down  by  Metternich 
and  Gentz.^ 

Alexander  still  clung  firmly  to  the  illusion  that  he  was  the 
champion  of  international  "rights."  When  his  brother-in-law,  the 
King  of  Wiirttemberg,  maintained  his  determination  to  grant  a 
constitution  in  the  face  of  the  protests  of  Austria  and  Prussia, 
the  Tsar  found  that  his  policy  needed  a  new  formula.  Insurrec- 
tion and  revolution  on  the  part  of  subjects  against  their  Kings 
were  inadmissible.  On  the  other  hand,  the  voluntary  concession 
of  liberal  institutions  by  Kings  to  their  subjects,  he  held,  must  be 
regarded  as  a  sacred  privilege.  In  this  connection,  it  must  be 
noted  that  the  King  of  Wiirttemberg  had  addressed  his  appeal  to 
Alexander  "in  the  name  of  Liberty  and  the  free  exercise  of  the 
monarchical  principles  guaranteed  by  the  'Holy  Alliance.'  "  This 
was  the  last  occasion  when  the  principles  of  this  mystical  pact 
were  to  be  invoked  in  the  cause  of  liberal  reform.^ 

Reactionary  fears  were  justified  by  the  series  of  revolutions 
which  followed  the  popular  uprising  of  January  1,  1820,  led  by 
Riego  in  Spain.  This  constitutional^  movement  soon  spread  over 
the  whole  southern  part  of  Europe,  and  its  repression  through 
"intervention"  became  the  chief  concern  of  the  Powers  con- 
federated by  the  "System  of  1815."  ^ 

The  King  of  Spain,  after  his  unsuccessful  attempt  to  obtain 
the  intervention  of  the  Powers  assembled  at  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
had  found  himself  almost  powerless  to  stem  the  tide  of  victorious 
Liberalism  in  his  American  colonies.  All  the  resources  of  his 
Kingdom  had  been  expended  in  preparing  a  great  military 
expedition,  which  during  the  year  1819  vainly  awaited  the 
necessary  transports  on  the  Island  of  Leon,  near  Cadiz.    The 

^Alexander  now  asked  the  Court  of  London  "what  steps  were  to  be  taken  regarding 
Germany"  and  that  Cabinet  replied  there  was  no  motive  to  interfere.  Gentz,  Depeches 
inedites  du  Chevalier  de  Gentz  aux  Hospodars  de  Falachie,  vol.  ii,  p.  17. 

*  The  Tsar  declared  "that  it  was  unfortunate  when  a  monarch  did  not  know  the  proper 
time  to  give  a  constitution  to  his  people."  Mr.  Campbell  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 
April  10,  1820.     MS.  Dispatches,  Russia. 

'  The  Constitution  forced  on  Ferdinand  was  the  same  which  Alexander  had  applauded  in 
1812!     Pasquier,  Memoires,  vol.  iv,  p.  498. 

*  Metternich  declared  he  "was  able  to  inform  the  Princes  of  Germany"  that  no  dif- 
ferences separated  the  sovereigns  of  Europe,  whose  inviolable  intention  was  to  keep  the 
peace.     Gentz,  Depeches  inedites,  vol.  II,  p.  127. 


98 


THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 


revolution  had  its  origin  among  these  troops.^  The  harsh  con- 
ditions of  military  service  was  the  fault  alleged.  But  the  mis- 
government  of  Ferdinand  throughout  the  peninsula  and  the 
liberal  ideas  left  in  the  wake  of  Napoleon's  armies  caused  dis- 
turbances to  break  out  with  startling  rapidity  all  over  Spain. 
Troops  stationed  at  Coruna  in  the  far  north  and  Barcelona  in 
the  south  joined  the  mutineers.  Within  two  short  months  the 
revolutionaries  obtained  their  ends.  The  army  proclaimed  the 
readoption  of  the  Constitution  of  1812,  and  the  ignoble  Ferdinand 
hastened  to  accept  the  situation — pretending  to  accede  as  gra- 
ciously as  possible  to  the  popular  wishes. 

As  Metternich  had  prophesied  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  Constitu- 
tional government  now  became  the  question  of  the  day.  A  few 
months  later,  a  revolution  similar  in  its  aims  to  that  in  Spain 
broke  out  in  Sicily,^  where  on  the  6th  of  July  the  Spanish  Con- 
stitution was  accepted  by  the  King.  A  third  Constitutional 
revolution  took  place  in  Portugal,  where  the  same  document  was 
again  proclaimed  (on  August  23). 

Any  interference  of  the  Powers  in  Portugal,  however,  was  a 
direct  challenge  to  England's  traditional  policy  to  act  as  sole 
protector  with  respect  to  that  state.^ 

The  Tsar  now  sought  an  opportunity  to  propose  an  intervention 
between  the  King  of  the  two  Sicilies  and  his  subjects,  thus  making 
the  Neapolitan  revolution  a  matter  of  European  rather  than  of 
exclusively  Austrian  concern.  Metternich,  from  reasons  of  policy, 
at  last  agreed  to  Alexander's  favorite  plan — a  European  Con- 
gress.^ This  solution  once  decided  upon,  the  opening  of  the 
debates  was  set  for  October  20,  1820,  at  Troppau.^ 

But  from  the  beginning  the  differences  separating  the  Powers 
represented  were  even  less  likely  to  result  in  unity  of  action 
than  at  Aix-la-Chapelle.®  Castlereagh  refused  to  join  the  Congress, 
as  desired  by  the  Tsar,  and  sent  Lord  Stewart  instead.  Troppau 
thus  became  little  more  than  a  reunion  of  the  three  monarchs 

'  "The  army,  which  was  ill  clothed,  ill  fed  and  worse  paid,  mutinied  to  prevent  being 
embarked  for  Spanish  America,  on  board  a  fleet  composed  of  vessels  that  were  esteemed 
not  seaworthy  for  so  long  a  voyage."  Stapleton,  The  Political  Life  of  George  Canning, 
vol.  I,  p.  33. 

^  Pasquier,  Memoires,  vol.  iv,  pp.  515-516. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  514.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  526  et  seq.  '  Gentz,  Depeches  inedites,  vol.  ii,  p.  81. 

''  I  he  invitation  to  Troppau  came  at  an  awkward  moment  for  Castlereagh.  "We  know 
to  what  point  the  Tsar  wishes  to  push  the  principle  of  Alliance,"  he  said.  "The  five  powers 
would  soon  be  a  sort  of  European  Government.  It  would  be  universal  monarchy,  the 
dream  of  the  Abbe  St.  Pierre!"     Pasquier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  539. 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS       99 

allied  under  the  terms  of  the  "Holy  Alliance."  The  British  (and 
the  French)  representatives  were  frankly  present,  not  to  take 
part  in  the  "European"  deliberations  but  merely  to  furnish  their 
respective  courts  with  an  accurate  account  of  the  debates.^ 

Alexander  saw  in  the  reunion  of  Troppau  a  new  opportunity 
to  proclaim  to  the  world  some  of  his  favorite  theories:  the  fraternal 
solidarity  of  the  great  Powers,  and  their  devotion  to  the  principles 
of  concerted  action.  The  right  to  exercise  powers  of  supernational 
police  among  the  countries  of  Europe  was,  he  believed,  to  be 
vindicated  at  last.  From  the  beginning  of  the  conference,  how- 
ever, he  favored  a  policy  which  was  directly  opposed  to  the  wishes 
of  Metternich.  He  renewed  his  contention  that  while  a  constitu- 
tion which  was  the  result  of  a  revolutionary  movement  could  not 
properly  be  recognized  by  the  Allied  Powers,  it  could  nevertheless 
be  granted  by  a  sovereign  to  his  people.  The  right  of  Ferdinand — 
if  he  so  desired — to  maintain  the  constitution  already  granted 
was  therefore  upheld.  In  view  of  Alexander's  own  recently 
avowed  intentions  with  respect  to  granting  a  constitution  to 
Russia,  and  always  haunted  by  the  determination  to  be  "con- 
sistent," no  other  course  appeared  open  to  him. 

A  declaration  signed  on  November  13  by  the  plenipotentiaries 
of  Austria,  Russia  and  Prussia — the  signatories  of  the  "Holy 
Alliance" — formally  announced  to  Europe  a  decision  which  seemed 
to  respect  the  prejudices  of  Alexander  while  in  fact  affirming  the 
most  reactionary  features  of  Metternich's  policies. 

This  declaration  created  a  tremendous  sensation  throughout 
Continental  liberal  circles.     It  read  as  follows: 

Any  state  forming  part  of  the  European  Alliance  which  may  change 
its  form  of  interior  government  through  revolutionary  means,  and  which 
might  thus  become  a  menace  to  other  states,  will  automatically  cease  to 
form  a  part  of  the  Alliance,  and  will  remain  excluded  from  its  councils 
until  its  situation  gives  every  guarantee  of  order  and  stability.' 

^Castlereagh  declared  to  Decaze  "he  was  sick  of  military  revolution."  But  a  strong 
liberal  reaction  had  resulted  in  England  from  the  accession  of  the  unpopular  George  IV. 
This  made  it  advisable  to  disassociate  English  policy  from  any  direct  attack  on  consti- 
tutionalism, whether  in  Naples,  Spain  or  Portugal.     Pasquier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  526. 

^  The  second  article  read:  "The  Allied  Powers  not  only  formally  declare  the  above  to  be 
their  unalterable  policy,  but,  faithful  to  the  principles  which  they  have  proclaimed  con- 
cerning the  authority  of  legitimate  governments,  they  further  agree  to  refuse  to  recognize 
any  changes  brought  about  by  other  than  legal  meant.  In  the  case  of  states  where  such 
changes  have  already  taken  place  and  such  action  has  thereby  given  cause  for  apprehension 
to  neighboring  states  (if  it  lies  within  the  ability  of  the  powers  to  take  such  useful  and 
beneficent  action)  they  will  employ  every  means  to  bring  the  offenders  once  more  within 
the  sphere  of  the  Alliance.  Friendly  negotiations  will  be  the  first  means  resorted  to,  and 
if  this  fails,  coercion  will  be  employed,  should  this  be  necessary."  Quoted  in  Debidour, 
Histoire  Diplomatique  de  l' Europe,  vol.  i,    p.  152. 


100  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Although  the  Powers  of  the  "Holy  AlHance"  alone  signed  this 
document,  the  wording  of  the  manifesto  seemed  to  dedicate  the 
whole  power  of  the  European  Confederation  to  the  suppression 
of  liberal  reform.^  Not  only  Castlereagh  found  himself  obliged 
to  disassociate  his  government  from  the  conclusions  reached  by  the 
Congress  (in  two  notes,  dated  December  19  and  January  16),  but 
even  the  Government  of  Louis  XVIII  followed  suit.  Fear  of 
popular  and  parliamentary  disapproval  had  united  Great  Britain 
and  France  in  opposition  to  the  Troppau  Declaration.^ 

The  Liverpool  Cabinet,  however,  was  far  from  unsympathetic 
with  any  movement  that  tended  to  stamp  out  the  "Red"  menace  of 
revolution.  In  France,  Richelieu's  Ministry,  once  more  in  power, 
was  wholly  subservient  to  Russian  views.  Alexander  now  sought, 
in  a  measure,  to  placate  liberal  opinion.  In  explanation  of  the 
manifesto,  he  again  attempted  to  reaffirm  the  benevolent  principles 
underlying  his  conception  of  a  Confederated  Europe.  The  means 
chosen  was  a  memoir,^  addressed  to  the  Russian  representatives 
in  the  principal  courts  of  Europe.  This  document  was  especially 
intended  to  counteract  the  impression  already  prevalent  "that 
the  Triple  Alliance  is  opposed  by  another  formed  of  the  Con- 
stitutional States,"  the  latter  group  including  "besides  England 
and  France,  the  two  Americas."  After  complimenting  Austria 
and  Prussia  for  their  firmness  "in  the  great  task  of  reconcilia- 
tion," the  Tsar  gave  free  rein  to  his  resentment  against  England 
as  the  obstacle  in  the  path  of  concerted  action.* 


In  its  main  results,  Troppau  definitely  ranged  the  Tsar  on  the 
side  of  obscurantism  and  reaction.  Whatever  may  have  been 
his  personal  antipathy  to  Metternich  and  his  plans,  Alexander,  by 
signing  the  manifesto,  entered  the  group  dominated  by  the  genius 
of  the  Viennese  statesman.  While  still  proclaiming  his  Liberalism, 
he  now  adopted  Metternich's  formula,  to  the  effect  that  "to  a 

1  The  Tsar  "wished  an  act  of  guarantee  of  the  internal  peace  of  states  in  the  sense  that 
the  transactions  of  1814,  1815  and  1818  had  assured  the  political  peace  of  Europe." 
Gentz,  Depeches  inedites  du  Chevalier  de  Gentz  aux  Ilospodars  de  Valachie,  vol.  il,  p.  97. 

"^  The  preliminary  Troppau  protocol  was  signed  November  19.  "It  was  the  first  step 
along  the  road  followed  by  this  Triple  Alliance,  which  was  soon  to  be  substituted  for  the 
quintuple."     Pasquier,  Memoires,  vol.  v,  pp.  33-34. 

*  MS.   Troppau,  1820,  Russian  F"oreign  Office. 

*  In  the  following  phrases:  "The  British  Empire,  now  at  the  zenith  of  riches  and  civili- 
zation, appears  for  the  moment  to  be  engulfed  by  its  own  prosperity." 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS       101 

world  gone  mad  must  be  opposed  a  new  order,  a  new  system 
inspired  by  wisdom,  reason,  justice  and  correction."  ^ 

The  Tsar's  attitude  at  Troppau  was  but  confirmed  during  the 
adjourned  sessions  of  the  Congress  held  at  Laybach  (a  spot  chosen 
as  convenient  for  the  attendance  of  the  King  of  the  two  Sicilies). 
To  give  the  proceedings  a  tone  of  formality  becoming  to  an 
occasion  which  the  Tsar  chose  to  believe  an  important  continua- 
tion of  the  "System  of  Congress,"  the  Russian  plenipotentiaries 
presented  at  the  first  meeting  (held  January  11,  1821)  their 
"opinion  concerning  the  forms  and  precedence  to  be  followed 
during  the  deliberations  of  Laybach."  ^  "Far  from  having  in 
view  new  political  combinations,"  the  Memoir  concludes,  "this 
reunion  is  especially  called  to  reaffirm  the  system  which  has  given 
to  Europe  the  blessing  of  peace  by  restoring  independence  to  the 
nations."  Instead  of  the  "journal"  of  the  proceedings  kept  at 
Troppau,  the  Tsar  now  desired  to  substitute  formal  "protocols" 
of  the  daily  proceedings — signed  by  all  the  plenipotentiaries 
present. 

It  was  only  when  the  representatives  of  the  other  Powers 
pointed  out  that  under  the  terms  of  such  an  arrangement  the 
British  plenipotentiary  (Gordon)  would  be  excluded  from  the 
debates  by  the  terms  of  his  instructions  that  the  Russian  repre- 
sentatives consented  to  continue  the  system  of  informal  con- 
ferences which  had  been  followed  at  Troppau.  In  the  Conferences 
of  Laybach  "veritable  discussions  were  replaced  in  the  minutes 
by  convenient  debates  arranged  by  Mr.  Gentz,  who  even  com- 
posed the  opposing  arguments."  ^ 

At  the  second  Conference,  held  on  January  12,  the  comedy 
wherein  the  King  of  Naples  was  to  play  the  part  of  mediator  be- 
tween the  Powers  and  his  revolted  subjects  was  carefully  staged. 

^MetternichtoAlexander,Troppau,  December  15, 1820.  MS.  Troppau,  Russian  Foreign 
Office.  Whole  paragraphs  in  the  above,  which  include  long  tirades  against  anarchy,  etc., 
are  heavily  underlined  in  pencil  and  annotated  by  Alexander  himself. 

2 This  was  endorsed  by  the  Emperor  himself.  In  this  document,  the  Russian  envoy 
proposes  a  set  of  rules  to  govern  the  deliberations  of  the  Powers:  While  the  con- 
ferences of  Troppau,  he  maintained,  were  only  preliminary  and  preparatory  (and,  the 
Powers,  therefore,  necessarily  prevented  from  deliberating  "in  due  form"),  the  meeting 
at  Laybach  formed  a  European  legislature.  At  Troppau  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the 
intervening  Powers  had  not  all  received  "precise  and  positive  instructions  concerning  the 
limits  of  their  policy."  Now  that  these  preliminary  questions  had  been  discussed  and  the 
scope  of  the  debates  clearly  set  fortn,  the  plenipotentiaries  should  now,  he  believed,  declare 
themselves  part  of  a  "formal  system."  MS.  Minutes,  Laybach,  1820,  Russian  Foreign 
Office.     This  contains,  besides  the  minutes,  a  "Report  to  the  Emperor." 

^  Pasquier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  134. 


102  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Metternich  read  a  communication  from  Ferdinand  to  the  Allied 
sovereigns,  asking  them  to  define  the  intentions  of  the  Conference 
with  respect  to  his  kingdom  and  to  communicate  their  disposi- 
tions to  his  representative,  who  would  wait  upon  them  at  Laybach. 
In  drafting  their  reply,  the  plenipotentiaries  were  careful  to  annex 
a  stern  rebuke  to  the  revolutionary  government  of  Naples,  joined 
to  a  refusal  to  deal  with  any  member  of  the  de  facto  government. 
On  the  other  hand,  they  "consented"  to  receive  a  personal  repre- 
sentative of  the  King  in  the  person  of  Chevalier  de  Rufo.^ 

The  King  of  Naples  continued  the  role  which  had  been  assigned 
him  by  Metternich,  expressing  his  appreciation  of  the  action 
taken  by  the  Powers.  He  begged  them  with  feigned  benevolence 
"not  to  proceed  to  extreme  measures  until  all  means  of  concilia- 
tion had  been  exhausted.  The  just  anger  of  the  sovereigns  of  the 
"Holy  Alliance"  having  thus  been  appeased,  Metternich  next 
obtained  the  "approval"  of  Ferdinand  to  proceed  to  more  active 
measures  of  coercion,  which  were  communicated  to  Naples. 
The  King,  "now  convinced  of  the  futility  of  changing  the  disposi- 
tion taken  by  the  united  sovereigns,"  summoned  the  Duke  of 
Calabria,  Regent  of  the  Kingdom,  "to  require  his  people  to  re- 
nounce all  adherence  to  the  political  changes  brought  about  by 
the  revolution  of  July  2.^ 

The  "small  fry"  of  the  Italian  Princes  were  now  admitted 
(January  26),  to  take  cognizance  of  the  proceedings  and  to  justify 
the  principle  of  "concerted  action,"  by  signing  Gentz's  Minutes.^ 

King  Ferdinand  himself  had  arrived  on  January  8.^  This  mon- 
arch, after  binding  himself  by  every  conceivable  oath  to  support 
the  Constitution,  had  reluctantly  been  permitted  by  the  de  facto 
government  to  leave  his  kingdom.  Once  beyond  the  frontier, 
he   cast   aside   the  insignia  of  the  Carbonari  which  decorated 

'MS.  Minutes,  Laybach,  1820,  Russian  Foreign  Office. 

*  Ibid.,  Third  Conference,  Minutes. 

'Among  these  were  Prince  Corsini,  representing  the  Arch-Duke  of  Tuscany,  Count 
Daglio,  representing  the  King  of  Sardinia,  and  Cardinal  Spina,  representing  the  Pope. 
With  a  single  notable  exception  these  lesser  Powers  approved  the  measures  taken  by  the 
Conference.  In  answer  to  Metternich's  somewhat  complacent  assumption  "that  the 
sovereigns  of  Italy  would  approve  the  resolutions,"  Spina  said  that  the  Pope  felt  obliged 
to  insert  in  the  protocol  a  clause  to  the  effect  that:  "As  it  now  appears  that  measures 
which  might  bring  on  hostilities  are  contemplated,  the  Envoy  of  His  Holiness  is  not 
authorized  to  take  any  part  in  the  conference  or  to  give  any  advice."  Ibid.  See  Minutes 
for  January  28. 

■*  Pasquier,  Memoires,  vol.  v,  p.  59. 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS       103 

his  person  and  placed  himself  under  the  personal  protection  of 
Metternich.  At  Laybach,  Ferdinand  soon  recovered  all  his 
legitimist  pretensions.  He  listened  with  unkingly  glee  while 
the  Triple  Alliance  planned  the  destruction  of  the  Constitutional 
regime  he  had  sworn  to  defend.  From  Pasquier's  Memoires 
we  learn  it  was  only  with  difficulty  that  the  King  was  persuaded 
to  employ  decent  diplomatic  forms  in  addressing  the  provisional 
government  of  his  kingdom,  at  the  head  of  which  his  son,  the 
Duke  of  Calabria,  still  posed  as  Regent.^ 

The  harmony  of  the  proceedings  was  now  marred  by  Gordon, 
the  English  plenipotentiary.  He  announced  ^  that  "in  spite  of 
the  presence  of  a  British  Minister  at  Laybach,  this  envoy  finds 
himself  unauthorized  to  take  part  directly  in  the  proceedings  of 
the  Conference."  2  The  French  plenipotentiary  also  ventured  to 
ask  Metternich  whether  Ferdinand  on  his  return  might  not  be 
allowed  to  modify  the  disposition  taken  by  the  Powers. 

The  Austrian  diplomat  replied  that  "the  Italian  Powers" 
could  under  no  circumstances  "allow  the  establishment  of  insti- 
tutions incompatible  with  their  tranquillity."  Thus  even  the 
"liberal"  formula  just  adopted  by  the  Tsar — that  reforms  were 
justifiable  if  granted  by  a  sovereign — was  denied  all  authority. 
The  tide  of  reaction  was  at  its  flood! 

At  both  Laybach  and  Troppau  the  Tsar's  illusion  that  these 
gatherings  were  an  administrative  directorate  of  Europe  was 
carefully  respected  by  Metternich.  "Of  all  the  children  I  have 
met  with,"  he  writes  in  his  Memoires  concerning  the  author  of 
the  Holy  Alliance,  "the  Emperor  of  Russia  is  the  greatest  child 
of  all."  ^  During  long  interviews,  which  the  informal  relations 
established  by  the  gathering  of  the  sovereigns  facilitated,  Metter- 
nich urged  upon  Alexander  the  necessity  of  further  reactionary 
measures.  In  proving  this  thesis,  he  was  again  singularly  helped 
by  the  course  of  events.  The  activities  of  the  secret  societies  in 
Russia  were  now  at  their  height.  The  Tsar's  own  fife  was  threat- 
ened by  men  formerly  associated  in  the  movement  for  reform  he 
had  himself  initiated.  He  even  oflFered  Metternich  the  support 
of  Russian  troops  to  restore  Ferdinand  to  his  throne.^     Besides 

i/*zc^.,  p.  54. 

*  Session  of  January  25.     MS.  Minutes,  Laybach,  1820,  Russian  Foreign  Office. 

'  Metternich,  Memoires,  vol.  in,  p.  531. 

*Gentz,  Defeches  inedites,  vol.  ii,  p.  127. 


104  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

the  news  of  continued  revolutionary  successes  in  South  America, 
a  revolution  broke  out  beneath  the  very  noses  of  the  assembled 
monarchs  in  the  neighboring  state  of  Piedmont.  Here  the  Liberal 
Party  (profiting  by  the  departure  of  the  Austrian  Expeditionary 
Forces,  which  were  to  restore  Ferdinand's  authority)  declared 
for  a  constitution  similar  to  those  successively  adopted  in  Spain, 
Portugal  and  Naples. 

It  required  but  a  few  weeks  for  the  well-drilled  armies  of  Austria 
to  overcome  the  resistance  of  the  Liberals  in  both  Naples  and 
Piedmont.  But  the  lesson  had  not  been  lost  upon  Alexander. 
"The  period  of  Troppau  and  Laybach"  (writes  Grand  Duke 
Nicolas)  was  a  crisis  in  the  life  and  experiences  of  the  Emperor. 
The  impression  made  upon  him  was  so  strong  that  it  lasted  until 
the  day  of  his  death."  ^ 

The  spectacle  afforded  by  the  European  Congress  held  at  Aix, 
Troppau  and  Laybach  was  calculated  to  confirm  the  Washington 
Cabinet  in  their  determination  to  remain  aloof  from  the  "Holy 
League."  In  this  policy  they  were  doubtless  strengthened  by  the 
objections  of  the  British  Cabinet — and  the  reports  of  the 
speeches  made  by  the  Liberal  leaders  in  Parliament.^  American 
public  opinion,  in  spite  of  an  earlier  belief  in  the  high-mindedness 
of  Alexander,  could  hardly  fail  to  beyisillusioned  by  the  trans- 
formation brought  about  in  his  character  through  contact  with 
the  reactionary  statesmen  who  formed  the  majority  at  these 
"international"  gatherings.  A  strong  sympathy  with  the  "revo- 
lutionaries" in  Spain,  Naples  and  Greece  was  naturally  felt 
throughout  North  and  South  America.  The  author  of  "Novo- 
siltzov's  Instructions"  was  about  to  abandon,  in  this  atmosphere 
of  "practical  statesmanship,"  nearly  all  the  Liberal  "points"  of 
the  program  which  had  insured  him  so  much  hearty  sympathy 
in  the  New  World.^ 

The  sincerity  of  Alexander's  devotion  to  the  principles  of  inter- 
national solidarity,  and  of  his  conversion  to  Metternich's  policy 

'Grand  Due  Nicolas  Mikhailowitch,  U Empereur  Alexandre  ler,  vol.  i,  p.  231. 

2  In  France  and  (ireat  Britain  Liberal  opinit  n  was  aroused  against  the  proceedings  at 
Laybach.  In  Parliament,  Mr.  Mackintosh  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  liberty  of  states 
was  at  an  end.  In  the  House  of  Lords,  Lord  Holland  bitterly  attacked  both  the  Holy 
Alliance  and  the  Tsar.  Pasquier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  pp.  146-148.  See  also  a  dispatch  from 
Poletica  to  Nesselrode,  published  in  American  Historical  Review,  vol.  xviii,  p.  328. 

^A  document  whose  language  is  curiously  typical  of  the  Laybach  Conference  will  be 
found  in  Appendix  11.  It  also  offers  a  remarkable  parallel  if  considered  in  connection 
with  the  "Red  Peril"  of  anarchy  in  Russia  at  the  present  time. 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS       105 

of  reaction,  was  soon  to  be  put  to  a  supreme  test.  In  the  measures 
taken  against  the  secret  societies  of  Russia  an  exception  had 
always  been  made  in  favor  of  the  Hetairie,  an  association  whose 
object  was  to  foster  the  growing  spirit  of  resistance  among  the 
Greek  patriots  to  the  oppression  of  the  Turkish  Government. 
A  natural  sympathy  was  felt  by  the  Russians  with  their  coreligion- 
aries.  Moreover,  a  large  party  in  Russia  were  convinced  that  the 
Empire's  destiny  lay  in  the  Orient,  considering  Alexander's 
European  adventures  and  his  departure  from  Catherine's  plan 
of  Eastern  conquest  as  a  fatal  step.  The  news  that  open  revolt 
had  broken  out  in  the  Moldo-Wallachian  principalities,  the 
autonomy  of  which  were  the  fruits  of  Catherine's  Turkish  wars, 
reached  Laybach  shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  at 
Turin.  The  leader  of  the  Greek  revolution  was  an  ex-officer  of 
the  Russian  Army,  the  son  of  a  former  hospodar,  Alexander 
Ypsilanti.^  Since  the  beginning  of  July,  1820,  this  rebel  leader 
had  made  his  headquarters  at  Kichenev,  within  Russian  territory, 
where  his  open  campaign  against  the  Sultan  had  received  every 
encouragement  from  the  Tsar's  officials.  In  his  proclamation 
addressed  to  the  Greek  patriots,  Ypsilanti  had  even  ventured  the 
following  significant  phrases: 

Should  the  Turks  in  their  desperation  venture  to  make  an  incursion 
upon  your  territory,  you  have  nothing  to  fear:  a  great  power  stands 
ready  to  punish  their  insolence.^ 

Between  his  duty  to  his  countrymen  and  their  wishes  and 
his  devotion  to  his  new  international  ideals  Alexander  did  not 
long  hesitate.  He  felt  that  the  moral  obligation  to  maintain  the 
bond  of  the  Holy  Alliance  outweighed  any  doctrine  of  national 
or  religious  solidarity.  Ypsilanti  was  degraded  from  his  rank 
in  the  Russian  Army.  The  Russian  Ambassador  at  the  Porte, 
Baron  Stroganov,  was  instructed  to  inform  the  Sultan  that  the 
Russian  forces  would  remain  strictly  neutral,  and  that  the  Tsar 
wished  to  be  considered  as  wholly  disapproving  the  movement. 
To  La  Ferronnays,  representing  the  Government  of  Louis  XVIII 
at  Laybach,  Alexander  expressed  himself  with  all  the  one- 
sidedness  of  a  doctrinaire: 

This  outbreak  has  occurred  when,  as  the  revolutionaries  believe,  the 
sovereigns  were  occupied  elsewhere.     Moreover,  they  seem  to  have 

1  Pasquier,  vol.  v,  p.  191. 

2  Debidour,  Histoire  Diplomatique  de  V Europe,  vol.  i,  p.  156. 


106  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

thought  they  had  my  approval  to  their  course.  Without  paying  any 
attention  to  what  public  opinion  in  Russia  may  desire,  I  have  published 
to  the  whole  world  my  disapproval  of  the  insurrectionary  movement. 

So  far  had  Metternich's  pupil  traveled  along  the  paths  of  re- 
action that  in  the  outbreak  of  a  Christian  population  against  the 
secular  tyranny  of  a  Mussulman  Sultan  he  now  saw  only  the 
machinations  of  a  group  of  secret  societies.  He  could  even 
stretch  the  mystical  language  of  his  Holy  Alliance  to  describe 
them  as  "anti-Christian"!^ 

*********** 

Alexander  reached  St.  Petersburg  on  his  return  from  Laybach 
on  June  7,  1821.  Hardly  had  he  lost  contact  with  the  "spirit"  of 
the  Congress  when  doubts  began  to  assail  him  as  to  the  wisdom  of 
his  course  in  the  Orient.  From  the  moment  he  crossed  his  own 
frontiers  he  had  been  greeted  everywhere  with  loud  demonstra- 
tions in  favor  of  the  Greeks.  Half-veiled  threats  and  mutterings 
of  dissatisfaction  concerning  the  measures  taken  with  respect 
to  the  late  revolution  reached  him  from  every  side.^  In  St. 
Petersburg  he  found  Stroganov  awaiting  him.  The  Russian 
Ambassador  at  the  Porte  had  been  an  eye  witness  of  terrible 
scenes  in  Constantinople:  Sultan  Mahmoud  had  chosen  Easter 
Day  to  perpetrate  a  crime  peculiarly  revolting  to  the  Orthodox 
Russians.  The  Patriarch  of  the  Greek  Church — the  leader  of  the 
Christian  faith,  which  the  Tsar  had  sworn  to  protect  and  cherish — 
had  been  arrested  at  the  altar  during  mass.  Clad  in  his  sacred 
vestments,  he  had  been  hung  by  Turkish  soldiers  at  the  door  of 
the  profaned  shrine. 

On  February  28,  1822,  the  Porte  threatened  once  more  to  inter- 
rupt the  peaceful  development  of  the  diplomatic  negotiations 
which  Alexander  (through  Metternich's  influence)  had  con- 
sented to  initiate.  An  insolent  note  addressed  to  the  Tsar 
required  among  other  things  the  extradition  of  all  Turkish  sub- 
jects who  had  taken  refuge  within  the  Russian  Empire.    In  order 

^In  a  letter  of  March  10,  1821,  to  his  confidant  Golytzine  in  Russia  he  wrote  in  even 
stronger  terms  "Ypsilanti  is  mad.  His  act  will  not  only  cause  his  own  undoing,  but  will 
probably  drag  down  in  his  fall  a  great  number  of  victims.  His  compatriots  have  no 
cannons  nor  military  material,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  Turks  will  easily  crush  them. 
Moreover,  there  is  no  doubt  in  my  own  mind  that  the  first  suggestion  for  this  insurrection 
came  from  the  Central  Committee  in  Paris.  They  evidently  desire  to  create  a  diversion  in 
favor  of  Naples,  and  thereby  to  prevent  us  from  destroying  one  of  the  chief  synagogues  of 
Satan,  established  with  the  single  intention  of  propagating  his  anti-Christian  doctrine." 
Quoted  by  Rain,  Un  Tsar  ideologue,  Alexandre  I^,  p.  403. 

2  Pasquier,  Memoires,  vol.  v,  p.  331. 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS       107 

to  calm  Alexander's  renewed  hostility,  Metternich  resorted  to  a 
plan  which  he  knew  would  appeal  to  the  Tsar's  favorite  doctrines. 
During  January-February,  1822,  he  proposed  that  the  whole 
question  of  Greek  independence  should  be  regulated  by  a  new 
Congress  of  the  Great  Powers.     This  was  to  be  held  in  Vienna. 

It  was  necessary,  however,  first  to  obtain  the  assent  of  the 
British  Cabinet  to  a  gathering  wherein  the  question  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Turkish  Empire  might  be  decided  in  accordance  with 
the  system  "consecrated"  by  the  "Holy  Alliance."  Metternich 
craftily  pointed  out  to  Castlereagh  that  in  their  exhausting 
struggle  with  the  Turks — marked  by  terrible  atrocities  on  both 
sides — the  Greeks  would  necessarily  come  to  a  decision  of  their 
quarrel  before  its  merits  could  be  submitted  to  the  ponderous 
judgment  of  Alexander's  world  tribunal.  In  the  meanwhile, 
Lord  Strangford,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  was 
given  a  free  hand  by  both  Metternich  and  Castlereagh  to  hasten 
an  arrangement  which  would  guarantee  an  early  peace. 

Metternich  had  succeeded  once  more  in  making  Vienna  the 
center  of  world  negotiations.  The  Russian  troops,  which  to  the 
joy  of  all  Russian  patriots  had  already  advanced  as  far  as  Witespk, 
received  orders  to  return  to  their  garrisons,  and  a  Russian  envoy, 
Tatistcheff,  preceded  his  master  to  the  Austrian  capital  in  order  to 
commence  negotiations  along  new  lines.  As  a  final  guarantee  of 
his  determination  to  submit  Russian  differences  with  the  Porte  to 
the  concerted  action  of  the  Powers,  Alexander  even  consented  to 
dismiss  from  his  councils  both  Capo  d'Istria  and  Stroganov,  the 
principal  promoters  of  the  war  movement  in  Russia. 

Thus  while  Byron  sang  the  heroic  deeds  of  Marco  Bozzaris, 
and  embarked  upon  the  "Modern  Crusade"  which  so  moved  the 
"classicists"  of  the  early  nineteenth  century,  while  the  passes  of 
Thermopylae  once  more  saw  the  hordes  of  Asia  stopped  and  beaten 
back  by  Greek  defenders,  the  diplomats  of  the  "Holy  Alliance" 
continued  their  negotiations.  The  Tsar's  faith  was  renewed 
that  an  application  of  the  formulas  of  his  "League  of  Christian 
Charity  and  Peace"  would  enforce  order  in  a  distracted  world. 
The  enactments  of  another  Congress  were  about  to  test  once  more 
the  practical  workings  of  his  "sublime  idea."  ^ 


^  "Alexander   loved  these  reunions  which  recalled  his  preponderant  position  in  1814 
and  1815."    Ibid.,  p.  443. 


108  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

The  Congresses  of  Laybach  and  Troppau  had  estranged  Eng- 
lish poHcy  from  that  of  the  "Holy  AlHance."  In  the  Enghsh 
House  of  Commons  frequent  representations  were  made  to 
Castlereagh  that  the  poHcy  pursued  by  Great  Britain  in  the 
Councils  of  the  great  Powers  was  not  consistent  with  the  ends 
pursued  by  a  great  liberal  democracy.  As  the  orators  of  the  oppo- 
sition were  ready  to  recall,  he  had  "panegyrized"  the  objects 
of  the  Holy  League  when  the  news  of  this  strange  agreement  had 
first  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  Parliament,  nor  had  his 
subsequent  conduct  gone  far  to  reassure  the  more  radical  members 
of  that  body.^ 

The  avowed  policy  of  this  League  of  Sovereigns  was  believed 
to  be  no  less  dangerous  from  the  respectable  motives  alleged  on 
their  behalf.- 

A  contemporary  writer  thus  summarizes  the  situation: 

A  new  era  had  commenced  in  the  history  of  the  World — a  system  of 
governing  Europe  by  Congresses,  instead  of  by  separate  and  independent 
Governments,  was  established.  A  scheme  was  formed,  and  actually 
begun  to  be  put  in  operation,  to  destroy  throughout  the  globe  the  just 
freedom  of  the  people.  And  while  all  this  mighty  machinery  was  being 
put  in  movement,  England  was,  if  not  a  willing,  at  least  a  passive 
spectator.* 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  this  "complication  of  affairs  and  jarring 
of  opposite  principles"  that  the  nations  learned  that  the  three 
sovereigns  of  the  "Holy  Alliance"  and  the  representatives  of 
France  and  England  were  about  to  meet  once  more  in  a  Congress 
at  Verona,^  at  a  time  when  these  international  gatherings  were 
most  suspicious  to  Liberal  opinions. 

The  tragic  death  of  the  Marquis  of  Londonderry — to  which 
title  Lord  Castlereagh  had  succeeded  on  the  death  of  his  father — 
now  brought  about  a  fundamental  change  in  English  foreign  policy. 
George  Canning,  the  new  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was  in  no 
sense  a  radical.     He  had  even  been  considered  one  of  the  decided 

^  Stapleton,  The  Political  Life  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  18. 

''■"The  desire  to  maintain  peace,  and  to  free  Europe  from  the  'scourge  of  revolution,' 
determined  the  three  powers  forthwith  to  proceed  to  destroy  hy  force  of  arms  the  free  insti- 
tutions which  the  Neapolitan  nation  had  asked  and  obtained  from  their  Sovereign.  But 
in  assigning  the  reasons  for  the  selection  of  Naples  in  preference  to  either  Spain  or  Portugal, 
as  the  object  of  their  interference,  the  intention  to  act  in  the  same  way,  as  soon  as  possible, 
towards  those  two  countries,  was  clearly  manifested.  .  .  ."    Ihid.,  pp.  38-39. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  62. 

^  Verona  was  chosen  rather  than  Vienna  because  the  affairs  of  Italy  were  supposed  to 
be  the  object  of  the  gathering.     Pasquicr,  Memoires,  vol.  v,  p.  446. 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS       109 

enemies  of  reform — but  his  attitude  with  respect  to  English 
interests  abroad  had  always  been  approved  by  the  lovers  of  con- 
stitutional liberty.^ 

Canning  received  the  seals  of  the  Foreign  Office  from  the  King 
on  September  16,  1822.  In  inaugurating  his  policy  he  was 
determined  not  to  lend  the  prestige  of  his  new  office  either  to  the 
Congress  in  Vienna  or  to  the  subsequent  gathering  in  Verona. 
It  is,  indeed,  probable  that  Canning  would  have  avoided,  if 
possible,  sending  any  English  representative  whatsoever  to  the 
latter  gathering.^ 

The  Duke  of  Wellington,  the  envoy  chosen  by  Castlereagh, 
had  been  delayed  on  his  journey  to  Vienna,  so  that  his  arrival 
almost  coincided  with  the  departure  of  the  Allied  sovereigns 
for  Verona.^  It,  therefore,  appeared  advisable  that  this  great 
man,  who  embodied  England's  prestige  both  at  home  and  abroad, 
should  be  permitted  to  accompany  the  leaders  of  Europe.  Wel- 
lington's instructions,  moreover,  were  precise  and  complete,  and 
his  character  gave  every  guarantee  to  Canning  that  they  would  be 
loyally  carried  out.  He  was  to  decline  in  the  name  of  his  govern- 
ment all  participation,  either  direct  or  indirect,  in  the  military 
operations  in  Spain,  for  which  the  Tsar  Alexander  now  sought  a 
mandate,  and  to  forbid  all  access  to  Portugal  to  the  armies  of  the 
"Holy  Alliance"  in  the  name  of  the  ancient  treaties  which  had  so 
long  united  that  country  to  Great  Britain. 

The  matters  to  be  considered  at  the  Congress  of  Verona 
(October-November,  1822)  were  arranged  by  Metternich  accord- 
ing to  a  well-considered  agenda.^  The  question  of  Greek  inde- 
pendence (involving  the  quarrel — so  dangerous  for  Europe's  peace 

*  It  was  not  without  some  hesitation  that  Canning  had  accepted  the  Foreign  Secretary- 
ship. In  the  Cabinet  he  was  about  to  join,  certain  members  held  principles  far  different 
from  his  own, — nor  was  he  supported  by  the  personal  views  of  his  Sovereign.  The  Duke 
of  Wellington  had  been  one  of  Castlereagh's  supporters  and  was,  therefore,  believed  to  be 
strongly  "predisposed  towards  the  policy  of  the  Continental  School."  In  Lord  Liverpool, 
however,  the  head  of  the  Cabinet,  Canning  had  a  warm  personal  friend  and  admirer,  and 
a  "cordial  approver  of  his  system  of  foreign  policy."     Stapleton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  125-129. 

^Ibid.,  p.  143. 

^  Pasquier,  op.  cit.,  vol.  v,  p.  446. 

*This  agenda  included: 

1.  The  slave  trade. 

2.  The  piratries  exercised  in  American  waters,  and  the  question  of  Spanish 

colonies. 

3.  The  Grecian  question. 

4.  The  Italian  question. 

5.  The  Spanish  question. 

See  Chateaubriand,  Congres  de  Feronf,  vol.  i,  p.  74. 


110  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

— between  the  Governments  of  Russia,  Austria  and  the  Sublime 
Porte)  was  the  first  discussed. 

The  differences  between  Turkey  and  Russia  continued  in  the 
hands  of  Austria  and  England,  as  mediating  Powers.  The  Greeks 
were,  however,  sternly  denied  the  assistance — or  even  the  moral 
support — of  the  new  Congress.  The  Tsar  in  his  distrust  of 
all  revolutionary  movements  declared  them  wholly  unworthy 
of  sympathy,  and  even  refused  to  allow  the  delegates  (waiting 
the  pleasure  of  the  Powers  at  Ancona)  a  hearing  before  that 
body.^  In  spite  of  an  eloquent  appeal  which  Andrew  Mataxis 
addressed  to  the  Pope,  their  delegates  were  finally  ordered  to 
return  to  their  distracted  country. 

In  respect  to  Italian  aflfairs,  the  decisions  of  the  Congress  of 
Verona  were  also  in  accord  with  the  policy  of  the  Holy  Alliance. 
The  mandate  of  Europe  seemed  permanently  accorded  to  Austria 
to  carry  out  the  anti-revolutionary  campaign  proposed  by  Metter- 
nich,  although  the  Pope  still  courageously  protested  against  this 
tyranny.^  Alexander,  however,  was  careful  to  intimate  to  Aus- 
tria (with  the  support  of  the  French  delegation)  that  the  exercise 
of  this  mandate  in  no  way  involved  the  permanent  recognition 
of  Austria's  rights  to  the  hegemony  of  Italy. 

With  the  exception  of  the  above  definite  successes  for  the  policy 
of  the  "Triple  Alliance," — events  which  were  in  the  main  unop- 
posed by  England  or  France — the  course  of  the  debates  at  the 
Congress  of  Verona  now  tended  undeniably  toward  a  disintegra- 
tion of  the  "European  system."  ^ 

^  Debidour,  op.  cit.,  vol.  !,  p.  187. 

^  The  astute  diplomacy  of  the  Vatican  had  distrusted  from  the  beginning  the  "quietist" 
language  of  the  Act  of  September,  1815.  The  King  of  Naples,  lost  to  every  sense  of 
patriotism  or  personal  dignity,  begged  that  the  Austrian  Army  of  Occupation  be  allowed 
to  remain  in  his  dominions. 

^  Nevertheless,  the  Tsar's  optimism  remained  insensible  to  every  reproof.  In  a  conver- 
sation with  Chateaubriand,  Alexander  triumphantly  declared  himself  as  follows:  "Can 
you  now  believe,  as  our  enemies  declare,  that  the  Alliance  is  a  vain  word  which  only  serves 
to  cover  private  ambitions?  This  was  perhaps  true  in  the  beginning  of  our  system,  but 
now  that  the  civilized  world  is  in  peril,  particularistic  interests  must  be  forgotten.  There 
can  no  longer  be  any  question  of  English,  French,  Russian,  Prussian  or  Austrian  policy; 
there  only  remains  a  general  political  system,  which  should,  in  the  interest  of  all,  be  fol- 
lowed in  common  by  all  peoples  and  their  rulers.  I  must  be  the  first  to  exhibit  my  belief 
in  these  principles — convictions  on  which  I  had  founded  the  Alliance.  An  occasion  to 
prove  this  presented  itself  in  connection  with  the  Grecian  revolt.  Nothing  was  less  in 
accord  with  public  opinion  in  my  country  than  my  acts  at  that  time.  I  saw,  however,  in  the 
troubles  of  the  Peloponnesus  the  signs  of  a  revolutionary  plot,  and  I  immediately  desisted 
from  further  action  on  their  behalf."  Quoted  in  Chateaubriand,  Congres  de  Verone,  vol.  I, 
pp.  221-222. 


THE  ERA  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  CONGRESS       111 

Wellington  maintained  that  Great  Britain  regarded  as  wholly 
pernicious  and  dangerous  the  policy — approved  by  the  Congress — 
of  addressing  common  notes  of  protest  to  the  Spanish  Constitu- 
tional Cabinet.  His  government,  he  declared,  had  adopted  as  a 
basic  principle  of  foreign  policy  the  principle  of  non-intervention 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  other  states.  The  English  representative 
would  be  ordered  to  remain  in  Madrid,  whether  or  not  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  other  Powers  were  ordered  to  withdraw.^ 

In  view  of  the  imminent  intervention  of  France  in  Spanish 
affairs,  Wellington,  moreover,  now  saw  fit  officially  to  bring  to 
the  attention  of  the  Congress  Great  Britain's  intention  of  recog- 
nizing the  Spanish-American  Colonies.  This  action,  so  important 
to  the  common  policy  which  the  two  Anglo-Saxon  Powers  were 
about  to  develop,  had  long  been  pending: 

The  relations  which  existed  between  His  Majesty's  subjects  and 
certain  other  parts  of  the  world  for  a  long  time  have  placed  His  Majesty 
in  a  position  where  it  will  be  necessary  to  recognize  the  de  facto  existence 
of  governments  formed  by  the  different  Spanish  provinces  in  order  to 
enter  into  relations  with  the  latter.  The  relaxation  of  Spanish  authority 
has  given  rise  to  an  increase  of  piratry  and  filibustering.  It  is  impossible 
for  England  to  put  a  stop  to  this  intolerable  affliction  without  the 
cooperation  of  the  local  authorities  along  these  coasts.  The  necessity 
of  cooperation  in  this  respect,  therefore,  can  hardly  help  but  lead  to  new 
acts  recognizing  the  de  facto  existence  of  one  or  another  of  these  self- 
constituted  governments.^ 

By  basing  this  action  on  commercial  rather  than  political 
grounds,  the  British  Cabinet  sought  through  a  policy  of  expediency 
to  avoid  raising  the  time-worn  issue  of  "legitimacy"  in  connection 
with  the  Spanish  colonies.  But,  as  Wellington  was  well  aware, 
in  addition  to  the  commercial  aspects  of  the  case,  a  large  party  in 
the  English  Parliament  supported  the  constitutional  pretensions 
of  the  South  American  republics  in  the  spirit  of  liberal  sympathy 
long  upheld  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.^ 

*  This  note  is  given  in  ibid.,  p.  123. 

2  Quoted  in  ibid.,  pp.  89-90. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  94. 


CHAPTER  VI 
EUROPE  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

"It  ought  to  be  the  aim  of  American  statesmanship  to  prevent  and  frustrate 
for  all  time  European  interference  with  the  development  of  the  states,  and 
even  with  the  destinies  of  the  whole  Northern  Continent."  Hamilton's 
policy  in  1781,  as  outlined  in  Oliver's  Alexander  Hamilton:  An  Essay  on 
American  Union. 

While  the  closing  debates  of  the  Congress  of  Verona  were 
taking  place,  and  the  language  of  the  platitudinous  manifesto, 
which  was  to  crown  its  labors,  was  in  course  of  elaboration  by  the 
delegates  of  the  "Holy  Alliance,"  negotiations  were  being  carried 
on  in  Paris  with  respect  to  the  proposed  French  intervention  in 
Spain.  Chateaubriand  had  a  final  long  interview  with  Alexander, 
whose  personal  influence  and  charm  were  never  exerted  to  better 
purpose  than  in  his  negotiations  with  the  two  principal  French 
envoys  at  Verona.  Montmorency,  who  was  almost  as  visionary 
and  mystical  as  the  Tsar  himself,  fell  a  ready  victim  to  his  per- 
suasions respecting  an  intervention  in  the  interests  of  Ferdinand. 
Chateaubriand,  who  had  been  chosen  by  Villele  to  counteract 
his  colleague's  legitimist  enthusiasm,  fell  a  victim  to  his  own 
childish  vanity.  The  Tsar's  flattery  and  a  little  personal  attention 
from  the  Autocrat  seem  to  have  convinced  him  that  the  Spanish 
campaign  was  the  surest  way  of  restoring  French  prestige.  Al- 
though no  Russian  interests  were  directly  served,  the  Tsar  found 
satisfaction  in  giving  actuality  to  the  anti-revolutionary  program 
of  international  administration  laid  down  at  Troppau  and  Lay- 
bach. 

Chateaubriand  now  accepted  the  plan  of  an  intervention  in 
Spain  with  all  the  enthusiasm  of  an  author  compiling  a  historical 
scene.  In  the  situation  he  was  contriving  he  already  saw  himself 
the  central  figure.  Only  the  monumental  conceit  of  the  creator 
of  "Atala"  could  have  penned  the  dispatches  he  has  assembled 
in  two  volumes  dealing  with  this  episode — so  closely  connected 
with  the  history  of  Spain  in  South  America  and  the  promulgation 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.^ 

It  was  in  vain  that  public  opinion  in  France  protested  against 
an  enterprise  to  a  great  extent  imposed  upon  the  French  envoys 
at  Verona  by  the  Tsar's  conception  of  international  duty.     In 

^  Chateaubriand,  Congres  de  Verone. 

113 


114  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

vain  the  opposition  called  attention  to  the  impropriety  of  the 
Constitutional  King  of  France  using  his  superior  strength  to 
crush  the  power  of  a  constitutional  government  and  to  reestablish 
absolutism  in  a  liberal  state.  The  supporters  of  the  Charter — 
upon  which  rested  the  restored  Government  of  France — saw  in 
the  policy  of  intervention  the  first  steps  towards  the  denunciation 
of  this  pact.  But  Villele,  persuaded  by  Chateaubriand  and  the 
growing  influence  of  the  Ultra-Royalists,  now  wavered  in  his 
wise  determination  to  neglect  the  Tsar's  advice.  Only  Canning's 
appeals — made  through  a  direct  correspondence  with  Chateau- 
briand— delayed  for  a  time  the  march  of  the  Royalist  troops.^ 

The  ensuing  months  were  nevertheless  to  be  filled  with  a  series 
of  bitter  disappointments  for  the  Tsar,  and  of  rebufi^s  to  his 
schemes  of  concerted  action.  Far  from  the  center  of  European 
events,  he  followed  with  an  anxious  eye  the  development  of  the 
French  intervention  in  Spain  and  the  struggle  of  the  Greeks  for 
the  liberty  which  he  had  denied  them  in  the  interests  of  a  doc- 
trinaire devotion  to  the  tenets  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  Austrian 
jealousy — and  the  French  Ministry's  desire  to  reserve  for  the 
Bourbon  dynasty  all  the  laurels  to  be  gained  in  the  Spanish 
War — kept  him  from  taking  an  active  part  in  these  events. 
Nevertheless  he  intimated  to  the  Allied  Powers  that  the  nucleus 
of  a  Russian  Army,  which  he  pompously  called  "The  Army  of  the 
Alliance,"  was  already  mobilizing  in  Poland.-  Every  success  of 
the  campaign  to  restore  Ferdinand  to  his  throne  was  followed 
by  a  shower  of  Russian  decorations  conferred  upon  all  those  who 
had  shown  the  slightest  deference  for  his  advice   and  "policies." 

The  military  details  of  the  campaign  of  1823  do  not  fall  within 
the  province  of  this  study.^  A  Bourbon  prince  carried  the  white 
standard  of  "Old"  France  across  the  frontier,  and  the  numerical 
superiority  of  the  French  troops,  aided  by  the  guerrilla  bands  of 
the  "Apostolicos,"  soon  brought  the  Duke  of  Angouleme  to  the 
walls  of  Cadiz.  Within  this  city  the  Constitutional  Government 
had  taken  refuge,  carrying  with  them  the  unwilling  Ferdinand, 

'  "Negotiate  at  least  before  you  invade,"  was  Canning's  common  sense  rejoinder  to  the 
elegantly  phrased  arguments  of  the  author  of  the  Memoires  d'outre  tomhe.  "Leave  the 
Spanish  revolution  to  burn  itself  out  within  its  own  crater;  you  have  nothing  to  apprehend 
from  the  eruption,  if  you  do  not  open  a  channel  for  the  lava  through  the  Pyrenees.  Such 
are  my  opinions  honestly  and  sincerely  given.  Such,  Lord  Liverpool  tells  me,  he  believed 
to  be  yours  before  you  left  this  country."     Chateaubriand,  vol.  i,  p.  473. 

2  See  Rain,  Un  ideologue  Alexandre  /«^  p.  425. 

^  See  Pasquier,  Memoires,  vol.  v,  pp.  497-499. 


EUROPE  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  115 

now  a  political  prisoner  rather  than  a  king  of  Spain.  In  spite  of 
the  support  platonically  extended  the  Constitutional  cause  by 
public  opinion  in  both  England  and  the  United  States,  it  became 
evident  at  the  end  of  September  that  further  resistance  was 
useless.  Ferdinand  VII  was  allowed  his  liberty  after  taking  the 
most  solemn  oaths  to  refrain  from  reprisals  toward  the  Constitu- 
tionalists. Scarcely  had  the  King  found  safety  behind  the  French 
lines  when  he  gave  the  signal  for  an  outbreak  of  reactionary 
terrorism,  which  has  made  his  name  execrated  throughout  the 
peninsula  to  the  present  day.  Riego,  the  patriotic  leader,  was 
hanged  at  Madrid.  A  Royalist  Government,  composed  of  Apos- 
tolicos,  carried  out  the  whims  of  a  maniac  monarch,  in  face  of  the 
protests  of  the  Duke  of  Angouleme,  who  returned  to  France  in 
disgust,  leaving  behind  him  a  discontented  Army  of  Occupation.^ 

The  Conservative  Party  in  Portugal  now  sought  to  imitate  the 
reactionary  deeds  of  Ferdinand.  Here,  however.  Canning  firmly 
intervened.  By  the  terms  of  a  note  dated  March  31,  Canning 
intimated  to  the  French  Government  that  if  their  troops  should 
further  approach  the  Portuguese  frontier,  it  would  be  considered 
by  Great  Britain  as  a  "hostile  act."  The  Absolutist  Party  never- 
theless once  more  took  up  their  arms  against  the  Constitutional 
Government  in  spite  of  Canning's  effort  to  isolate  Portugal  from 
the  quarrels  of  legitimacy  and  liberalism.^ 

While  the  brief  triumph  of  the  Bourbon  intervention  in  Spain 
was  wholly  gratifying  to  the  reactionary  Powers  of  the  "Holy 
Alliance,"  the  course  of  events  in  Spanish  America  was  soon  to 
give  them  cause  for  serious  alarm.  Every  success  of  the  policy 
pursued  by  France  in  Spain  caused  Canning  to  seek  a  counter- 
poise which  might  add  to  the  influence  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Spanish  Colonies.  Yet  even  at  this  time  Canning 
retained  hopes  of  preserving  the  monarchical  system  in  South 
America.     This  is  shown  by  the  special  favors  he  extended  to  the 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  517-S21. 

^  In  September,  1824,  the  monarchs  forming  the  Holy  Alliance  received  a  new  recruit 
wholly  in  accord  with  their  most  obscurantist  doctrines.  By  the  death  of  the  prudent 
Louis  XVIII,  his  brother,  the  Count  d'Artois,  became  King  (Charles  X)  of  France. 
During  the  years  1823-1824  the  tide  of  reaction — which  now  characterized  the  Tsar's 
internationalism — was  at  its  height.  Metternich  was  wholly  occupied  in  applying  the 
repressive  measures  of  1820  to  the  German  Confederation.  It  was  time — he  informed  his 
master — to  oblige  the  sovereigns  of  South  Germany,  if  not  to  abolish  their  constitution,  at 
least  to  modify  them  to  an  extent  which  would  suppress  public  debates.  Such  was  the 
strange  outcome  of  the  policies  now  championed  by  the  author  of  the  Instructions  to 
Novosiltzov! 


116  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Empire  founded  by  Iturbide  in  Mexico.  In  that  continent  he  was 
now,  however,  confronted  with  the  growing  repubhcan  influences 
of  the  United  States.  In  the  month  of  July,  1823,  it  was  learned 
in  London  that  Iturbide's  scheme  to  found  a  vast  Central  American 
state  had  ended  in  failure,  Mexico  under  the  influences  of  the 
United  States  was  about  to  declare  itself  a  federal  republic.^ 

A  new  factor  reconciling  the  British  Cabinet  to  this  plan  was 
the  ominous  program  of  monarchical  intervention  urged  by  the 
diplomatic  impresario,  Chateaubriand.^  This  imaginative  states- 
man now  dreamed  of  extending  the  French  intervention  in  Spain — 
where  it  appeared  firmly  established — to  the  colonies  overseas. 
To  Ferdinand  VII  he  hinted  a  compromise,  by  the  terms  of  which 
the  colonies  of  South  America  would  be  transformed  into  a  league 
of  separate  principalities.  At  the  head  of  each  of  these  would  be 
placed  a  prince  of  the  House  of  Bourbon,  chosen  from  the  French, 
Spanish  and  Italian  branches.  The  whole  of  this  gigantic  scheme 
of  reaction  was  to  be  underwritten  and  guaranteed  by  the  Powers 
of  the  "Holy  Alliance."  It  was  at  this  moment,  so  fateful  to  both 
American  Continents — that  the  British  ForeignMinister  made  the 
first  overtures  for  a  coordination  of  the  liberal  policies  pursued  in 
both  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.^ 

On  March  31,  1823,  Rush,  the  American  Minister  at  the  Court 
of  St.  James,  had  an  important  interview  with  Canning  concerning 
the  Spanish  Colonies.  Referring  to  the  British  note  which  had 
immediately  preceded  the  invasion  of  Spain  by  the  French  Armies, 
he  asked  whether  its  meaning  was  that  England  would  not 
remain  passive  under  any  attempt  by  France  to  bring  any  of  the 
American  Colonies  "under  her  dominion  either  by  conquest  or  by 
cession  from  Spain."  Canning  replied  by  asking  Rush  what 
he  thought  his  Government  would  say  to  going  "hand  in  hand 

'  See  Villanueva's  interesting  study  based  upon  the  archives  of  the  French  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  La  Santa  Alianza  {La  Monarquia  en  America,  vol.  ili),  p.  81. 

2  Ibid.,  73.  Chateaubriand  ordered  the  French  Minister  at  Madrid  to  advise  sending 
a  Bourbon  Prince  to  Mexico. 

^  The  determination  with  which  Chateaubriand  had  carried  out  his  policy,  and  the 
confidence  he  expressed  in  the  ability  of  France  to  carry  out  the  mandates  of  the  "Holy 
Alliance,"  were  proofs  of  the  constant  and  unwavering  support  he  had  obtained  from  the 
Emperor  of  Russia.  In  the  debates  of  Parliament  concerning  South  America,  Brougham, 
the  great  champion  of  South  American  freedom,  had  stated  as  an  undisputed  fact  "that 
Ferdinand  had  been  promised  by  the  Emperor  Alexander,  that  if  the  King  of  Spain  would 
throw  off  the  Constitutional  fetters  by  which  he  was  trammelled,  he  would  assist  him  in 
recovering  his  Transatlantick  Dominions."  Stapleton,  The  Political  Life  oj  George 
Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  46. 


EUROPE  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  117 

with  England  in  such  a  poHcy?"  The  Minister  expressly  added 
that  "he  did  not  think  that  concert  of  action  would  become  nec- 
essary." ^ 

Canning  received  no  direct  answer  from  Rush,  who  now  sought 
instructions  from  his  government.  The  matter  was  indeed  not 
formally  resumed  until  August  22.  On  that  date  Canning  set 
forth  the  British  position  as  follows :- 

1.  She  conceived  the  recovery  of  the  colonies  by  Spain  to  be  hopeless. 

2.  That  the  question  of  their  recognition  as  independent  states  was 
one  of  time  and  circumstances. 

3.  That  England  was  not  disposed,  however,  to  throw  any  impediment 
in  the  way  of  an  arrangement  between  the  colonies  and  mother  country 
by  amicable  negotiation. 

4.  That  she  aimed  at  the  possession  of  no  portion  of  the  colonies  for 
herself. 

5.  That  she  could  not  see  the  transfer  of  any  portion  of  them  to  any 
other  Power  with  indifference. 

At  the  same  time  Rush  was  told  by  Canning  that  if  the  United 
States  "acceded  to  such  views,  a  declaration  to  that  effect  on 
their  part  concurrently  with  England"  would  be  the  most  effectual 
mode  of  warning  France  and  of  persuading  Spain  that  neither  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  countries  cherished  territorial  ambitions  in  South 
America.^ 

On  August  23,  Rush  replied  categorically  to  Canning's  ques- 
tions,^ assuming  an  identical  position  except  with  regard  to  recog- 
nition (which  had  already  been  made  by  the  United  States).  In 
reporting  the  matter  to  his  government  he  was  careful  to  point 
out  that  while  he  had  thought  it  proper  to  meet  the  spirit  of  the 
British  proposals  as  far  as  he  could,  he  had  at  the  same  time 
avoided  any  act  which  might  be  construed  as  pledging  his  govern- 
ment or  to  "implicate  it  in  the  federative  system  of  Europe."  ^ 
This  appeared  the  more  necessary  from  the  fact,  that  as  Canning 
informed  him  on  the  26th,  the  affairs  of  Spanish  America  were 
to  form  the  subject  of  a  new  European  Congress  as  soon  as  France 
had  terminated  her  military  operations  in  Spain. 

On  the  28th,  Rush  informed  Adams  of  the  quandary  in  which 
he  was  placed  by  the  rapid  development  of  the  situation,  and  of  his 

1  Rush,  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London,  vol.  ii,  p.  11. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  25. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  26. 
<  Ibid.,  p.  29. 


118  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

intention  on  his  own  responsibility  "to  make  a  declaration,  in 
the  name  of  my  government,  that  it  will  not  remain  inactive  under 
an  attack  upon  the  independence  of  those  states  by  the  Holy 
Alliance."  This  declaration,  however,  he  made  contingent  upon 
"recognition  by  Great  Britain  without  delay."  It  will  thus  be 
seen  that  if  Canning  had  not  judged  it  inopportune  to  afford  the 
recognition  urged  by  Rush  (which  he  accorded  the  following  year), 
that  courageous  diplomat  would  have  associated  the  policies  of  his 
country  and  that  of  Great  Britain  on  his  ow^n  responsibility,  sub- 
ject to  the  disavowal  of  the  Department  of  State. ^ 

On  November  26  Canning  informed  Rush  that  their  last  inter- 
view on  the  subject,  just  a  month  before,  had  led  him  to  conclude 
that  nothing  could  be  done  between  them  in  view  of  the  latter's 
insistence  regarding  recognition.  He  had  therefore  decided  that 
"Great  Britain  should  herself,  without  any  concert  with  the  United 
States,  come  to  an  explanation  with  France,"  and  had  already  had 
several  conferences  with  the  French  Ambassador,^  Prince  Polig- 
nac,  and  had  afterwards  recorded  them  as  an  official  Memorandum 
embodying  England's  "irreductible  demands."  This  was  coupled 
w^ith  a  notification  of  the  British  Cabinet's  unchangeable  de- 
termination to  withdraw  from  the  Congressional  system  of  the 
Holy  Alliance.  "England  could  not  go  into  a  joint  deliberation 
upon  the  subject  of  Spanish  America  upon  an  equal  footing  with 
other  Powers,  whose  opinions  were  less  formed  upon  that  question, 
and  whose  interests  were  less  implicated  in  the  decision  of  it."  ^ 

In  answer  to  Canning's  contentions,  Polignac  was  instructed 
to  present  a  note  modifying  Chateaubriand's  previous  attitude. 
He  now  admitted  in  substance  the  whole  of  the  British  demands: 

That  his  Government  believed  it  to  be  utterly  hopeless  to  reduce 
Spanish  America  to  the  state  of  its  former  relation  to  Spain; 

That  France  disclaimed,  on  her  part,  any  intention  or  desire  to  avail 
herself  of  the  present  state  of  the  Colonies,  or  of  the  present  situation 
of  France  towards  Spain,  to  appropriate  to  herself  any  part  of  the  Spanish 
possessions  in  America,  or  to  obtain  for  herself  any  exclusive  advantages; 

And  that,  like  England,  she  would  willingly  see  the  mother  country, 
in  possession  of  superior  commercial  advantages,  by  amicable  arrange- 

'  Rush,  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London,  vol.  ii,  pp.  32-33. 

2  Respecting  these  negotiations,  Canning  informed  Rush,  very  properly  "that  he  would 
willingly  furnish  .  .  .  that  part  which  embodied  the  views  of  England,  but  that  where  those 
of  France  were  at  stake  he  did  not  feel  that  he  had  the  same  discretion."  Ibid.,  pp.  61-65. 
The  version  of  Canning's  official  biographer,  Stapleton,  treats  the  subsequent  negotia- 
tions more  fully. 

3  Stapleton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  29. 


EUROPE    AND   THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE  119 

merits;  and  would  be  contented  like  her,  to  rank  after  the  mother 
country,  among  the  most  favored  nations: 

Lastly,  that  she  abjured,  in  any  case,  any  design  of  acting  against  the 
Colonies  by  force  of  arms. 

That  as  to  what  might  be  the  best  arrangement  between  Spain  and 
her  Colonies,  the  French  Government  could  not  give,  nor  venture  to 
form,  an  opinion  until  the  King  of  Spain  should  be  at  liberty.^ 

While  acquiescing  in  the  principal  points  of  Canning's  memo- 
randum, Polignac  was  not,  however,  prepared  to  abandon  the 
principles  of  intervention.  Referring  to  the  conference  which 
France  now  desired,  he  declared: 

That  he  saw^  no  difficulty  which  should  prevent  England  from  taking 
part  in  the  Conference,  however  she  might  now  announce  the  difference, 
in  the  view  which  she  took  of  the  question  from  that  taken  by  the  Allies.^ 

He,  moreover,  made  the  acquiescence  of  France  in  the  British 
program  in  South  America — and  by  implication  that  of  the  Powers 
of  the  Holy  Alliance — depend  upon  a  "principle  of  union  in  govern- 
ment, whether  monarchical  or  aristocratical,"  at  the  same  time 
referring  to  the  principles  of  the  Spanish-American  revolution  as 
"absurd  and  dangerous  theories."  ^ 

True,  how^ever,  to  his  policy  of  reducing  the  Spanish-Ameri- 
can question  to  one  of  an  opportunistic  and  commercial  character, 
Canning  now  replied: 

That,  however  desirable  the  establishment  of  a  monarchical  form  of 
government,  in  any  of  those  provinces,  might  be,  on  the  one  hand,  or 
whatever  might  be  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  it,  on  the  other  hand, 
his  government  could  not  take  upon  itself  to  put  it  forward  as  a  con- 
dition of  their  recognition.* 

While  from  the  above  declarations  it  will  be  seen  that  the  aims 
of  the  reactionary  government  in  France  were  not  wholly  aban- 
doned, the  phrase  "that  it  was  utterly  hopeless  to  reduce  Spanish 
America  to  the  state  of  its  former  relations  to  Spain"  was  the 
outstanding  result  the  "logic  of  events"  recognized  by  both  par- 
ties.    England  now  followed  the  example  of  the  United  States  in 

^Ibid.,  pp.  30-31. 

^Ibid.,  p.  31.  "The  refusal  of  England  to  cooperate  in  the  work  of  reconciliation 
might  afford  reason  to  think,  either  that  she  did  not  really  wish  for  that  reconciliation, 
or  that  she  had  some  ulterior  object  in  contemplation;  two  suppositions  equally  injurious 
to  the  honor  and  good  faith  of  the  British  Cabinet."     Ibid. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  32. 

*  Stapleton,  The  Political  Life  of  George  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  32.  Gentz  at  this  time 
nevertheless  believed  that  Canning  realized  the  necessity  of  supporting  the  monarchical 
principle.  See  Gentz,  Depeches  inedites  du  Chevalier  de  Gentz  aux  Hospodars  de  Vdachie, 
vol.  II,  p.  282. 


120  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

accrediting  Consuls  to  the  principal  "provinces"of  South  America. 
Commissioners — a  term  by  which  the  diplomatic  rank  of  Minister 
was  thinly  veiled — ^were  sent  to  both  Colombia  and  Mexico. 

Canning  realized  that  in  all  these  transactions  France  repre- 
sented the  policy  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  But  in  view  of  the  com- 
plicated negotiations  which  were  being  simultaneously  carried 
on  involving  the  integrity  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  he  believed  it 
unwise  to  risk  an  open  break  with  Russia  and  Austria.  More- 
over, the  interior  situation  in  England,  and  the  reactionary 
tendencies  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington  and  Lord  Liverpool,  pre- 
vented any  avowed  opposition  towards  the  Continental  Powers 
with  respect  to  the  monarchical  principles  of  "conservation"  and 
"legitimacy."  ^ 


A  last  attempt  was  now  made  by  King  Ferdinand  himself  to 
obtain  the  intervention  of  the  three  Powers.    He  proposed  that — 

the  several  Powers,  the  Allies  of  His  Catholic  Majesty  .  .  .  establish 
a  Conference  at  Paris;  in  order  that  their  Plenipotentiaries,  together 
with  those  of  His  Catholic  Majesty,  might  aid  Spain  In  adjusting  the 
affairs  of  the  revolted  colonies.^ 

This  invitation,  communicated  by  the  Spanish  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  the  Diplomatic  Agents  of  the  Courts  of  Paris,  St. 
Petersburg  and  Vienna,  was  couched  in  the  most  conciliatory 
language.  The  King  of  Spain  even  promised  "to  consider  of  the 
alterations  which  events  had  produced  in  his  American  prov- 
inces.    ■* 

In  order  to  persuade  England  to  overlook  the  indiscretions  of 
Ferdinand  VH,  and  to  consent  once  more  to  enter  into  a  con- 
ference with  respect  to  Spanish-American  affairs,  Chateaubriand 

^  The  key  of  Canning's  policy  towards  the  "Holy  League,"  as  set  forth  by  biographer 
Stapleton,  was  as  follows: 

"Still  it  was  not  by  any  violent  transition  from  a  practice  of  support  to  a  system  of 
active  opposition  to  that  Alliance,  that  he  could  have  safely  brought  about  any  salutary 
results.  A  sudden  change  from  one  side  to  the  other,  would  infallibly,  by  raising  the  hopes 
of  the  democratical  party,  have  excited  them  to  outrage,  and  have  thus  produced  the 
very  evil  which  it  was  intended  to  prevent.  But,  no:  the  dissolution  of  the  Alliance  was  to 
be  effected,  gradually,  by  the  withdrawal  from  it  of  the  countenance  of  England;  and  the 
balance  was  to  be  held  'not  only  between  contending  nations,  but  between  conflicting 
principles,'  giving  the  preponderance  to  neither,  but  aiding  rather  the  liberal  side." 
Stapleton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  134-135. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  34. 

'  Ibid.  At  the  same  time,  however,  a  decree  was  issued  by  the  Council  of  the  Indies 
which  showed  the  determination  of  this  infatuated  Monarch  to  replace  the  administration 
of  the  Colonies  upon  the  same  basis  as  they  had  existed  before  the  Revolution  of  1820. 


EUROPE  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  121 

memorialized  Canning  in  a  series  of  notes,  which  only  succeeded 
in  drawing  from  the  British  Foreign  Minister  a  more  definite 
statement  of  England's  views  with  respect  to  all  forms  of  inter- 
national intervention. 

It  was  not  by  perpetually  creating  occasions  (Canning  stated);  it 
was  not  by  incessant  meddling  with  petty  interests,  and  domestic 
squabbles  in  other  countries,  that  the  influence  of  Great  Britain  was  to 
be  maintained.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  more  likely  to  be  frittered  away 
by  such  restless  exertion,  and  to  be  found  exhausted,  or  disabled  from 
acting,  when  real  occasion  should  arise. ^ 

His  disgust  with  the  principles  of  the  European  Confederation 
was  summed  up  in  a  final  scathing  inquiry: 

What  was  the  influence  which  we  had  had  in  the  Counsels  of  the 
Alliance?  We  protested  at  Laybach;  we  remonstrated  at  Verona.  Our 
protest  was  treated  as  waste  paper;  our  remonstrances  mingled  with 
the  air.^ 

Meanwhile,  the  Republics  of  South  America,  through  the  force 
of  arms,  were  assuring  for  themselves  the  right  to  an  independent 
choice  of  their  own  form  of  government,  the  end  so  ardently 
desired  by  the  Liberals  in  both  England  and  the  United  States. 

Following  the  victories  of  Bolivar  and  Sucre,  the  former  had 
been  proclaimed  dictator  of  a  federation  of  republics,  which 
included  Peru,  Venezuela  and  Greater  Colombia.  After  the 
Battle  of  Ayacucho  (December  8,  1824),  the  Spanish  forces  were 
shut  up  in  the  fortresses  of  Callao,  which  became  the  last  remain- 
ing vestige  of  Spain's  great  Colonial  Empire  on  the  South  Ameri- 
can Continent.  There  could  no  longer  be  any  question  of  con- 
trolling the  destinies  of  the  New  World  through  policies  of  inter- 
national action  such  as  those  pursued  by  the  Emperor  Alexander 
and  Chateaubriand.  The  latter,  indeed,  now  disappeared  from 
the  scene,  unregretted  even  by  the  Ultra-Royalists.- 

But  the  Washington  Government  was  still  ignorant  of  Polig- 
nac's  declaration.  The  Monroe  Cabinet  were  now  earnestly  con- 
sidering to  what  lengths  they  were  prepared  to  go  in  single  opposi- 
tion to  the  European  System.^ 

^Ibid.,  p.  37. 

^  In  the  future  he  employed  his  undoubted  talents  as  a  writer  in  a  prolonged  opposition 
to  the  Villele  Cabinet. 

'  Russia  was  now  isolated  in  her  pretensions — and  Russia,  as  Canning  held,  "could 
hardly  act  alone."  With  the  fall  of  Cadiz,  Monroe  and  Calhoun  had  believed  that  the  Holy 
Alliance  would  restore  South  America  to  Spain.  Only  the  sturdy  Adams  maintained  his 
determined  composure.     Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  50  etseq. 


122  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

On  November  19  (during  an  interview  with  Addington), 
Adams,  while  suggesting  the  difficulties  that  Great  Britain  might 
find  in  breaking  her  former  close  relations  with  her  allies,  declared 
that  the  United  States  would  decline  to  attend  any  conference  on 
South  America,  unless  the  new  republics  were  also  invited  to  be 
present.  No  Congress,  he  maintained,  could  give  Europe  a  right 
"to  stretch  the  arm  of  power  across  the  Atlantic."  In  the  strong- 
est terms  he  reflected  upon  the  pretensions  of  the  "Congressional 
System":  "The  very  atmosphere  of  such  an  assembly  must  be 
considered  by  this  government  as  infected — and  unfit  for  their 
plenipotentiary  to  breathe  in."  "The  ground  I  wish  to  take," 
wrote  Adams  in  his  Diary,  "is  that  of  earnest  remonstrance  against 
the  interference  of  the  European  Powers  by  force  in  South 
America — but  to  disclaim  all  interference  on  our  part  with 
Europe." 

"As  the  Holy  Alliance  has  come  to  edify  and  instruct  us  with 
their  principles,"  he  wrote  in  reference  to  Poletica's  Mission  of 
Exhortation,  "it  is  due  in  candor  to  them  and  in  justice  to  our- 
selves to  return  the  compliment." 

It  was  Adams's  temperate  views  that  triumphed  in  the  Cabi- 
net and  the  final  Presidential  Message  of  December  reflected 
his  desires.  Moreover,  as  subsequent  events  readily  proved,  this 
limited  association  with  British  policy  was  wholly  satisfactory 
to  the  friends  of  the  liberal  cause  in  Parliament.  ^  The  Monroe 
Message  of  December  2,  1823,  was  chiefly  directed  against  the 
principles  of  intervention  by  the  Powers  of  Europe  with  respect  to 
matters  of  purely  American  interest.  In  affirming  their  detach- 
ment from  European  affairs,  Monroe  and  Adams  also  placed  them- 
selves in  direct  opposition  to  the  system  of  World  Congress  which 
Alexander  had  sought  to  establish  under  the  auspices  of  his 
League  of  Peace.  The  unanimity  with  which  these  gatherings 
of  the  Powers  had  avoided  the  thorny  dangers  of  European  policy 
— always  complicated  by  particularistic  interests — to  join  in  com- 
minatory  notes  and  admonitions  to  the  United  States,  had  doubt- 
less not  escaped  their  attention.     Moreover,  a  question  of  purely 

^  "The  question  with  regard  to  South  America,"  said  Mr.  Brougham,  "was  now,  he 
believed,  disposed  of,  or  nearly  so;  for  an  event  had  recently  happened,  than  which  no 
event  had  ever  dispersed  greater  joy,  exultation,  and  gratitude,  over  all  the  Freemen  of 
Europe;  that  event,  which  was  decisive  on  the  subject,  was  the  language  held  with  respect 
to  Spanish  America  in  the  speech  .  .  .  of  the  President  of  the  United  States."  Stapleton, 
vol.  II,  p.  46. 


EUROPE  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  123 

North  American  policy  was  still  pending — the  immediate  cause 
of  the  "non-colonization  clause"  of  the  message. 

The  Tsar  had  shown  no  intention  of  invoking  the  fraternal  bond 
of  the  Holy  Alliance  as  against  the  territorial  expansion  of  the 
United  States  in  the  northern  continent  of  America.  In  spite  of 
his  attempts  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  to  annex  a  territorial  guarantee  to 
the  program  of  the  Powers,  no  attempt  was  ever  made  to  coerce 
the  Washington  Cabinet  by  "concerted  action"  in  the  latter's 
somewhat  arbitrary  treatment  of  the  Florida  question.  But  the 
objections  which  the  young  Republic  addressed  to  the  Conti- 
nental Powers  with  respect  to  "extending  their  system"  to  South 
America  or  of  "controlling  the  destinies"  of  that  quarter  of  the 
globe  was  accompanied  by  a  territorial  declaration  which  at  the 
time  applied  chiefly  to  their  own  northern  Continent.  This  had 
immediately  in  view  the  Tsar's  famous  ukase  of  1821.^ 

By  the  terms  of  this  decree,  which  had  been  taken  as  fore- 
shadowing a  policy  of  Russian  expansion  on  the  North  Pacific 
coast,  the  "pursuit  of  commerce,  whaling  and  fishing  was  exclu- 
sively reserved  to  Russian  subjects  from  the  Behring  Straits  to 
51°  north  latitude."  At  the  same  time  all  foreign  vessels  were 
forbidden  to  approach  "within  less  than  one  hundred  Italian  miles 
of  the  Russian  settlements  on  that  coast"  under  pain  of  confis- 
cation.^ 

When  Middleton,  the  American  Minister,  stated  his  objections 
to  Speranski,  Governor  of  Siberia,  regarding  these  pretensions  of 
the  ukase,  the  latter  did  his  best  to  reassure  him  with  respect  to 
the  policy  it  indicated.  The  Tsar,  he  said,  had  abandoned  his 
original  intention  to  make  of  these  northern  waters  a  mare 
clausum  out  of  respect  to  the  United  States.  Middleton,  who 
was  without  instructions,  contented  himself  with  somewhat 
sarcastically  referring  to  the  Papal  Bulls  of  1493  "dividing  the 
oceans  between  Spain  and  Portugal."  ^ 

Middleton  soon  observed,  however,  "that  the  conditions  of  the 
ukase  were  not  insisted  upon."  He  also  learned  that  "they  were 
signed  by  the  Emperor  without  examination,"  and  that  "it  was 

^  MS.  Dispatches,  Russia,  1822,  contains  a  printed  copy  of  the  ukase  forwarded  in  Mid- 
dleton's  dispatch  of  January  9,  1822.  Middleton  reports  the  Tsar  much  occupied  by  his 
duties  as  the  arbitrator  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  in  the  question  arising 
from  Article  I  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent. 

^  Bancroft,  History  of  the  Pacific  States,  vol.  xxiii,  pp.  348-351. 

^Mr.  Middleton  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  February  20,  1822.    MS.  Dispatches,  Russia. 


124  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

possible  that  his  signature  had  been  surreptitiously  obtained"  by 
persons  interested  in  the  trade  of  the  Northwest  coast.  In  short, 
while  Capo  d'lstria  maintained,  "We  will  not  revoke  or  retract," 
the  American  envoy  was  at  the  same  time  informed  "that 
no  orders  have  been  issued  in  the  sense  that  you  fear."^  There 
is  every  proof  that  the  subsequent  negotitations  were  marked  by 
the  Tsar's  desire  to  retire  with  dignity  from  the  position  which  he 
had  assumed,  and  the  principal  importance  of  the  entire  incident 
turns  on  the  important  declaration  of  American  policy  which  it 
provoked  and  the  non-colonization  clause  of  the  Monroe  Message. 

The  terms  of  the  ukase  had  been  communicated  to  the  Secretary 
of  State  by  Poletica  in  February,  1822,  and  caused  an  immediate 
protest.  When  Monroe  inquired  why  the  boundary,  as  yet 
undefined  by  treaty,  had  thus  been  arbitrarily  settled,  the 
Russian  Minister  replied  that  51°  north  latitude  had  been  chosen 
as  lying  half  way  between  the  Russian  settlement  at  Novo 
Archenglsk  and  the  most  northern  American  settlement  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Columbia  River.  Mention  was  made  of  the  matter 
in  the  Presidential  Message  of  December,  1822,  but  it  was  not 
until  the  new  Envoy  Baron  de  Tuyll  arrived  in  April,  1823,  that 
the  matter  was  resumed.  Under  instructions  from  the  Tsar  he 
asked  that  the  American  Minister  in  St.  Petersburg  be  given 
power  to  negotiate  a  settlement.  This  was  agreed  to  by  Adams 
and  resulted  in  instructions  to  Mr.  Middleton  being  drawn  up. 

In  July,  1823,  de  Tuyll  was  called  to  the  State  Department  and 
told  that  the  question  had  been  altered  by  the  determination  of  the 
United  States  Government  to  consider  the  whole  territory  of 
both  North  and  South  America  "as  closed  in  future  to  European 
colonization."  Adams  now  based  his  case  on  the  newly  signed 
treaty  with  Spain  which  had  ceded  to  the  United  States  all  the 
rights  formerly  held  by  that  country  up  to  the  41st  degree  of 
latitude  north,  upon  the  discoveries  of  Captain  Grey  and  of  the 
Lewis  and  Clarke  Expedition,  and  doubtless  upon  Middleton's 
report  of  his  negotiations  in  St.  Petersburg.^ 

A  large  part  of  the  territory  affected  by  the  ukase  of  1821  was, 
pending  a  settlement  of  the  boundary  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States,  held  in  common  by  these  two  countries.     Their 

1  Mr.  MidtUeton  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  February  20,  1822.  MS.  Dispatches,  Russia. 
^ These  negotiations  were  reported  by  Mr.  Middleton  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  April 
19,  1824.     MS.  Dispatches,  Russia. 


EUROPE    AND   THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE  125 

interest  in  curbing  the  Tsar's  pretensions  was  thus  a  mutual  one, 
and,  until  the  enunciation  of  the  "non-colonization"  principle 
in  the  Monroe  Message,  seemed  likely  again  to  give  to  their 
policies  a  similar  direction.  On  January  5,  1824,  however. 
Rush  had  an  important  interview  with  Canning  in  London. 
The  former  told  the  American  Minister  "that  he  was  still  embar- 
rassed in  the  preparation  of  his  instructions  to  Sir  Charles  Bagot 
in  consequence  of  the  non-colonization  principle  laid  down  in  the 
President's  message."^  He  also  asked  Rush  to  allow  the  negotia- 
tions in  St.  Petersburg  to  progress  separately  and  not  conjointly, 
as  previously  proposed  by  the  United  States.^  It  now  became 
the  task  of  the  American  Minister  to  obtain  support  or  at  least 
toleration  for  "non-colonization"  by  enlisting  the  ready  jealousies 
of  the  Powers.  At  a  dinner  at  Prince  Polignac's  he  expressed  a 
hope  that  France  would  not  intervene  on  such  a  principle  as  he  had 
to  meet  the  "known  opposition  of  the  whole  British  Cabinet." 
By  such  means  the  antipathies  of  the  European  Powers  were 
stayed  until  the  important  principle  became  established  by  time.^ 
Meanwhile,  an  amicable  negotiation  had  settled  the  matter  of  the 
ukase.  Middleton  signed  an  agreement  with  Russia,  fixing  the 
boundary  at  55°  north  latitude  in  April,  1824,  four  months  after 
the  bold  stand  taken  in  Monroe's  Message.^ 

Having  traced  the  evolution  of  the  two  cardinal  principles  of 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  published  to  the  world  by 
the  Monroe  Message,  i.  e.  the  paragraph  forbidding  the  powers  of 
Europe  to  extend  their  system  to  the  American  Continent  or  to 
control  the  destines  of  its  inhabitants  *  and  the  equally  important 
warning  concerning  any  future  attempts  at  colonization,"  it  now 

^  Rush,  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London,  vol.  ii,  p.  87. 

^  Ibid.,  v.  103. 

3  McMaster,  A  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  vol.  v,  pp.  20-22. 

^  "We  owe  it  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between  the 
United  States  and  those  Powers  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their 
part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and 
safety.  With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  Power,  we  have  not 
interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with  the  Governments  who  have  declared  their 
independence  and  maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  consideration 
and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of 
oppressing  them,  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any  European 
Power,  in  any  other  light  than  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the 
United  States."     Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  ii,  p.  218. 

^  "In  the  discussions  to  which  this  interest  has  given  rise  and  in  the  arrangements  by 
which  they  may  terminate  the  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting,  as  a  principle 
in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are  involved,  that  the  American 
continents,  by  the  free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and  main- 
tain, are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  Euro- 
pean Powers."     Ibid.,  p.  209. 


126 


THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 


becomes  necessary  to  consider  the  corresponding  obligation  re- 
affirmed by  the  American  Cabinet  as  part  of  this  same  declara- 
tion: the  renewed  engagement  not  to  interfere  in  matters  of 
purel}^  European  concern.^ 

The  sincerity  of  the  intentions  thus  declared  was  to  be  tested 
almost  immediately  by  the  course  of  European  events.  The 
struggle  carried  on  by  the  Greek  insurgents  had  been  followed 
with  sympathetic  interest  in  the  United  States.  Monroe  had 
been  inclined  to  empower  Rush  to  act  in  concert  with  the  British 
Government  to  end  the  horrors  of  their  situation  and  even  wished 
to  propose  an  appropriation  for  a  Minister  to  Greece.  In  his 
Message  of  December  3,  1822,  he  had  declared  it  natural  that 
"the  reappearance  of  those  people  in  their  original  character, 
contending  in  favor  of  their  liberties,  should  produce  that  great 
excitement  and  sympathy  in  their  favor  which  have  been  so 
signally  displayed  throughout  the  United  States."  At  the  same 
tim.e  he  expressed  a  strong  hope  "that  these  people  will  recover 
their  independence  and  resume  their  equal  station  among  the 
nations  of  the  earth."  ^  Largely  due  to  the  influence  of  Adams, 
however,  and  his  determination  to  avoid  all  interference  on 
our  part  with  Europe,  the  President's  generous  impulses  were 
restrained.  The  Greeks  were  again  noticed  in  the  message  of  a 
year  later,  but  the  challenge  it  contained  to  Alexander's  favorite 
internationalist  policies  had  little  or  no  application  to  the  Gre- 
cian situation,  and  was  indeed  wholly  ignored  in  St.  Petersburg.^' 

The  final  settlement  of  the  fate  of  these  revolutionists  was  to 
offer  the  last  occasion  upon  which  the  Tsar  sought  to  apply  the 
later  formulas  of  his  internationalism,  and  only  concerns  our  study 
in  this  respect. 

To  Alexander — brooding  over  his  own  misunderstanding  of  the 
Turkish  situation — the  reports  of  Canning's  able  negotiations  in 
the  interest  both  of  Great  Britain  and  of  the  Grecian  patriots 

1  "Our  policy  in  regard  to  Europe,  which  was  adopted  at  an  early  stage  of  the  wars 
which  have  so  long  agitated  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  nevertheless  remains  the  same, 
which  is,  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  concerns  of  any  of  its  Powers."  Richardson,  Ales- 
sages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  II,  pp.  218-219. 

""  Ibid.,p.  193. 

^A  curious  example  of  the  point  to  which  the  prejudice  has  developed  in  America 
against  entanglement  in  European  affairs  is  shown  in  a  recent  Life  of  Clara  Barton,  by 
William  E.  Barton.  The  author  points  out  that  the  first  refusal  by  the  United  States 
to  join  the  International  Red  Cross  was  largely  the  result  of  the  popular  belief  that  such 
an  act  would  be  contrary  to  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 


EUROPE  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  127 

came  as  a  bitter  disillusion.  This  able  statesman,  in  whom  he 
recognized  the  arch  enemy  of  the  "Holy  Alliance,"  had  now 
induced  even  the  wily  Metternich  to  serve  his  own  aims.  While 
Lord  Byron  led  another  expedition  of  volunteers  in  active  military 
support  of  the  Greeks,  Canning  skilfully  held  the  balance  between 
the  sympathies  of  the  Liberals  and  the  time-honored  British  policy 
of  maintaining  the  prestige  of  the  Sublime  Porte. 

When,  however,  the  French  intervention  in  Spain  had  brought 
the  Spanish  War  to  a  favorable  conclusion,  Alexander  determined 
once  more  to  appeal  to  his  allies  in  support  of  his  favorite  policy 
of  a  "European  intervention"  to  insure  the  pacification  of  Greece. 
With  this  end  in  view,  he  sought  an  interview  with  the  Emperor 
of  Austria  at  Czernowitz  in  October,  1823.  Nesselrode  was  also 
sent  to  consult  with  Metternich,  who  was  detained  by  illness  at 
Lemberg. 

These  pourparlers  resulted  in  a  compromise.  While  Austria 
and  England  were  allowed  to  continue  their  negotiations  at  Con- 
stantinople, it  was  agreed  that  the  five  great  Powers  should  at 
the  same  time  be  invited  to  a  series  of  conferences  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, where  the  Emperor  of  Russia  would  be  afforded  an  oppor- 
tunity to  develop  his  views  with  respect  to  revolution.  This 
gathering  was  but  to  reveal  the  growing  weakness  of  the  bonds 
uniting  the  Holy  League. 

The  Tsar's  last  attempts  to  make  a  "European  matter"  of 
the  Greek  situation  were  resisted  by  Villele,  who  retained  the 
Presidency  of  the  Council  under  the  reactionary  Charles  X.  He 
refused  to  risk  any  action  that  might  cause  a  break  in  Anglo- 
French  relations.  Even  the  Court  of  Berlin,  under  the  domina- 
tion of  Metternich  ventured  to  withhold  its  assent  to  any  plan 
for  an  intervention  by  the  Powers. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  again  and  again  declared  that  his 
master  would  in  no  case  join  in  "coercive  measures."  Finally, 
after  six  weeks  of  sterile  debate,  the  Conference  avoided  the 
appearance  of  failure  by  issuing  a  protocol  (dated  April  7,  1825), 
which  directly  avoided  reference  to  the  principal  matters  at  issue. 
The  Sublime  Porte  was  requested  to  accord  "spontaneously" 
measures  necessary  to  pacify  the  revolted  provinces.  In  case  of 
refusal,  a  "mediation"  was  to  be  proposed  by  each  of  the  Powers 
acting  separately y  the  latter  phrase  being  a  concession  to  England's 
views. 


128  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

This  complete  breakdown  of  the  principle  of  concerted  action 
was  highly  resented  by  Alexander.  The  Emperor  complained,  in 
terms  of  reproachful  bitterness,  of  the  treatment  which  he  had 
met  with  from  his  allies.  At  the  same  time  he  threw  out  hints 
that  the  Greek  question  was  "not  the  only  ground  of  difference" 
between  Russia  and  Turkey;  and  that  if  Russian  grievances  had 
been  for  a  time  abandoned  in  favor  of  European  interests,  the 
failure  of  the  conference  to  support  the  latter  principle  would  be 
a  reason  for  peremptorily  insisting  upon  satisfaction  regarding 
the  other  points  of  dispute.^ 

For  a  time  it  looked  as  though,  in  spite  of  all  Metternich's 
finesse,  the  Turko-Russian  conflict  feared  by  the  Powers  of 
Europe  was  about  to  break  out.  The  Russian  Cabinet  renewed 
a  diplomatic  protest  with  respect  to  the  whole  series  of  its  com- 
plaints against  the  Porte.  In  addition  to  these  demands,  the 
mobilization  of  Russian  troops  began  along  the  River  Pruth, 
the  old  route  of  invasion  from  Russia  to  Turkey.  The  Tsar, 
meanwhile,  set  out  upon  a  journey  toward  the  southern  provinces, 
which  in  the  eyes  of  Europe  took  on  a  dangerous  significance. 

At  this  time,  however,  the  aspect  of  Grecian  affairs  underwent 
a  sudden  change.  The  Egyptian  Army,  which  had  energetically 
aided  the  Turkish  forces  in  reducing  the  Greek  insurgents  of  the 
Peloponnesus,  suddenly  suspended  its  victorious  attack  upon 
Nauplia.  In  the  month  of  July  they  reembarked  for  Tripoli  and 
Egypt.  The  explanation  for  such  a  merciful  course  of  conduct 
could  only  be  found  in  an  English  intervention.  The  fleets  of 
Great  Britain  under  Commodore  Hamilton  threatening  the  base 
of  the  Turkish  Army  had  brought  about  results  which  the  united 
protests  of  the  Powers  of  the  "Holy  Alliance"  had  been  unable 
to  obtain.  As  a  result  of  this  respite,  the  Greek  Government  offered 
to  Leopold  of  Saxe-Cobourg — the  English  candidate  for  the 
Grecian  throne — the  crown  which  the  French  Ministry  had 
desired  to  confer  upon  a  Bourbon  prince. 

Thanks  to  Canning's  diplomacy  and  the  might  of  Britain's 

'  Stapleton,  The  Political  Life  of  George  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  436.  Contemporary  Liberal 
opinion  held  that  this  was  a  complete  and  unregretted  defeat  of  the  Tsar's  principles. 
"The  admission  by  one  of  the  members  of  the  Holy  Alliance  of  that  which  this  pro- 
posal implies,  that  there  'were  interests  which  would  justify  nations  in  taking  their  own 
measures  with  regard  to  countries  in  a  state  of  civil  war,'  was  at  once  giving  up  one  of 
the  principles  to  which  that  Alliance  had  most  pertinaciously  adhered,  and  consequently 
was  an  acknowledgment  that  their  principles  (England  having  set  them  at  defiance)  were 
no  longer  tenable  in  practice."     Ibid.,  p.  437. 


EUROPE  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  129 

sea  power,  the  Greek  question  seemed  about  to  reach  a  settlement. 
Alexander  (through  Mme.  de  Lieven,  wife  of  his  Ambassador  in 
London)  sought  a  reconciliation  with  the  British  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs.  But  before  undertaking  the  mediation  that  the 
Tsar  now  appeared  willing  to  place  solely  in  his  hands,  Canning 
demanded  that  the  Russian  Armies  be  withdrawn  from  the 
Pruth,  and  even  threatened,  if  this  were  refused,  to  occupy  the 
Morea  and  the  Islands  of  the  Grecian  Archipelago. 

But  a  dramatic  turn  of  affairs  was  about  to  follow  this  final 
abdication  by  Alexander  of  his  favorite  principle  of  European 
intervention.  On  September  1,  1825,  he  had  left  St.  Petersburg 
for  the  South.  Failing  health,  not  reasons  of  a  military  nature, 
was  the  cause  of  this  journey.  In  a  little  town  on  the  Asiatic 
borders  of  his  vast  Empire,  the  final  act  in  the  life  drama 
of  the  Tsar-Idealist  was  about  to  be  played.  Far  from  the  scenes 
of  his  triumphs  and  disappointments,  the  conqueror  of  Napo- 
leon— the  dreamer  of  a  Holy  Alliance  which  should  unite  the 
nations  of  the  world  in  bonds  of  "Justice,  Christian  Charity  and 
Peace" — was  to  end  his  full  and  eager  life  beneath  the  shadow  of 
disappointment  and  failure. 

Sensitive  to  the  opinion  of  his  contemporaries,  the  Tsar  suffered 
acutely  from  the  misunderstanding  and  suspicion  that  greeted 
every  new  effort  to  give  practical  effect  to  his  international  poli- 
cies.^ Nor  could  he  hide  from  himself  the  fact  that  in  Russia 
his  popularity  had  fallen  to  the  lowest  ebb  from  his  readiness  to 
sacrifice  national  interests  to  the  welfare  of  the  doctrinaire  ideal 
of  European  Federation. 

A  morbid  detestation  of  revolution  at  home  and  abroad  became 
the  guiding  principle  of  his  policy.  He  seems  to  have  regarded  the 
growing  danger  of  his  own  assassination  with  a  certain  fatalism — 
whether  arising  from  an  increasing  mental  lethargy  or  from  a  kind 
of  heroic  indifference,  it  is  hard  to  say.  But  with  respect  to  the 
repressive  policy  of  the  Holy  Alliance  he  remained  adamant. 
In  July,  1825,  but  a  few  months  before  his  death,  he  sermonized 
the  French  Minister  at  length  upon  the  dangers  of  coming  to  any 
agreement  with  the  insurgents  of  San  Domingo.'  "In  the  great 
struggle  we  are  carrying  on  the  issue  is  between  good  and  evil — 

^R^Lin,  Un  Tsar  tdealogue  Alexandre  I'f",  p.  425. 

2  Dispatches  of  the  French  Minister  to  the  Foreign  Office,  quoted  in  Grand  Due 
Nicolas  Mikhailowitch,  L'Empereur  Alexandre  /"■,  vol.  ii,  p.  530. 


130  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

law  against  fact — order  against  license.  The  present  unfortunate 
example  is  both  risky  and  dangerous  .  .  .  The  recognition  of 
the  independence  of  the  United  States  led  directly  to  the  French 
Revolution,"  ^ 

Yet  now  and  again  a  bright  ray  of  his  old  time  liberalism  came 
to  lighten  the  abyss  of  obscurantism  into  which  he  was  plunged. 
As  the  end  approached  he  seems  to  have  renewed  the  dreams  and 
visions  of  his  younger  days.  To  Karamzine,  the  great  historian, 
who  urged  upon  him  the  fact  that  his  "years  are  numbered" 
while  Russia  still  awaited  fulfillment  of  the  promise  of  his  earlier 
reign  he  replied:  "I  shall  yet  give  my  Empire  her  fundamental 
rights!"^  A  promise  made  under  the  shadow  of  death  yet  as 
vain  as  those  which  had  preceded  it!  To  all  who  surrounded  him 
Alexander  remained  to  the  last  the  "impenetrable  sphinx."  ^ 

It  became  evident  to  his  entourage  that  following  the  failure  of 
his  Grecian  policy,  the  Tsar  did  not  himself  know  what  ends  he 
wished  to  pursue.  He  seems  to  have  feared  the  accusation  of 
being  under  the  influence  of  the  liberal  Canning  as  much  as 
he  dreaded  reminders  of  his  subservience  to  the  reactionary 
Metternich.  Much  of  this  hesitancy  was  doubtless  due  to 
illness.  That  Alexander's  physical  condition  was  now  serious  had 
become  evident  to  all  who  surrounded  him.  Recurrent  attacks  of 
erysipelas  frequently  confined  him  to  his  bed.  Morbid  suspicions 
preyed  upon  his  mind.^ 

Moreover,  the  conviction  was  daily  growing  clearer  to  the  Tsar 
that  he  was  the  center  of  a  vast  conspiracy  aimed  at  his  throne,  and 

1  Nevertheless,  Alexander  remained  to  the  end  popular  in  the  United  States.  Under 
date  of  July  2,  1825,  Clay,  acting  in  the  name  of  the  Cabinet,  urged  the  intervention  of  the 
Tsar  to  bring  about  a  cessation  of  hostilities  between  the  King  of  Spain  and  the  insurgents 
of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico.  Middleton  in  this  connection  wrote:  "The  proposition  .  .  . 
has  been  communicated  to  the  Allied  Cabinets  and  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  majority 
will  agree."  Mr.  Middleton  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Septembers,  1825.  MS.  Dispatches, 
Russia. 

^  Rain,  op.  cit.,  p.  437. 

3  Grand  Due  Nicolas  Mikhailowitch,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  309.  "I  do  not  believe," 
wrote  La  Ferronnays  to  Chateaubriand,  "that  it  is  possible  to  find  anyone  more  convincingly 
frank  and  loyal  in  his  conversation.  One  always  leaves  him  under  the  impression  that  here, 
at  last,  is  a  Prince  who  unites  to  the  qualities  of  a  Christian  knight  all  the  attributes  of  a 
great  sovereign.  He  also  gives  the  impression  of  a  man  of  intelligence  and  energy.  Well! 
on  the  other  hand,  bitter  experience  and  the  whole  story  of  his  life  teaches  us  that  he  can 
not  be  trusted."  Letter  of  May  19,  1823,  La  Ferronnays  to  Chateaubriand,  Archives 
of  the  French  Foreign  Office,  quoted  by  Rain,  op.  cit.,  p.  426. 

*  He  often  asked  the  favorite  Madame  Narychkine — of  whose  fidelity  he  also  had  well 
founded  reasons  to  doubt — "to  tell  him  frankly  whether  his  conduct  vyas  not  a  source  of 
ridicule"  to  the  courtiers  of  his  entourage.  He  often  talked  of  abdicating  the  throne 
with  an  earnestness  that  recalled  his  youthful  days.  Comtesse  de  Boigne,  Memoirs, 
vol.  Ill,  pp.  156-157. 


EUROPE  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE         131 

even  at  his  life.  The  preparations  for  his  eagerly  anticipated 
journey  to  South  Russia  (July,  1825)  were  interrupted  by  definite 
reports  of  an  alarming  nature  concerning  the  machinations  of  the 
"Sects,"  a  Russian  officer  of  English  origin  named  Sherwood 
revealing  to  his  master  the  plots  of  a  revolutionary  nature  which 
afterwards  became  fully  known  through  the  trials  of  the  Decem- 
brists. 

After  a  tiresome  journey  lasting  for  more  than  two  weeks 
Alexander  arrived  at  the  little  city  of  Taganrog  near  the  shores 
of  the  Black  Sea,  where  he  was  shortly  afterwards  joined  by  the 
Tsarina.  Freed  from  the  cumbersome  etiquette  of  the  court 
and  the  grinding  military  routine  which  disturbed  his  leisure  at 
St.  Petersburg,  the  Tsar  appears  to  have  rallied  from  his  state  of 
nervous  depression.  A  renewed  period  of  friendship — even  of 
marital  affection — reunited  him  to  the  much-tried  Empress  Eliza- 
beth. But  the  nervous  fever  of  activity  which  devoured  him 
soon  drove  him  forth  upon  another  journey.  Against  the  advice 
of  his  physician,  he  attempted  a  tour  of  inspection  in  the  provinces 
of  the  Crimea.  Returning  to  Taganrog  on  November  17,  he 
immediately  took  to  his  bed  with  a  burning  fever. 

In  spite  of  his  precarious  condition,  he  refused  the  medicines  of 
his  physicians,  Wylie  and  Stofregen.  It  became  apparent  to  all 
that  the  will  to  survive  his  disillusions  was  lacking — and  only  his 
splendid  physique  rebelled  at  the  final  surrender.  On  the  27th 
a  priest  was  sent  for  in  haste  to  give  him  the  last  communion,  of 
which  he  partook  with  touching  piety  and  devotion.  He  died 
on  December  1,  1825.^ 

1  In  spite  of  the  autopsy  signed  by  five  physicians,  a  strange  tradition  still  current  in 
Russia  declares  that  the  Tsar  lived  for  many  years  after  the  date  ascribed  to  his  death. 
He  is  identified  as  the  monk  "Feodor  Kousmitch,"  who  lived  as  a  hermit  in  the  wilds  of 
Siberia.  In  Russia,  the  author  was  assured  of  this  fact  by  the  son  of  an  official,  who  pre- 
tended that  his  father  had  known  the  Tsar  during  this  exile. 


t 


APPENDIX  I 

TERRITORIAL  GUARANTEES  AT  THE  CONGRESS  OF 
AIX-LA-CHAPELLE,  1818^ 

The  result  of  the  protocol  of  November  15 — although  expressing 
the  benevolent  intention  of  the  Allied  Powers,  as  well  as  those  of 
the  great  Association  of  Europe — nevertheless  leaves  much  to  be 
desired.  Another  agreement  more  positive  in  its  terms  and  more 
conservative  in  its  principles  will  be  needed  in  the  future.  The 
best  means  to  obtain  the  ends  desired  would  be  the  signing  of  a 
treaty  to  which  the  Powers  signatory  of  the  Recess  of  Vienna  ^ 
and  the  subsequent  Acts  of  Paris  would  adhere.  This  alone  could 
mutually  guarantee  the  integrity  of  their  rights  and  the  inviola- 
bility of  their  possessions  as  defined  by  the  above-mentioned 
Recess  and  Treaty  of  Paris  of  the  year  1815. 

Such  a  guarantee  of  solidarity  ought  to  be  explicit  and  contain 
a  definition  of  mutual  obligations.  His  Imperial  Majesty  finds 
the  basic  principles — and  a  definition  of  the  meaning  and  tenor  of 
such  a  treaty — in  the  fraternal  bond  of  September  14/26,  1815.^ 
A  proof  of  the  immutability  of  these  principles  is  to  be  found  in 
the  imposing  unanimity  with  which  they  were  accepted  by  the 
governments  of  Europe. 

If  the  Allied  Powers  share  this  view  and  judge  it  opportune 
and  necessary  to  base  their  diplomatic  acts  and  formulae  on  the 
principles  consecrated  in  the  act  mentioned  (thereby  ensuring 
to  the  alliance  the  guarantees  of  peace  and  security  which  are 
the  fruit  of  this  pact),  the  Emperor  of  Russia  is  ready  to  make  any 
sacrifice  to  accomplish  this  result.  His  Minister  is  ordered  to 
place  himself  in  direct  relation  with  the  Allied  Cabinets  to  discuss 
projects  of  a  treaty  along  this  line 

To  the  above  was  annexed  the  following: 

PROJECT  OF  TREATY 

The  transactions  which  have  taken  place  among  the  Powers  since 
the  year  1814,  and  especially  the  measures  taken  at  the  Congresses  of 
Vienna  and  Aix-la-Chapelle,  have  had  as  their  guiding  principle  the 
desire  to  establish  in  Europe  a  system  of  durable  peace  founded  on  the 
basis  of  a  territorial  guarantee   among  the  Powers.     The  courts  of 

^MS.  Treaty  proposed  by  Alexander  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  contained  in  a  folio  marked 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  1818,  in  Archives  of  Russian  Foreign  OflBce. 
*The  Final  Act  of  Vienna. 
^The  Holy  Alliance. 

133 


134  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

Austria,  France,  Holland,  Prussia  and  Russia  have  judged  it  expedient, 
following  the  spirit  of  these  general  transactions,  to  make  more  definite 
declarations  concerning  their  reciprocal  relations.  The  following  dis- 
positions have,  therefore,  been  taken: 

Reciprocal  Guarantees 

1st.  The  conduct  of  the  nations  will  be  guided  by  a  rule  binding  upon 
each  and  all;  an  engagement  to  remain  within  the  present  territorial 
limits  fixed  in  Europe  by  the  last  treaties,  and  an  intention  not  to 
attempt  to  expand  these  same,  unless  with  the  approval  of  the  Alliance 
or  in  the  case  of  voluntary  agreements. 

2d.  They  mutually  guarantee  the  respective  territories  as  fixed  by 
these  treaties  and  promise  to  make  common  cause  against  any  state 
seeking  to  trouble  the  general  peace.  This  clause  shall  become  imme- 
diately effective.^ 

3d.  They  agree  to  notify  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  of  the 
above  clause,  inviting  H.  B.  M.'s  government  to  use  its  good  offices  to 
obtain  the  results  desired  if  necessary  without  requiring  its  active  co- 
operation or  full  adhesion  (the  latter,  however,  they  will  always  be  ready 
to  receive). 

4th.  The  German  Confederation  will  be  invited  to  form  a  part  of  the 
present  system. 

5th.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  a  too  wide  extension  of  the  system  of 
reciprocal  guarantees  mentioned  above  would  only  tend  to  weaken  and 
render  more  difficult  the  attainment  of  the  ends  desired,  the  Powers 
agree  not  to  make  further  similar  propositions  to  the  other  powers.^ 

^  Compare  Article  X  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

*  There  is  no  record  that  the  principles  embodied  in  the  above  interesting  document — 
preserved  in  the  archives  of  the  Foreign  Office  in  St.  Petersburg — were  ever  formally 
debated  by  the  delegates  at  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle.  The  not  unnatural  reluc- 
tance of  all  the  Powers — with  the  exception  of  France  and  Russia — to  add  to  the  already 
complicated  system  of  treaties  uniting  the  Allies  may  have  forestalled  consideration  of  this 
earlier  "territorial  guarantee." 


APPENDIX  II 

WORLD  REVOLUTION  AFTER  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS: 

TROPPAU ' 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  been  directed  to  add 
to  the  annexed  account  of  the  Conference  of  Troppau  certain 
explanations  concerning  the  objects  of  the  present  reunion  of  the 
AlHed  Cabinets.  The  first  aim  of  these  deliberations  has  had 
for  its  object  to  save  the  world  from  the  plague  of  revolutionary 
anarchy.  A  union  of  the  great  Powers  delivered  Europe  from  the 
military  despotism  which  gave  birth  to  the  revolutions  in  France. 
Their  independence  attained,  the  nations  disarmed,  and  each 
hoped  to  see  its  own  population  enjoying  the  blessings  of  a  general 
peace  under  the  auspices  of  the  great  agreement  which  had  assured 
to  the  nations  of  Europe  complete  security,  both  within  and 
without.  New  manifestations  of  solidarity  have  surrounded  with 
fresh  guarantees  this  happy  state  of  affairs,  and  the  nations 
appeared  during  several  years  to  obtain  a  breathing  spell  fol- 
lowing the  long-drawn  period  of  their  misfortunes  .  .  .  Neverthe- 
less, the  revolutionary  struggle  had  left  its  mark  upon  the  whole 
of  Europe — and  in  its  trail  more  ideas  perverted  by  the  errors 
and  calamities  of  the  century.  These  latter  theories  arose  in 
the  midst  of  the  events  of  the  revolution,  and,  first  raised  to  power 
by  its  fatal  influence,  dropped  to  obscurity  through  the  ensuing 
peace.  The  sects  have,  therefore,  neglected  no  means  to  prevent 
the  progress  of  a  durable  pacification.  No  artifice  has  been  spared 
to  sow  discord  among  the  Allies.  No  effort  has  been  overlooked 
in  their  desire  to  drag  down  the  nations  or  thrones  by  provoking 
the  people  to  revolt.  This  latter  effort  has  been  especially 
directed  against  the  countries  wherein  revolution  has  long  exer- 
cised its  influence.  In  Spain,  Naples  and  Portugal  they  were, 
unfortunately,  successful.  In  turn  overwhelmed,  the  downfall 
of  these  three  states  shows  to  the  world  the  continued  exist- 
ence of  that  revolution  from  which  it  had  thought  itself  forever 
free.  Thus  scarcely  reconstructed,  the  edifice  of  Europe  finds 
itself  attacked  at  its  very  foundations:  international  law,  religion 
and  Christian  morality.  At  a  time  when  each  of  the  governments 
is  endeavoring  to  discover  the  real  needs  of  its  nationals  and  seek- 

'  MS.  Memoir  dated  November,  1820,  from  folio  marked  Troppau,  1820,  in  the  Archives 
of  the  Russian  Foreign  Office. 

135 


136  THE    HOLY   ALLIANCE 

ing  to  satisfy  these  aspirations  by  constructive  measures,  their 
pure  intentions  are  suddenly  paralyzed.  If  Europe  had  merely 
opposed  silence  to  the  enemy  already  triumphant  throughout 
the  territory  of  the  two  peninsulas,  the  results  of  the  obligations 
contracted  in  1814,  1815  and  1816  would  have  in  turn  been  de- 
feated. Isolated  and  without  help,  the  states  of  Europe  could 
only  have  compromised  with  the  revolutionary  despotism  .  .   . 

The  revolutionaries  attempted  to  persuade  the  people  that 
absolute  power  is  leagued  against  the  rights  of  nationality.  It 
was,  therefore,  essential  to  convince  them  that  true  sovereign 
power  must  prevent  and  punish  crime  and  insurrection,  and  this 
only  in  order  to  ensure  the  enjoyment  of  the  peaceful  rights  of 
its  subjects.  The  enemies  of  government  seek  to  represent  the 
reunion  of  Troppau  as  dominated  by  the  three  Courts  of  Austria, 
Prussia  and  Russia.  They  maintain  that  the  spirit  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  is  opposed  by  another  formed  of  the  Constitutional 
states — England,  France,  Holland,  Central  Germany,  Italy, 
Spain  and  the  two  Americas.  It  is,  therefore,  indispensable  to 
demonstrate  the  contrary  and  to  show  them  that  at  Troppau  the 
great  Powers  in  Europe  were  gathered  to  deliberate  with  respect  to 
the  stabilization  of  the  European  system.  This  was  the  fact  that 
rendered  necessary  the  reunion  of  the  five  Cabinets.  The  first 
problem  to  be  considered  was  consequently  the  reconciUation  of 
the  respective  views  of  Austria,  France,  Great  Britain,  Prussia 
and  Russia  so  that  the  policy  and  system  adopted  by  these  Powers 
toward  the  revolutionary  party  should  be  identical.  This  was  a 
difficult  task,  one  rendered  possible  through  energy  inspired  by 
love  of  the  right. 

Austria  by  its  position  is  called  upon  to  assist  the  Powers 
with  its  advice,  and  more  actively,  in  Italy,  where  the  situation  is 
only  assured  by  a  partial  treaty  concluded  with  H.  M.  of  Sicily. 
The  Treaty  of  June  12,  1815,  Austria  contends,  should,  therefore, 
disappear.  Acting  as  a  mandatory  of  the  European  Powers, 
she  should  play  the  most  important  part  in  the  great  task  of 
reconciliating  Naples,  both  to  the  King  and  to  the  laws  of  society. 
France  still  forms  the  center  of  sects,  whose  ambition  it  is  to 
overthrow  all  monarchical  government.  She,  therefore,  can  not 
be  expected  to  cooperate  successfully  at  the  present  time.  Act- 
ing as  a  support  to  the  general  cause,  she  should  hope  for  the 


APPENDIX    II  137 

assistance  of  the  Powers  .  .  .  Great  Britain,  now  at  the  zenith  of 
riches  and  civiHzation,  appears  for  the  moment  to  be  engulfed  by 
her  own  prosperity.  The  proof  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  the 
domestic  troubles  which  menace  the  Royal  family,  its  August 
Chief  and  its  most  zealous  servants.  Under  these  circumstances, 
the  government  can  not  be  counted  among  the  number  of  active 
members  of  the  European  Alliance,  and  should  be  happy  to  keep 
its  rank  as  an  Allied  court.  It  can  best  aid  by  not  holding  forth 
false  hopes  to  the  authors  of  the  great  catastrophe.  Prussia, 
fully  occupied  by  internal  relations  to  the  federal  states  of  Ger- 
many and  by  new  relations  with  Austria,  has  not  been  able  to 
consider  in  advance  the  difficult  questions  confronting  the  united 
Cabinets.  To  Russia  alone,  therefore,  thanks  to  its  strong  posi- 
tion, this  duty  appears  in  harmony  with  the  engagements  already 
taken,  etc. 


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^Talleyrand,  Memoires  du  Prince  de.     Publies  avec  une  preface  et  des  notes  par  le  Due  de 

Broglie.     5  vols.     Paris,  1891. 
Tatistcheff,   Serge.     Alexandre  I^''  et  Napoleon,  d'apres  leur  correspondance  inedite, 

1801-1812.     Paris,  1891. 
Vandal,  Albert.     Napoleon  et  Alexandre  !«>'.    3  vols.     Paris,  1898. 
Villanueva,  Carlos  A.     La  Santa  Alianza.     {La  Monarquia  en  America,  vol.   in.) 

Paris,  n.  d. 

.     Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin.     (La  Monarquia  en  America,  vol.  i.)     Paris,  n.  d. 

Waliszewski,  Kazimierz.     Le  fils  de  la  grand  Catherine,  Paul  I",  empereur  de  Russie,  sa 

vie,  son  regne  et  sa  mart,  1754-1801,  d'apres  des  documents  nouveaux    et  en  grande 

partie  inedits.     Paris,  1912. 


INDEX 


Adams,  John  Quincy,  1,  50,  61,  71;  position 
with  regard  to  Holy  Alliance,  91  et  seq.; 
position  with  regard  to  European  inter- 
ference in  America,  122. 

Aix-la-Chapelle:  Treaty  of,  21,  44-5,  59, 
61,  67;  Congress  of,  69  et  seq.;  results  of 
Congress  of,  83;  territorial  guarantees  of 
Congress  of,  133-34. 

Alliances:  of  Tsar  Paul  with  Napoleon,  8; 
Anglo-Russian,  12-3;  of  Tilsit,  16-7; 
France,  Austria  and  Great  Britain,  27. 
See  also  Treaties. 

Allied  General  Staff,  proposed,  74. 

Anglo-Russian  Alliance,  attitude  toward 
France, 13. 

Angouleme,  Duke  of,  leader  of  French  in- 
vasion of  Spain,  114-15. 

Arcis-sur-Aube,  battle  at,  19. 

"Armed  Neutrality,"  8,  10. 

Austerlitz,  defeat  of  Third  Coalition  at,  15- 
6. 

Austria,  1,  58,  97,  136;  recognition  of  Na- 
poleon by,  11;  on  side  of  Allies,  19;  party 
to  Treaty  of  Alliance,  28;  opposition  of,  to 
international  congresses,  72;  negotiations 
with  Great  Britain  at  Constantinople, 
127. 

Bagot,  Sir  Charles,  125. 

Balance  of  power,  Alexander's  principle  of, 
15. 

Bancroft,  cited,  123. 

Banda  Oriental,  67,  88. 

Baronov,  Russian  Governor  of  American 
colonies,  59-60. 

Barton,  William  E.,  cited,  126. 

Bennett,  member  of  Parliament,  attack 
upon  Holy  Alliance,  43-4. 

Bergasse,  Nicholas,  influence  of,  on  Alex- 
ander, 32,  34-5,  38-9. 

Berlin  Decree,  46. 

Bernadotte,  Crown  Prince  of  Sweden,  18. 

Bey  of  Algiers,  58. 

Bey  of  Tunis,  58. 

Blockades,  paper,  forbidden  by  Congress  of 
Powers  of  the  North,  10. 

Bodega  Bay,  Russian  colony  at,  59-60. 

Bogdanovitch,  cited,  4. 

Boigne,  Comtesse  de,  cited,  130. 


Bolivar:  cited,  60;  dictator  of  South 
American  republics,  121. 

Bonaparte,  Joseph,  assumption  of  royal 
authority  by,  61. 

Borgo,  Pozzo  di,  Russian  envoy,  65-6,  70. 

Boyce,  Myrna,  cited,  45. 

Brest,  46. 

Brougham,  member  of  Parliament,  opposi- 
tion to  Holy  Alliance,  42-3. 

Buenos  Aires,  61;  independence  of,  78. 

Byron,  Lord,  expedition  in  support  of 
Greeks,  107,  127. 

Campbell,  George  W.,  United  States 
minister  to  Russia,  88  et  seq,  97. 

Canning,  George,  2,  74;  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  108;  foreign  policy  of,  109, 
114;  intervention  in  Portugal,  115;  state- 
ment in  regard  to  colonies,  117  et  seq.; 
negotiations  with  regard  to  Greece, 
126-27. 

Caracas,  61;  political  and  commercial  con- 
cessions granted  to,  78. 

Carlsbad,  48;  Congress  of,  96. 

Castlereagh,  Lord,  28,  47,  73,  107-8;  in- 
fluence of,  at  Chaumont  negotiations,  22; 
at  Congress  of  Vienna,  26;  support  of 
Holy  Alliance,  42-3,  71,  74-5,  84;  pro- 
posal to  admit  France  to  Treaty  of 
Alliance,  73;  reservations  of,  83;  opposi- 
tion to  Troppau  Congress,  98,  100. 

Catherine,  Empress,  grandmother  of  Alex- 
ander, 3,  17,  death  of,  5. 

Caulaincourt,  Napoleon's  envoy  at  Chatil- 
lon,  20. 

Chateaubriand:  cited,  60,  71,  109  et  seq.; 
interview  with  Alexander,  113;  plan  of 
French  intervention  in  Spain,  116. 

Chateau-Thierry,  French  victory  at,  19. 

Chatillon,  Congress  of,  19. 

Chaumont,  Treaty  of,  2,  12,  20-1,  29,  45-6, 
71,  73-4. 

Choiseul-GoufHer,  Mme.  de,  cited,  23, 30, 33 . 

Clay,  Henry,  64. 

Cleland,  R.  G.,  cited,  60. 

Clery,  Robinet  de,  cited,  77,  96. 

Colombia,  independence  of,  121. 

Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  22. 

Congresses.     See  individual  headings. 

143 


144 


THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE 


Constantine,  Grand  Duke,  brother  of 
Alexander,  3. 

Constantinople,  negotiations  between  Aus- 
tria and  Great  Britain  at,  127. 

Continental  System,  effort  to  attach 
Alexander  to,  17. 

Copenhagen,  British  victory  at,  9. 

Correa,  Portuguese  Minister,  88. 

Cretenau-Joly,  Jacques,  cited,  73. 

Crimean  War,  outbreak  of,  39. 

Czartoryski,  Prince,  26,  35;  cited,  4-5, 
7,12, 16;  as  Prime  Minister,  8;  influence of> 
on  Alexander,  9,  25;  appointed  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  10-1. 

Dashkov,  Russian  envoy  to  the  United 
States,  49-50,  62-3,  80,  85. 

Debidour,  A.:  cited,  20,  26-7,  56  et  seq., 
64,72-3,99,  105,  110. 

Denmark:  attempt  to  separate,  9;  at 
Congress  of  Powers  of  the  North,  10. 

Diderot,  3. 

Divine  Right  of  rulers,  55. 

Dunning,  W.  A.,  cited,  47. 

Dupuis,  Charles,  cited,  17. 

Elba,  return  of  Napoleon  from,  27,  32. 

Elizabeth,  Empress,  131. 

Embargo,  English,  on  vessels,  8. 

Emerson,  Ralph  Waldo,  cited,  44. 

Era  of  Good  Feeling  in  the  United 
States,  50. 

Erfurt,  meeting  of  Alexander  and  Talley- 
rand at,  17. 

Eynard,  Charles,  cited,  32-3. 

Federation,  proposed,  of  small  states,  15. 

Feree-Champeniose,  La,  battle  at,  19. 

Ferdinand  VII,  Spanish  King,  58,  67; 
restoration  of  absolutism  and  the  In- 
quisition by,  56;  tyranny  of,  60;  trouble 
with  South  American  colonies,  64; 
attempt  to  restore,  to  the  throne,  114-15; 
proposal  of  international  conference,  by, 
120-21. 

Ferronnays,  French  representative  at  Lay- 
bach  Congress,  105. 

Finland,  "free  hand"  given  Russia  in,  17. 

Fischer,  Danish  Admiral,  9. 

Florida,  65;  controversy  over,  61-2;  Amer- 
ican invasion  of,  64;  cession  of  East> 
to  United  States,  92. 

Ford,  C,  cited,  32. 

France:  alliance   with   Great   Britain   and 


Austria,  27;  Alexander's  policy  toward, 
56;  payment  of  indemnity  by,  73;  ad- 
mitted to  Treaty  of  Alliance,  74;  state- 
ment of,  in  regard  to  Spain  and  colonies, 
118-19;  Sects  in,  135. 

Frankfort,  55. 

Frederick  William  III,  Prussian  King,  10, 
17,  56,  96. 

Friedland,  Russian  defeat  at,  17. 

Garde,  Le  Comte  A.  de  la,  cited,  24. 

Garden,  cited,  8,  10,  16,  18. 

Gentz,  Frederick  de:  cited,  24,  31,  37, 
72,  74-5,  77,  97  et  seq.,  119;  at  Vienna 
Congress,  29;  attacks  upon  Jacobinism, 
95-6;  at  Laybach  Congress,  101. 

German  Confederation,  59;  action  of 
Metternich  with  regard  to,  96. 

Ghent,  Peace  of,  26,  59. 

Goebel,  Julius,  cited,  70. 

Colder,  F.  A.,  cited,  47,  50. 

Golytzine;  Alexander's  letter  to,  29;  in- 
fluence of,  on  Alexander,  32. 

Gordon,  English  plenipotentiary  at  Lay- 
bach  Congress,  101,  103. 

Grand  Confederation  of  the  Powers  of 
Europe,  23. 

Great  Britain,  136-37;  agreement  with 
provisions  of  Congress  of  the  Powers  of 
the  North,  10;  agreement  with  Russia, 
12;  attitude  toward  France,  15-6;  party 
to  Treaty  of  Reichenbach,  18;  subsidies 
advanced  by,  20;  war  with  the  United 
States  (War  of  1812),  26,  93;  party  to 
Treaty  of  Alliance,  28;  attitude  toward 
Holy  Alliance,  41  et  seq.;  opposition  to 
action  regarding  Barbary  pirates,  57-8; 
as  an  American  power,  59;  opposition  to 
international  congresses,  72;  at  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  Congress,  75-6;  opposition  to 
international  naval  measures,  82;  recog- 
nition of  Spanish  American  colonies.  111; 
attitude  toward  Spanish  American  col- 
onies, 117;  negotiations  with  Austria  at 
Constantinople,  127;  settlement  of  Gre- 
cian question,  128. 

Greece,  resistance  to  Turkish  oppression, 
105  et  seq.,  126  et  seq. 

Grenada,  political  and  commercial  con- 
cessions granted  to,  78. 

Greville,  Charles  C.  F.,  cited,  45. 

Grimm,  3. 


INDEX 


145 


Hanover,  Prussian  evacuation  of,  10. 
Hanse  Towns,  acceptance  of  Holy  Alliance 

by,  47. 
Hardenberg,  Prussian  Liberal  Minister,  56. 
Harris,  Levett,  American  charge  d'affaires 

at  St.  Petersburg,  48-9,  55,  58,  62. 
Havre,  46. 

Heiairie,  Pan  Grecian  Association,  57,  105. 
Hildt,  John  C,  cited,  51,60,64. 
Holland,  136;  proposed  restoration  of,  13; 

acceptance  of  Holy  Alliance  by,  47. 
Humboldt,  Prussian  Liberal  Minister,  56. 
Hyde    de    Neuville,    French    Minister    to 

United  States,  61. 
Impeytany,  cited,  39. 
Instructions  to  Novosiltzov,  9,  11  et  seq., 

26,  29,  32,  67,  104. 
International  Maritime  Police,  proposed,  81. 
Istria,  Capo  d',  70;  adviser  to  Ale.xander, 

25,  49,  58;  foundation  of  Hetairie  by, 

57;  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  Congress,  77,  80, 

86;  dismissal  of,  107. 
Italy,  109-10,  136. 
Iturbide,  attempt  of,  to  found  Empire  in 

Mexico,  115-16. 
Jacobinism,  3,  95;  of  Laharpe,  5;  of  Alex- 
ander, 55. 
Josika,  Baron,  cited,  55. 
Joyneville,  C,  cited,  7. 
Juntas,  61;  revolt  of  South  American,  58. 
Kalisch,  Treaty  of,  12,  18,  21,  46. 
Kichenev,  105. 
Koslov,    Russian    Consul    in    the    United 

States,  53. 
Kraft,  tutor  of  Alexander,  4. 
Kronstad,  English  expedition  against,  9. 
Kriidener,    Baroness   de,   influence   of,   on 

Alexander,  32-3,  35,  38. 
Laharpe,  Frederick  Cesar,  25,  47;  tutor  of 

Alexander,   3   et  seq.,   32;   dismissal   of, 

5;  return  as  adviser,  8;  cited,  39. 
Landskoi,  Count,  3. 
Lansing,  Robert,  cited,  25. 
La  Rothiere,  French  defeat  at,  19. 
Laybach,     Congress    at,     101;    effect    on 

English  policy  of  Congress  at,  108. 
League  of  Nations,  proposed  by  Alexander, 

13-4. 
League  of  Neutrals,  9-10. 
League  of  Sovereigns,  38-9;  policy  of,  108. 
League  to  Suppress  Piracy,  82. 


Leipzig,  Battle  of  Nations  at,  19-20. 

Leopold,  of  Saxe-Coburg,  128. 

Lewis  and  Clarke  Expedition,  124. 

Liberalism;  opposition  to  Holy  Alliance, 
41-2;  of  Alexander,  55;  in  Germany,  96; 
in  Spanish  colonies,  97;  in  Piedmont,  104. 

Lieven,  Count,  Russian  Ambassador  in 
London,  40-1,  50,  62-3. 

Liverpool,  Lord,  reactionary  tendencies  of, 
120. 

Londonderry,  Marquis  of,  108. 

Louisa  Augusta,  Princess  (Empress  Eliza- 
beth), 4. 

Luxembourg,  Prussian  occupation  of,  27. 

McMaster,  John  B.,  cited,  92,  125. 

Mahmoud,  Sultan;  opinion  of  Holy  Alli- 
ance, 57;  atrocities  of,  against  Russians, 
106. 

Maistre,  Joseph  de,  cited,  40. 

Martens,  Georg  F.  de,  cited,  9,  19-20,  23, 
28,  31,  55,  73. 

Masson,  tutor  of  Alexander,  4. 

Mataxis,  Andrew,  110. 

Mediation:  plan  of  Ferdinand  for,  75  et 
seq.,  83  et  seq.;  Russian  plan  of,  79. 

Metternich,  20,  29,  82;  criticism  of  Alex- 
ander, 2,  55-6;  cited,  25,  32,  37-8; 
at  Congress  of  Vienna,  25  et  seq.;  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle  Congress,  83;  action 
against  Sects  and  Jacobinism,  95-6;  at 
Troppau  Congress,  99;  at  Laybach 
Congress,  102-3;  at  second  Vienna  Con- 
gress, 107;  at  Verona  Congress,  109-10. 

Mexico,  attempt  to  found  Empire  in, 
115-16. 

Middleton,  American  Minister  to  Russia, 
123-24. 

Mikhailowitch,  Grand  Due  Nicolas,  cited, 
4,  22,  26,  30,  41,  104,  130. 

Monroe,  President,  50,  71,  126. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  1,  113,  122. 

Montmiriel,  French  victory  at,  19. 

Montmorency,  113. 

Moore,  John  Bassett,  cited,  60,  93. 

Moscow,  burning  of,  18. 

Muraviev,  tutor  of  Alexander,  4. 

Naples,  Kingdom  of,  102;  activities  of 
Sects  in,  135. 

Napoleon,  11;  Tsar  Paul's  alliance  with,  8; 
Alexander's  opposition  to,  16-7;  in- 
vasion of  Russia  by,  18;  abdication  of,  22, 
33;  return  from  Elba,  27,  32. 


146 


THE   HOLY  ALLIANCE 


Nelson,  English  Admiral,  9. 

Nesselrode,  Comte  de,  cited,  46,  66, 11 ,  88. 

"New  Order,"  theory  of  self-determination, 

12-3. 
Non-colonization,  principle  of,  124-25. 
Non-intercourse  act,  46. 
Novosiltzov,  unofficial  adviser  of  Alexander, 

8;  Instructions  to,  9,  II  et  seq.,  26,  29,  32, 

67,  104. 
Orders  in  Council,  46. 
Pallas,  tutor  of  Alexander,  4. 
Palmella,    Count,     Portuguese    envoy    to 

Aix-la-Chapelle  Congress,  81. 
Paris,  3,  55;  First  Treaty  of,  2,  21  et  seq.; 

Second,  28. 
Parker,  Hyde,  English  Admiral,  9-10. 
Pasquier,  Chancelier  du,  cited,  30,  32,  41, 

71-2,  74,  16,  91  et  seq. 
Paul,  Tsar,  father  of  Alexander,  3;  assassi- 
nation of,  7-8;  alliance  with  Napoleon,  8. 
Pavlovsk,  4. 

Pensacola,  capture  of,  64. 
Peru,  independence  of,  121. 
Phillips,  Walter  Alison,  cited,  11,  20,  22, 

28,72. 
Piedmont,  revolution  in,  104. 
Pinkney,  United  States  Minister  to  Russia, 

49,  63. 
Pitt,  William,  57;  reply  to  Novosiltzov,  12, 

lS-6;   promise   to   support    Russia   and 

Prussia,  18. 
Pizarro,  M.,  Spanish  Minister  of  Affairs, 

65. 
Poland:  proposed  restoration  of,  21,  26,  29; 

Alexander's  policy  in,  56. 
Poletica,  Chevalier,  successor  to  Dashkov, 

53,  80;  efforts  to  join  United  States  to 

Holy  Alliance,  85  et  seq.,  91  et  seq. 
Polignac,     Prince,     French     Ambassador, 

statement  of  French  demands,  118  et  seq. 
Polovstov,  cited,  64  et  seq.,  78. 
Port  Mahon,  proposed  cession  to  Russia  of, 

58. 
Portugal,   109;  participation  in  Treaty  of 

Paris,    23;    proposed    military    measures 

against,  64;  revolution  in,  98;  activities  of 

Sects  in,  135. 
Powers  of  the  North,  Congress  of,  10. 
Pradt,  Abbe  de,  cited,  84. 
Prussia,  1,  97,  136;  participation  in  Con- 
gress of  Powers  of  the  North,  10;  recog- 


nition of  Napoleon,  11;  party  to  Treaty 
of  Reichenbach,  18;  formation  of  federal 
union  in,  21;  occupation  of  Luxembourg, 
27;  opposed  to  international  congresses, 
72;  Liberalism  in,  96. 

Rain,  Pierre,  cited,  3,  5,  18,  24,  28  et  seq., 
106,  114,  130. 

Rambouillet  Decree,  46. 

Reddaway,  William  F.,  cited,  121. 

Reichenbach,  Treaty  of,  2,  18-9. 

Revolutions,  7;  in  Sicily  and  Spain,  97-8; 
in  Portugal,  98;  in  Piedmont,  104. 

Richardson,  James  D.,  cited,  125-26. 

Richelieu,  Duke,  of  51;  French  Minister  at 
Vienna  Congress,  28,  61;  at  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  Congress,  72  et  seq. 

Riego,  leader  of  uprising  in  Spain,  97; 
execution  of,  115. 

Rivadavia,  representative  of  junta  of 
Buenos  Aires,  88. 

Ross,  British  attache,  7. 

Rousseau,  3. 

Rufo,  Chevalier  de,  representative  of 
Naples,  102. 

Rush,  Richard,  American  Ambassador  to 
Great  Britain;  cited,  88;  negotiations 
with  Canning  regarding  colonies,  116  et 
seq.,  125. 

St.  Mark,  capture  of,  64. 

Samborski,  Father  Andrew,  religious  tutor 
of  Alexander,  4. 

Sardinia,  proposed  reestablishment  of 
Kingdom  of,  12-3;  acceptance  of  Holy 
Alliance  by,  47. 

Saxony,  acceptance  of  Holy  Alliance  by,  47. 

Schnitzler,  J.  H.,  cited,  40. 

Schuyler,  Eugene,  cited,  57. 

Schwartzenberg,  Austrian  military  com- 
mander, 19. 

Sects,  revolutionary  societies,  56,  95,  131, 
135-36. 

Serbia,  57. 

Shepherd,  William  R.,  cited,  58. 

Sicily,  revolution  in,  98. 

Slave  trade:  move  to  abolish,  81,  93;  dis- 
cussed at  Verona  Congress,  109. 

Sorel,  Albert,  cited,  1 1-2,  16-7,  19-20,  23^. 

Spain,  136;  restored  to  Bourbons,  21;  party 
to  Treaty  of  Paris,  23;  Alexander's 
policy  toward,  56;  as  an  American  power, 
59;  mediation  with  colonies,  75  et  seq.; 


INDEX 


147 


barred  from  Aix-la-Chapelle  Congress, 
16;  treaty  with  the  United  States,  92; 
Liberalism  and  revolution  in,  97-8;  pro- 
posed invasion  by  France,  113-14;  ac- 
tivities of  Sects  in,  135. 

Speranski,  Governor  of  Siberia,  35,  123. 

Stapleton,  Augustus  G.,  cited,  98,  108-9, 
Wd  et  seq. 

Stein,  Prussian  Liberal  Minister,  56. 

Stewart,  Lord,  representative  of  Great 
Britain  at  Troppau  Congress,  98. 

Strangford,  Lord,  British  Ambassador  at 
Constantinople,  107. 

Stroganov,  Count,  6;  unoflScial  adviser  of 
Alexander,  8;  Russian  Ambassador  to 
Turkey,  105-6;  dismissal  of,  107. 

Stuart,  Sir  Charles,  65. 

Subsidies,  advanced  by  Great  Britain, 
18,  20. 

Sweden:  at  Congress  of  Powers  of  the 
North,  10;  party  to  Treaty  of  Paris,  23. 

Switzerland,  7-8;  as  an  independent  state, 
21 ;  acceptance  of  Holy  Alliance  by,  47. 

System  of  1815,  2,  28,  39,  83,  97. 

Talleyrand:  interview  with  Alexander,  17; 
cited,  20,  22  et  seq.;  formula  of  "legiti- 
macy" of,  26;  dismissal  of,  27-8. 

TatistchefF,  Serge,  cited,  12,  16;  Russian 
Ambassador  to  Spain,  58,  64,  66;  sale 
of  ships  to  Spain  by,  63;  envoy  to  second 
Vienna  Congress,  107. 

Third  Coalition,  15;  defeat  of,  16. 

Tilsit,  alliance  of,  16-17. 

Toeplitz,  Treaty  of,  2,  19,  46,  96. 

Tolstoy,  Grand  Marshal  Count,  24. 

Treaties:  of  Concert,  16;  of  Alliance,  28, 
55,  64.     See  also  individual  headings. 

Troppau,  Congress  at,  98  et  seq.,  135  et 
seq.;  effect  of  Congress  of,  on  English 
policy,  108. 

Tucuman,  Congress  of,  61. 

Turkey:  Alexander's  policy  toward,  57; 
oppression  of  Greeks,  105  et  seq.,  126 
et  seq. 

Tuyll,  Baron  de,  Russian  Minister  to  the 
United    States:    instructions    to,    51-2; 


negotiations  of,  regarding  colonization, 
124. 

United  States:  foreign  policy  of,  1 ;  war  with 
Great  Britain,  26,  93;  attempt  to  draw, 
into  Europeaji  affairs,  44—5;  attitude 
toward  Holy  Alliance,  45  et  seq.,  84  et 
seq.,  104;  Era  of  Good  Feeling  in,  50; 
effort  to  bring,  into  Holy  Alliance,  58, 
78-9,  94;  invasion  of  Florida,  64;  in- 
fluence of,  on  European  affairs,  67; 
proposed  to  membership  in  International 
Maritime  Police,  81-2;  diplomatic  policy 
of,  84  et  seq.;  Treaty  with  Spain,  92. 

Vandal,  Albert,  cited,  16-7. 

Venezuela:  political  and  commercial  con- 
cessions granted  to,  78;  independence  of, 
121. 

Verona,  Congress  of,  34,  108  et  seq. 

Vertus,  37;  review  of  Russian  Army  at,  30, 
40. 

Vienna,  Congress  of,  2,  23  et  seq.,  45,  57,  59, 
71;  second  Congress  of,  107. 

Villanueva,  C.  A.  de,  cited,  60-1,  116. 

Vilieie,  113-14,  127. 

Voltaire,  3. 

Vorontzov,  Russian  Ambassador  to  Great 
Britain,  9. 

Waliszewski,  K.,  cited,  7. 

Warsaw,  Grand  Duchy  of,  proposed  union 
with  Russia,  25. 

Washington,  Treaty  of,  92-3. 

Waterloo,  campaign  of,  27,  30. 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  64-5;  opposition  to 
Allied  General  Staff,  74;  envoy  to  second 
Vienna  Congress,  109,  111;  reactionary 
tendencies  of,  120. 

Westphalia,  Treaty  of,  14. 

World  War,  1. 

Wiirttemberg,  Kingdom  of,  97;  acceptance 
of  Holy  Alliance,  47. 

Young  Liberal  Circle,  object  of,  6;  return  to 
St.  Petersburg  of,  8. 

Ypsilanti,  Alexander,  leader  of  Greek 
revolution,  105. 


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